P L D 1989 Peshawar 36 (PLP)

4. One cannot accept such an interpretation of the role of Returning Officer in accepting or rejecting the nomination paper at the time of scrutiny. Section 14 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976, provides as follows:‑ "14(2) The Returning Officer shall, in the presence of the persons attending the scrutiny under subsection (1), examine the nomination papers and decide any objection raised by any such person to any nomination. (3) The Returning Officer may, either of his own motion or upon any objection, conduct such summary enquiry as he may think fit and may reject 'a nomination paper if he is satisfied that‑ (a) the candidate is not qualified to be elected as a member; (b) Omitted. (c) any provision of section 12 or section 13 has not been complied with; or (d) Omitted." Even an appeal before the appellate forum is to be summarily decided as laid down in subsection (5) of section 14 of the aforesaid Act.

5. It is quite evident from the above‑quoted provisions of law that an objection to the nomination papers attracts a summary enquiry on the part of Returning Officer. Such a summary enquiry, to be held within the limited period chalked out in the statutory pre‑election schedule, cannot encompass the ramifications of a full‑blooded judicial proceedings.

6. In this respect, the learned Judge of the High Court, sitting in appeal from the order of Returning Officer, acted in accordance with law when he disregarded highly technical objection raised by the Returning Officer in relation to the material placed before him, A and evaluated the same after hearing both the parties. The requirements of law, both substantive and procedural, were amply complied with and the matter was disposed of in more judicial a manner than is expected in a summary enquiry. The learned Judge had before him a detailed report of the Police authority from Karachi duly recognised by the local Police of Kohat, listing nearly twenty‑five criminal cases registered against the petitioner, resulting in his conviction in most of them. The cases, inter alia, involve offences of Gambling, Prohibition and under Sind Crime Control Act. The nature of involvement of the petitioner in such eases was obviously of moral turpitude. Above all, it has not been denied that the petitioner is a history‑sheeter with the Nazim Abad Police Station. The impact of the aforesaid material was elaborately made out by the learned appellate Judge after examining law and judicial precedents on the subject. The conclusions drawn were that the Petitioner's conduct disqualified him from contesting elections under Clauses (d) (f) & (g) of Article 62 of the Constitution and Clauses (d), (f) & (g) of the amended subsection (1) of section 99 of the Representation of the People Act, 1976.

7. The learned counsel also relied upon a Supreme Court judgment in appeal, Raja Muhammad Afzal v. Ch. Muhammad Altaf Hussain and others reported in 1986 S C M R 1736. The precedent so cited we are afraid, is of no avail to him. On the contrary, in the said case, the Hon'able Judges of the Supreme Court acknowledged the summary nature of the enquiry under section 14 of the Representation of the People Act. The point involved therein was different and the question of procedural requirements before an Election Tribunal established under the lawn post‑election period was involved. It has no relevance to the summary enquiry conducted during the scrutiny of the nomination papers.

8. We have, also, serious misgivings about the petitioner's decision to approach us with a Constitutional petition. The process of election flows in its own pre‑determined course. It has its limited period and set rules of game. It has its own area of ventilating grievances and exclusive forums for meeting those grievances. An undesirable practice has developed over the recent years, which has been deprecated time and again by the superior Courts of our country, that after exhausting, and sometimes before exhausting, the statutory remedies 13 provided by law the premises of High Courts are invaded for then settlement of disputed questions of fact. Such a practice not only defeats the purpose for which the statutory forums of exclusive jurisdiction are created, but the orderly process of important national events, as in this case is unjustifiably and unnecessary obstructed. I Article 199 of the Constitution certainly does not envisage the issuance of directions in such a situation. The jurisdictional threshold of this Court is not to be crossed to review the decisions of forums or Courts of fact in the field of their exclusive domain unless they transgress their own jurisdictional frontiers chalked out for them by a Statute.

9. In the case in hand too we have been asked to scrutinize the questions of fact, duly concluded by a forum comprising of a Judge of the High Court, relating to the disqualifications of the petitioner. We decline to do so, specially when the said forum has in arriving at its conclusions met all the requirements of law without suffering from any jurisdictional defects.

10. In the circumstances we dismiss this petition in limine. A.A./657/P Petition dismissed.