1986 PLP 1385 (MLD)

2. The respondent Mst. Shagufta had filed this ejectment application alleging that deceased Muhammad Suleman, the predecessor of remaining appellants and his son respondent No.1, Iqbal Suleman, had taken Shops Nos.2 and 4 on Plot III‑E‑23 Nazimabad, Karachi, which were owned by the respondent on a rent of Rs.100 per month. The respondent has alleged that her son has an intention to start his own business in these shops and has no other place of business, therefore, both these shops are required by the respondents for the bona fide use of her son. It has been further alleged in the application that the appellants have locked that shops and have shifted their business to some other place and are not occupying the same for the last more than 4 months without any reason. Hence she was prayed for their ejectment. 3.The application was contested by the appellants who filed written‑statement. In the written‑statement they admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. They also admitted the rate of rent. They have, however, denied that the respondent requires the shops for bona fide use and occupation of her son. They have alleged that the respondent is greedy woman and had demanded the enhancement of rent. On the refusal of the appellants to yield to the demand she filed an Ejectment Case (No.390/73), against the appellants on the false grounds of default and subletting. The said ejectment application was dismissed by the 1st appellate authority. The respondents did not file second appeal. When her above attempt to coerce the if appellants failed, she filed present application for ejectment on the false pretext of requirement of these shops for the use of her son.

4. The parties filed their respective affidavits and that of their witnesses. They then cross‑examined one another, other and the each other witnesses.

5. The learned Controller took up the issue regarding the requirement of the shops by the respondents for the bona fide use‑of her son for determination and decided the issue in favour of the respondents.

6. During the course of appeal it was decided to allow examination of Dr. Abdul Aziz, as a witness for the appellants. His evidence has been recorded today and he has been cross‑examined by the respondent's counsel, as well as, some questions were also put to him by the Court.

7. I have heard Mr. S. Qutubuddin Ahmed, Advocate for the appellants and Mr. Qaiser Qureshi, Advocate for the respondents at length.

8. The respondents had filed the affidavit of her son and attorney Muhammad Saleem. He had stated that he had completed his studies and intended to start his own business of establishing of a printing press and, therefore, required these 2 shops for his bona‑fide use. He was cross‑examined at length. He denied the suggestion that the respondents wanted to enhance the rent and had therefore, filed this case to pressurise the appellants. The appellants alleged that the respondent's son was in occupation of Shop No.3 which she had rented out subsequent to the filing of this ejectment application to one Dr.Abdul Aziz. Dr. Abdul Aziz, was examined by the Court on the application of the appellants as shown above. He has not supported the case of the appellants. Although he admitted that he had entered into the possession of Shop No.3 in 1982, but he denied that the respondents or her son Muhammad. Saleem had given him the possession thereof. He stated that one Iqbal had given him the possession of his shop on Pugri, subsequently he had executed the rent agreement in favour of the respondents. He also denied the knowledge of the facts that respondent s; son was occupying the shop before he entered into its possession. Dr. Abdul Aziz is witness of the appellants. He was not declared hostile by the appellants' counsel. His evidence against the appellants is therefore, to be believed.

9. The appellant s evidence in the trial Court was mostly of the denial of the need of the shops, by the respondents on and the allegations that this ground was mala‑fide and it was urged only as a lever to coerce the appellants to enhance the rent.

10. Mr.Qutubuddin, Advocate pointed out that in the ejectment application the name of the son of the respondent was not mentioned nor it was mentioned as to what business he wanted to carry on in those shops.

11. I do not find any merit in any one of the contentions of the: appellant's counsel. By now it is a settled law that this ejectment application need not contain unnecessary details 'such as the name o the son for whom the premises are required or the business which that son wants to start. It is enough if it is mentioned in the application that the premises is required for a bona fide personal use. Such details can be left for the stage of evidence. In this connection it will be useful to reproduce the following passage from the case Toheed Khanum v. Muhammad Shamshad, reported in 1980 S C M R 593. "Again the High Court feel' into an error when it placed under reliance on the fact that the nature of the business was not stated in the application and we are surprised to note that the High Court has held that the first appellate Court had, on a proper assessment of the evidence reached the conclusion that the requirement was not genuine although this exercise was not done by that Court, apart from giving credit to the improper motive in filding the application which consideration also prevailed with the High Court. " Further, neither the first Appellate Court nor the High Court has held the evidence of the appellants witnesses to be false or in any‑ way lacking in any essential respect for establishing the plea; and as to how the evidence was insufficient we are unable to gather from the finding of the first appellate Court. The reliance on the Peshawar case was inapt as in that case, after the assessment of the evidence it was held that the landlord had merely expressed his desire to have the premises for the use of his children which is not the case here for substantial reconsiderations have been stated for acquiring the shop for her jobless son. "Lastly, the High Court has failed to give due effect to section 13(4) of the Ordinance which provides as safeguard to the tenant in case the landlord fails to occupy the shop for business in which case the tenant can obtain possession as provided therein. It is true that independently of this provision, the Rent Controller has to satisfy himself that the requirement of clause (a) of section 13(3)(ii) is fulfilled and if upon the evidence he is so satisfied then there can hardly be any room for denying the relief to the landlord; and in case of any lapse in his part, section 13(4) can be pressed into service." In another case Zahooruddin v. Ayub Baig, reported in 1981 SCMR 1081, the Hon'ble Judge of the Supreme Court have held:‑‑ "Where in the ejectment application the landlord does not mention that he needed the disputed portion of the house, for the residence of his son, who was to be married soon, this omission by itself would not be fatal to his case. Clause i(a) of subsection 3(a) of section 13 of the Rent Restriction Ordinance permits a landlord to apply for the ejectment of his tenant if he requires the residential building in good faith for his own occupation or for the occupation of any of his children. It would be seen that the requirement of his children is really in the nature of an extension of the personal requirement of the landlord himself, as the property does not belong to his children and yet the law permits him to ask for its vacation if it is needed for their occupation in good faith. It follows, therefore, that even if in the ejectment application it is not specifically stated that the requirement is for the occupation of any of his children, a landlord would still be entitled to spell out this need in evidence. Similarly the allegation made by the appellant that the respondent had demanded the enhancement of the rent in the past even if it is assumed to be true, does not necessarily lead the Court to the conclusion that the appellant's plea that he required the premises for his bona fide Dersonal use was mala fide or false. The above case of Toheed Khanum had almost similar facts as the present case. in that case also the previous ejectment application eras filed on the ground of default in payment of rent it was dismissed. The Supreme Court did not agree with the contention that such dismissed would lead to the conclusion that the subsequent application was mala‑fide. I am, therefore, of the clear view that the respondent require that the shops in question for the personal bona fide use and her son Muhammad Saleem, for establishing printing press. However, if the appellants apprehension that the requirements is mala fide has got an footing there are sufficient safeguard provided in the rent laws to deal with an unscrupulous landlord who had, after getting the premises vacated on the ground of bona fide personal use, given it on higher rent to any other tenant. These are reasons for which I had dismissed the appeal by my order, dated 19‑3‑1986. A.A. Appeal dismissed.