P L D 1955 Lahore 562 (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.--‑This order will dispose of Civil Revisions Nos. 1 to 9 of 1955 and 12 of 1955, in all of which the point involved is the same. The respondents in all these revision petitions are the same. They had obtained orders of ejectment under the Urban Rent Restriction Act against the different petitioners in these revision petitions. Applications for execution of the orders for ejectment were submitted in all cases to the Senior Civil judge, but before they were filed the Urban Rent Restriction Act, section 17 of which authorised a Civil Court to execute the orders of ejectment as decrees, had expired. Objection was taken on behalf of: the petitioners that after the expiry of the Act the orders were not executable in a Civil Court. This is the only point to be decided in all these revision petitions. Section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Act, under which the order of ejectment passed by a Rent Controller could be executed by a Civil Court, runs :‑ "Every order made under section 10, or section 13, and every order passed on appeal or revision under section 15 shall be executed by a Civil Court having jurisdiction in the area as if it were a decree of that Court." The argument which prevailed before the learned Senior Civil Judge and which was accepted on appeal by the learned District Judge was that as soon as an order of ejectment was passed the landlord acquired the right to get it executed as a decree in a Civil Court and the expiry of the Act did not effect a right which already vested in him. A simple approach to the matter is this. Whenever a Court is approached for the exercise of a particular jurisdic tion there must be some provision of law under which it can exercise that jurisdiction. The Court is now being asked to execute an order of ejectment passed by the Rent Controller. What is the provision under which the Court can execute this order ? Section 17 has expired. There is no provision in the Civil Procedure Code or any other law empowering a Court to proceed in this behalf. There is no doubt that had the Urban Rent Restriction Act been a permanent statute, the result might have been different in view of section 6 of the General Clauses Act which runs: "Where this Act, or any Central Act or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, repeals any enactment hitherto made or hereafter to be made, then, unless a diffe rent intention appears, the repeal shall not‑ (a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect ; or (b) affect the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; or (c) affect any right, privilege obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any enactment so re pealed ; or (d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any enactment so repealed ; or (e) affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid ; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the Repealing Act or Regulation had not been passed." Any legal proceeding or remedy can, by virtue of this section, be "instituted" or "enforced" in spite of a repeal: But it must be understood that this provision does not embody aryl general principle governing statutes and will only apply to cases which are within its wording. It applies to repeals and the case on the expiry of a temporary statute is not a case of repeal. We are dealing here with the Urban Rent Restriction, Act section 1 (3) of which provides that it will remain in force for a period of two years. As has been held in Crown v. Havels (P L D 1949 Lah. 550 (F. B.)) the general principle accepted in. England, India and Pakistan is that a statute, temporary or permanent, is deemed after its termination never to have existed except for transactions past and closed. If expired statute is to have any further effect that has to be provided for by the legislature. In the case of a temporary statute, the statute itself may make a provisional for its effect after its expirl', for a temporary statute envisages its expiry. In the case of a repealed statute, its effect after its repeal may be saved either by the Act which repeals or by some general provision. In the case of a permanent statute, its effect after its repeal is saved to the extent mentioned in section 6 of the General Clauses act. Section 6 however, does not apply to temporary statutes which are not repealed but expire. They are, therefore, within the general principle of law that after expiry they are deemed never to exist except for transactions past and closed. It is not correct to say that the landlords acquired on account of orders of ejectment a right to get the orders of ejectment executed as decrees by a Civil Court. Section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Act did not say that the order would amount to a decree passed by a Civil Court. B It simply provided that the order shall be executed as if it is a decree which is entirely different thing from saying that the order would become a decree. The authority of a Civil Court to execute this order existed only under section 17 of the Urban Rent Restriction Act. Had the order amounted to a decree the Civil Court could have had jurisdiction to execute it on account of the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, which empowers it to execute decrees. I may point out that even in that case also there would have been difficulties in the way of execution in the absence of any procedural, provision applicable at the time when the order was sought to be executed because a decree can, under the Civil Procedure Code, be executed either by the Court which passed it or by the Court to which it is transferred. The Court which passed the decree is no longer in existence. In fact it has been held by a Full Bench of this Court that the Rent Controller is not a Court at all. In order that an ordinary Civil Court may execute a decree it would have first to be transferred by the Court which passed it. Again the difficulty would be there that the tribunAl which passed it was not a Court and did not exist for transferring the decree. I hold that the Urban Rent Restriction Act having expired there is no jurisdiction in the Civil Court to execute an order, of ejectment passed by it. All these revision petitions are accepted but there is no order as to costs. A. H.Petitions accepted.