SCMR 1992

1992 PLP 683 (SCMR)

GAO LABORATORIES LIMITED‑‑‑Petitioner Versus INSPECTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF

Jurisdiction / Court
Supreme Court of Pakistan
Decided Date
Civil Petition for Leave to Appeal No.429‑K of 1991, decided on 14th
Honorable Judges
Sajjad Ali Shah and Saleem Akhtar, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1992 PLP 683 (SCMR)
Forum / Court Supreme Court of Pakistan
Bench Members Sajjad Ali Shah and Saleem Akhtar, JJ
Parties GAO LABORATORIES LIMITED‑‑‑Petitioner Versus INSPECTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF
Primary Law Income‑tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1992 PLP 683 (SCMR)?

This judgment primarily cites: Income‑tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1992 PLP 683 (SCMR)?

The case was heard and decided by the Supreme Court of Pakistan bench comprising: Sajjad Ali Shah and Saleem Akhtar, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1992 PLP 683 (SCMR) (GAO LABORATORIES LIMITED‑‑‑Petitioner Versus INSPECTING ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Income‑tax Ordinance (XXXI of 1979)‑‑

Representation

  • Fatehali W. Vellani Advocate Supreme Court and Majida Razvi, Advocate‑on‑Record for Petitioner. .
  • Shaikh Haider, Advocate Supreme Court and S.M. Abbas, Advocate on‑Record for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing: 14th November, 1991.

Headnotes / Summary

November, 1991. (On appeal from the judgment and order of the High Court of Sindh dated 24‑10‑1991 passed in C.P.No.D‑384 of 1991) ‑‑‑‑S. 66‑A‑‑‑Constitution of Pakistan (1973), Art. 185(3)‑‑‑Leave to appeal was granted to consider the questions which required interpretation of S. 66‑A namely whether upon the appellate order being made on the appeal from the original assessment order, the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner had jurisdiction under S. 66‑A to revise the original assessment and whether upon the appellate order being made the original assessment order merged with the appellate order according to doctrine of merger with the consequence that there was then no longer available an order of the Incometax Officer capable of revision under S. 66‑A of the Ordinance. Khalid Malik and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLD 1991 Kar. 1; Commissioner of Incometax, East Zone, Karachi v. Atta Muhammad Faiz 1985 PTO 874; Messrs Gojer Brothers (P.) Ltd., v. Shri Ratan Lal Singh AIR 1974 SC L3W; Commissioner of Incometax, Bombay v. AIR 1958 SC 868; State of Madras v. Madural Mills Co. Ltd., AIR 1967 SC 681; Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Incometax (Central) 1990 PTO 90 and Commissioner of Incometax, East Pakistan, Dacca v. Wahiduzzaman 1965 PTO 283 ref.

Judgment & Decree

SALEEM AKHTAR, J.‑‑‑The petitioner seeks leave to appeal against the judgment of the High Court of Sindh passed in C.P. No.D‑384 of 1991 dismissing the petition in which the notice dated 18‑3‑1991 issued by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner of Incometax, Range‑I, Companies‑I, Karachi, under section 66‑A of the Incometax Ordinance was challenged.

2. The assessment for the year 1987‑88 was completed under section 62 of the Incometax Ordinance by assessment order dated 31‑5‑1988. The petitioner filed an appeal to the Commissioner of Incometax (Appeals), Zone 2, Karachi, which was partly allowed by an order dated 30th July, 1988. The department being dissatisfied with the said order appealed to the Incometax Appellate Tribunal which was withdrawn and consequently dismissed. The petitioner had also filed appeal against the appellate order passed by the Commissioner of Incometax (Appeals) which is pending before the Tribunal. After dismissal of the appeal filed by the department petitioner's case was reopened under section 65 of the Incometax Ordinance as it was found that the Incometax Officer had completely ignored to tax the receipts of Rs.130 million shown as extraordinary receipts in the debit accounts of the petitioner. This, according to the petitioner, was received on sale of technical and marketing know how and sale of their rights in trade mark and related goodwill. By an assessment order dated 24‑6‑1989 this receipt was brought to tax as capital gains. The petitioner filed an appeal but it was dismissed. The petitioner then filed further appeal before the Tribunal and it was held that proceedings initiated under section 65 of the Ordinance were illegal and without jurisdiction. Consequently the assessment made by reopening the case was cancelled and the original assessment order passed by the I.T.O. was restored. Thereafter the respondent by its notice dated 18‑3‑1991 addressed to the petitioner notified his intention to cancel the original assessment made by the I.T.O. under section 66A of the Ordinance. This notice was challenged by filing Constitution Petition which was dismissed by the impugned judgment. Section 66A reads as follows.‑

"66A. Powers of Inspecting Assistant Commissioner to revise Incometax Officer's order. (1) The Inspecting Assistant Commissioner may call for and examine the record of any proceedings under this Ordinance, and if he considers that any order passed therein by the Incometax Officer is erroneous m so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of revenue, he may, after giving the assessee an opportunity of being heard and after making, or causing to be made, such enquiry as he deems necessary, pass‑such order thereon as the circumstances of the case justify, including an order enhancing or modifying the assessment, or cancelling the assessment and directing a fresh assessment to be made. (2) No order under subsection (1) shall be made after the expiry of four years from the date of the order sought to be revised."

3. The main contention of the petitioner was and has been repeated here that after filing appeal by the petitioner against the assessment order and after the appellate order had been passed the said assessment order merged with the appellate order and there was nothing left for the purposes of invoicing section 66A. According to the learned counsel section 66‑A can be invoked only against the assessment order passed by the Incometax Officer and no other order. The Division Bench of the High Court considered the principles of merger as enunciated in (1) Khalid Malik and others v. Federation of Pakistan and others PLO 1991 Karachi 1. (2) Commissioner of Incometax, East Zone, Karachi v. Atta. Muhammad Faiz, 1985 PTD 874. (3) Messrs Gojer Brothers (P.) Ltd. v. Shri Ratan Lal Singh, AIR 1974 SC 1380. (4) Commissioner of Incometax, Bombay v. Messrs Amritlal Bhotitlal and Co. AIR 1958 SC 868. (5) State of Madras v. Madural Mills Co. Ltd. AIR 1967 SC 681. (6) Hindustan Aluminium Corporation Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income tax (Central), 1990 PTD 90.

4. The judgment in the case of Commissioner of Incometax, East Pakistan, Dacca v. Wahiduzzaman, 1965 PTD 283, which is the judgment of our Supreme Court in which the question whether the provision of res judicate could be applied in relation to the decision of Incometax authorities was discussed and illucitated was referred. Relying on Amritlal Bhogitlal and Co.'s case and Madurai Mills' case it was observed as follows:‑- "We would further like to add that before the said doctrine of merger can be extended to cases arising out of the decisions given by the Incometax authorities, it must first be considered, whether the decision was reached after holding of a proper enquiry and after consideration of all the relevant aspects of the case. Otherwise any defect found in the decision can be rectified by invoking the relevant provisions of the Incometax Ordinance. We are fortified in this view by the observations made by our Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner of Incometax v. Wahiduzzaman, referred to earlier in this judgment. No doubt, in this case the question was as to the application of the principle of res judicate, but the proceedings in the instant case being of the same nature, the legal principle enunciated by the Supreme Court would be equally applicable. We are, accordingly, unable to agree with Mr. Vellani's contention that the doctrine of merger applies to the present case." The learned counsel for the petitioner has raised the following questions:‑-- "(1) Whether upon the appellate order being made on the appeal from the I original assessment order the Respondents have jurisdiction under section 66A of the Incometax Ordinance, 1979 to revise the original assessment order. (2) Whether upon the appellate order being made the original assessment order merged with the appellate order according to the doctrine of merger with the consequence that there is then no longer available an order of the Incometax Officer capable of revision under section 66A of the Incometax Ordinance, 1979."

5. These questions require interpretation of section 66A and are of general legal importance. We grant leave. Security Rs.3,

000. M.BA./G‑348/S Leave granted.