2018 PLP 188 (YLRN)

QAZI MUHAMMAD AMIN AHMED, J.

Jalil Ahmad Khan, petitioner herein, an Advocate by profession, is complainant in a case of murderous assault registered vide FIR No.653 with Police Station Sabzi Mandi, Gujranwala; it is alleged that on the eventful day i.e. 14-10-2017, at 7:40 a.m, accompanied by Khalil Ahmad and Muhammad Nawaz, PW, he was on way to Lahore when the respondents accompanied by eight unknown persons, variously armed, confronted the entourage and after encircling their vehicle, opened indiscriminate fire, resulting into massive damage to the vehicle and an injury to a passerby, namely, Muhammad Nawaz. Motive for the crime is previous enmity raging between the parties on account of multiple murders. As the investigation progressed, the petitioner moved application to the learned Area Magistrate at Gujranwala for issuance of a direction to the Investigating Officer for the inclusion of sections 6 and 7 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997, henceforth referred to as the Act, disposed of in the following terms:- "Record reveals that petitioner has already submitted application for adding offences under sections 6/7 ATA before Investigating Officer. I.O. has submitted that he shall add the offences after recording the version of the petitioner as per contents of FIR. With this observation, application is disposed off and I.O. is directed to record version of the petitioner and add the offence under sections 6/7 ATA if the same are made out, otherwise, to proceed further in accordance with law." Constructing observation ibid as a command for inclusion of offences prayed for, a direction by this Court is being sought in its Constitutional jurisdiction, to the Station House Officer to invoke the above penal provisions of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that reckless indiscriminate firing by the respondents, in broad daylight, at a thoroughfare, resulting into injuries to an innocent passerby not only struck terror but was also capable of creating a sense of fear and insecurity amongst the public at large and thus was, squarely cognizable under Section 6 of the Act; adds that the complainant in his professional robes was on way to a Court at Lahore and as such additionally a case stands made out for respondents' trial in special jurisdiction. Places reliance upon the cases of Zia Ullah v. Special Judge Anti-Terrorist Court Faisalabad and 7 others (2002 SCMR 1225) and Shahbaz Khan alias Tipu and others v. Special Judge Anti-Terrorism Court; Lahore No.3 and others (PLD 2016 Supreme Court 1)

2. Heard.

3. The Act has been enacted to provide a speedy mechanism for prevention of cases of terrorism, involving sectarian violence and heinous offences, scheduled therein. Insofar as impact of violence is concerned, it invariably, in each case, inspires awe and fear on surroundings as its concomitance and this alone by itself would not be sufficient to bring every act of violence within the ambit of section 6 of the Act. Jurisprudence so far evolved is more pointed upon the designs for which violence is resorted and consequent purposes to be achieved thereupon, thus, notwithstanding the magnitude of violence, run of the mill criminal cases involving settlement of personal scores fall outside the ambit of the Act. It is complainant's own case that the respondents lodged a case of homicide against him and his brothers and that he along with PWs was on way to attend proceedings therein at Lahore when they came under assault motive cited in the crime report is a reference to yet another murder case wherein complainant's younger brother Farooq Ahmad was allegedly murdered by the respondents, therefore, it can be safely concluded that the alleged assault was not for the achievement of purposes contemplated by the Act. Reliance is placed on the case of Amjad Ali and others v. The State (PLD 2017 Supreme Court 661), relevant portion whereof is advantageously reproduced:-- "We note in that context that a mere firing at one's personal enemy in the backdrop of a private vendetta or design does not ipso facto bring the case within the purview of Section 6 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 1997 so as to brand the action as terrorism. ". Same is the view taken in the case of Waris Ali and others v. The State (2017 SCMR 1572), reproduced below:- "In the present case, besides many infirmities highlighted in the earlier paras of the judgment, it appears that the noose was thrown wider, the act/acts, the crimes committed and executed were the consequence of personal motive and in the course of the transaction no element of terrorism defined by Legislature was involved, although it was gruesome in nature, however, the punishment provided under section 302(a) and (b), P. P.C. is also death sentence besides compensation too was awardable under section 544-A, Cr.P.C. therefore, in the matter of punishment there is no marked distinction, if the penal provision of P.P.C. is applied. The parties are having a blood feud since long and the objection to be achieved was to take revenge for the previous murder and attempted murder, therefore, in our considered view, both the Courts below have not taken due care by applying correct provision of law to the established facts of the case. The construction on the provision of Anti-Terrorism Act and the principle laid down in the cases cited at the bar i.e. Shahbaz Khan alias Tippu v. Special Judge Anti Terrorism Court, No.11, Lahore (PLD 2016 SC 951) proceeds on different premises, both legal and factual and are not attracted to the facts and circumstances qf the present case. Cases cited at the bar are based upon facts vastly distinguishable from the case in hand, as loss of life in the wake of magnitude of violence in those incidents is not comparable with the case in hand wherein the petitioner and his companions survived the assault unscathed, albeit injury to an unsuspecting pedestrian. Similarly mere incidence of a crime at a public place, ipso facto would not bring the event within the mischief of section 6 of the Act. Argument that the petitioner being an advocate, assaulted while being in the uniform, the case should be tried in special jurisdiction, is beside the mark inasmuch as the statute conferred no such status on him and thus, the same cannot be imported on the touchstone of his being a structural component of our system of administration of justice; admittedly, he was on way to attend Court proceedings as an accused. The case is still at an investigative stage and this court has traditionally exercised restraint to interfere with investigative processes in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction and this is yet another reason to dismiss this petition. Writ Petition No.98471 of 2017 fails. Petition dismissed in limine. JK/J-18/L Petition dismissed.