1987 PLP 1888 (CLC)

Being dissatisfied with the result, the petitioners submitted a representation to the Deputy Commissioner, Khanewal, requesting for suspension of the said Resolution. But their request was turned down by the Deputy Commissioner with the observation that; "There is no justification of suspension of resolution particularly in view of the fact that for the administrative grip over the staff it is required that the Chairman should be vested with sufficient powers to proceed against the subordinate staff."

2. Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the present petition. The ground on which the validity of resolution, dated 22‑11‑1986 is challenged is that the respondent No. 2 was interested in the matter of delegation of powers in question in his favour and taking part in the proceedings, dated 22‑11‑1986 as Chairman and by voting therein he acted in contravention of Rule 6 of the Punjab Local Councils (Conduct of Members) Rules, 1981 and on that score the said Resolution was void in law,. Rule 6 is reproduced below:‑ "Rule 6.‑‑ No member shall, having any interest, directly or indirectly in any matter to be considered by the Local Council, take part in the proceedings of the local council at a meeting in which such matter comes up for discussion nor shall he vote in respect of such matters."

3. In support of his thesis that respondent No. 2 being a member having interest in delegation of powers in favour of Chairman was disqualified to vote, the learned counsel for the petitioners relied on the following quotation from P.179 of Osbern's Law Dictionary (4th Edition). "Interest.‑‑A person is said to have interest in a thing when he has right, title, advantages, duties, liabilities connected with it whether present or future ascertained or provided they are not to remote." The learned Assistant Advocate‑General, however, controverted the assertion advanced on behalf of the petitioners by pointing out that delegation of powers not being in favour of respondent No. 2 personally, Rule 6 was not applicable.

4. It is undeniable that delegation of powers was not made in the personal name of respondent No.

2. It was in fact made with reference to the official designation of Chairman and as such as delegation was to enure for the benefit of all incumbent of that office. That being so, the voting by respondent No. 2 in favour of delegation of powers was undoubtedly intended to serve only an official interest. In these circumstances, the question is whether voting by Chairman comes within the mischief of Rule 6 I have no hesitation in answering the above question in the negative. To my mind, the interest spoken of in Rule 6 is personal interest as distinguished from interest held in official capacity. It seems that the idea underlying Rule 6 is to ensure against biased voting under the influence of personal motive. It is to be pointed out that the object of such provisions in Municipal Laws is to preserve the sanctity of civic duty by making its performance uninfluenced by personal considerations and to prevent conflict between official duty and personal interest. Where, therefore, there is no personal interest involved in a case the application of such provision is not attracted. The instant case does not involve any such personal consideration in so far as the Chairman is concerned. As such, I am clear in my mind that the case does not fall within the purview of Rule 6 and the action of respondent No. 2 in participating and voting in the relevant meeting is not hit by the prohibitive provision thereof. Moreover, if the interest sought to be attributed to respondent No. 2 to have the said powers by virtue of office were to be treated is sufficient to disqualify him to vote then the opposite interest attributable to members who voted against the Resolution (i.e. the petitioners) to retain the powers in question with themselves by virtue of being members of the Committee should equally disqualify them from taking part and voting in such proceedings. On the latter view, the result will be the nullification of the statutory provision empowering delegation of powers and the creation of a deadlock. An interpretation of a statutory Rule which may lead to nullification of a statutory provision and a deadlock in the operation thereof cannot be adopted.

5. The learned counsel has referred to Rule 5 of the said Punjab Local Councils (Conduct of Members) Rules, 1981 to urge that since personal interest is provided therein as a disqualifying factor for voting, Rule 6 of the said Rules cannot be restricted in its application to personal interest. I am afraid, I am unable to persuade myself to accept this argument. Rule 5 deals with a particular case in which a member holds pecuniary interest arising out of contract etc. and Rule 6 is general in scope, dealing with categories of interest other than contractual i.e. interest of property etc. Nothing contained in?Rule 5, can operate to detract from the validity of the proposition propounded above to the effect that Rule 6 is restricted in its application to a case where a member holds interest personal as distinguished from official capacity.

6. The learned counsel for the petitioner lastly attempted to argue that the Chairman could not cast his casting vote as there is no provision in the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979 whereas such a provision existed in the Municipal Act, 1911 as? contained in section 29 thereof and according to the learned counsel this omission in the Ordinance, 1979 was intentional. The contention has no merits. The model regulations for conduct of business framed under Municipal Administration Ordinance, 1960 and Rule 15(3) of the Town Committee Tulamba (Conduct of Business) Regulations, 1961, framed under the Repealed Laws make provision to that effect. These Regulations have been. continued by operation of section 168 of the Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979, thus the objection raised by learned counsel for the petitioners is fully met by the above provision.

7. I hold, therefore, that in the absence of any personal interest attributable to respondent No. 2, he was not disqualified from participating in and voting in proceedings resulting in the said B resolution, dated 22‑11‑1986. Consequently the said Resolution was perfectly valid.

8. In the result, the Constitutional Petition is without substance and is dismissed accordingly. However, in the circumstances of the case, I leave the parties to bear their own costs. K . B . A . / M‑297 / L???????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? Petition dismissed.