1993 PLP 460 (PLC)

DECISION The appellant was an employee of the respondents as a Senior Technician. He was served with a charge‑sheet on 6‑8‑1989, as he was alleged to have been involved in a case of gold smuggling. He has replied to the same on 12‑8‑1989. The enquiry against him is stated to have been ex parte; and he was dismissed from service on 6‑8‑1989. The police was also seized of the matter and the challan was submitted against him before the Court of Special Judge, Customs and Taxation wherein he was acquitted on 14‑5‑1990.

2. It was after this acquittal that the appellant had made a Representation before the authorities on 19‑6‑1990 which came to be rejected on 7‑10‑1990. Thereafter, on 28‑10‑1990 he had served a notice under section 80 of the C.P.C. which was replied to on 24‑10‑1991.

3. The Labour Laws were made applicable to the employees of the P.I.A. on 2‑11‑1989, and the grievance notice was given on 15‑2‑1991. As there was no redressal of his grievances, the petition came to be riled, in the Labour Court.

4. A grievance was made in the petition that the respondents did not care to wait for the outcome of the Criminal Case and had held the enquiry without providing a proper hearing to the petitioner. It went on to say that the cause of action had arisen on 6‑8‑1989 when the petitioner came to be dismissed and thereafter on 14‑5‑1991. '

5. The petition came to be resisted by the P.I.A. It was urged in the Written Reply, that the proceedings against the petitioner were in strict conformity with the Regulation No. 88 of the P.I.A. Act, 1956 and it was open to him to prefer an appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal, which was not done. It was therefore contended that the petition did not lie as the Industrial Relations Ordinance had been made applicable only from 2‑11‑1989 Otherwise too, the petition was barred by time. The other allegations came to be denied.

6. It appears that an application came to be riled before the Labour Court to take up the legal objections for preliminary hearing before any evidence was led in the case. The prayer was granted, resulting in the impugned order.

7. It appears that after the issuance of the show‑cause notice, service whereof has not been denied, the appellant was taken up with the criminal proceeding. Nothing is known for definite as to when he was arrested and when he came to be enlarged on bail. For aught we know, he says that he had made repeated representations to the respondents. He has not put any document, but .the record indicates that there was an appeal preferred by him before the Chairman which was rejected on 7‑10‑1991.

8. However, once the judgment of acquittal came from the Court of Special Judge Customs he stirred into activity. There was a representation made by him on 19‑6‑1991, a notice under section 80, C.P.C. followed on 28‑10‑1991, and thereafter came the grievance notice on 13‑12‑1991. It was mooted out therein that the cause of action would arise after the announcement of the judgment. The petition went further and mentioned that the cause of action accrued firstly on 6‑8‑1989 when the applicant was illegally removed from service, thereafter on 14‑5‑1991 when he was acquitted at the trial, then on 24‑11‑1991 when the legal notice was replied to by the respondent Corporation, and finally on 13‑2‑1992 when the grievance notice was given.

9. In my humble opinion the cause of action had arisen on the day when he was removed from service and his appeal against the removal had been dismissed by the Chairman. The contention that the cause of action accrued also from the acquittal at the trial is totally misconceived.

10. A criminal trial is a matter between the subject and the State and the domestic enquiry is a matter between the subject and subject, which in the case are the employer and the employee and the twain have independent existence of their own sons (sic) any overlapping. It is a trite proposition of law that a criminal prosecution does not bar a domestic enquiry and therefore if the PIA decided to proceed with the enquiry and had done all that could possibly be done to apprise the appellant of their intention to proceed against him, it was his bounded duty to partake in the same and if he failed to do so he has to thank himself for the consequences.

11. However, irrespective of the merit whether the P.I.A. was justified or not justified in commencing the proceedings‑‑ and I am of the opinion that it was perfectly justified‑‑‑looking to the scheme of section 25‑A of I.R.O. the grievance had to be brought to the notice of respondents within three months, after his dismissal was confirmed. The grievance notice came on 13‑12‑1991 and it does not meet the requirement of law. Reference maybe made to the case of National Bank of Pakistan v. MA. Rehman Baig 1991 PLC page 132.

12. I would have preferred the learned Presiding Officer to have allowed evidence to be led in the case as fragmentary disposal can lead to protracted litigation some time. But in the circumstances of the case, to my mind, it would have been nothing but an easy in futility.

13. I will, therefore, uphold the order and dismiss the appeal. A.A./2152/Lb.S Appeal dismissed.