1969 PLP 285 (SCMR)

HAMOODUR RAHMAN, C. J.‑The petitioner‑company holds a route‑permit on the Lahore‑Kasur route and is the owner of motor vehicle No. LEB‑6758. This vehicle was involved on the 15th of April 1965, in a road accident on Ferozepur Road, as u result of which from amongst the passengers of the vehicle a child of about i year died and 4 other persons received injuries. The driver of the vehicle was tried on a charge under section 304‑A of the Pakistan Penal Code for rash and negligent driving, but was ultimately acquitted. Notwithstanding such acquittal, the Regional Transport Authority, Lahore, called upon the petitioner‑company to show cause as to why its route‑permit should not be cancelled for operating its above‑mentioned vehicle in contravention of the conditions of the route‑permit. The Regional Transport Authority came to the conclusion, after hearing the petitioner. company that the accident could have been avoided had the driver been a bit more vigilant and careful, and cancelled the route‑permit. This order was upheld on appeal by the Member Board of Revenue. The petitioner‑company sought to challenge this order by a constitutional petition in the High Court of West Pakistan, but a Division Bench of the High Court, on the 20th of February 1968, dismissed the petition, holding that since in the present case the evidence before the Authority fully established that the "vehicle went off the road and turned turtle", it was obviously "speeding uncontrolled" in contravention of the conditions of the route‑permit. The decision in the case of Umara Khan v. Member, Board of Revenue (P L D 1965 Pesh. 104) was, therefore, held to be distinguishable and the authorities from the Indian jurisdiction cited before the High Court were found unacceptable. Soon after the decision of the High Court on the 20th of February 1968, this Court had itself dealt with the same point in the case of Member, Board of Revenue, West Pakistan v. Haji Akhtar Khan (P L D 1968 S C 270), wherein the judgment was announced on the 27th of March 1968. In that case too the driver of the vehicle had been tried and acquitted of charges under sections 279, 304‑A and 337 of the Pakistan Penal Code. This Court, after an elaborate examination of the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, came to the conclusion :‑ "that the Transport Authorities set up by the Act have been constituted as Administrative Tribunals vested with the jurisdic tion to take decisions of an administrative nature within the limits prescribed by the Act and upon the grounds specified therein. It follows, therefore, that upon general principles which are now universally accepted, the authority empowered to take a decision has also a duty cast upon it to apply its own independent mind to the facts and circumstances of each case in the light of the relevant provisions of the law and then to come to its own decision, regardless of what another authority or tribunal acting in a different jurisdiction may or may not have held . . It is no doubt eminently desirable that the spectacle of two departments of Government proceeding in contradictory directions should be avoided and due weight and consideration should be given to the findings of the Criminal Courts of the land which are entrusted with enquiries into offences, but this does not mean that the findings of one should be treated as conclusive by the other. Each has a duty to make up its own mind independently upon the materials placed before it but in a fair and reasonable manner without any taint of perversity or arbitrariness." Applying this test to the facts of the present case we have no hasitation in upholding the decision of the High Court, for, the very fact that the vehicle turned turtle in trying to avoid an accident would show that the vehicle was being driven at a speed at which it was uncontrollable. Now the maximum speed fixed under the 8th Schedule appended to the Motor Vehicles Ordinance for a vehicle of this type, is 40 miles per hour. If the vehicle was being driven at 40 miles per hour, it could not have turned turtle in trying to avoid an accident. There was, therefore, enough evidence before the Authority to come to the conclusion that the vehicle was being driven in contravention of the conditions of the route‑permit. So far as the acquittal by the Magistrate is concerned, it is pertinent to point out that the case really failed, because, reliable evidence was not placed before the Court. The defence case was that the vehicle had turned by reason of the driver having swerved to avoid a cyclist in front of him who was not giving way in spite of the horn being sounded. The Ferozepur Road is not a narrow road. It is difficult to appreciate, therefore, as to why the vehicle had to leave the road and go on to the katchha portion to avoid the accident. It is also difficult to appreciate why the vehicle could not be stopped if it was being driven at a speed below 40 miles per hour, the maximum prescribed under the Ordinance. The vehicle could not have turned turtle if it was being driven within the prescribed maximum speed. This fact by itself is sufficient to establish that the action taken by the Transport Authorities was neither perverse, nor arbitrary but was based on adequate material. There is no complaint here that the petitioner‑company was not given full opportunity of presenting its case before the Transport Authority or the appellate Authority. Hence no principle of natural justice has been violated. The High Court could not, therefore, in such circumstances, have interfered, under Article 98 of the Constitution, with an order passed in the lawful exercise of their jurisdiction, by the Transport Authorities. This petition is without any substance and is, accordingly, dismissed. Leave refused.