1980K82 (PLP)

The controversy in this case relates to House No. B/30-1533 at Hyderabad which was transferred to the appellant under settlement law vide P. T. O. dated 9-9-60 and the respondents are the statutory tenants therein. After the protection period the appellant moved the Rent Controller for possession of the premises and by his order dated 21-1-1972 the Rent Controller ordered the eviction of the respondents on the sole ground that the premises were required by the appellant for his and his family's personal use. On appeal, however, the learned Additional District Judge, Hyderabad reversed the order and dismissed the application of the appellant vide his judgment dated 19-3-76. Appellant seeks to challenge the said judgment in the present second appeal.

2. It is not disputed that the appellant has no other house of his own and that at the time of application for eviction he was putting up along with his family in the house of his son Chiraghuddin at Latifabad. The evidence of the appellant before the Rent Controller discloses that the appellant has, besides Chiraghuddin (who is married having grown-up children) one wife, four sons and two unmarried daughters. Out of these 4 sons one is in England, one is unmarried and is a student and the rest are married having children. His entire family excluding that of Chiraghuddin consists of 28 members.

3. The learned Additional District Judge reversed the finding recorded by the Rent Controller on two grounds. Firstly that the appellant did not disclose his present address in the ejectment application perhaps because he wanted to conceal from the Court that he was living in an "A" type Bungalow which has better accommodation than the premises in question consisting of two rooms only. From this the learned Judge inferred that the appellant had not come with clean hands. Secondly that the appellant had demanded Rs. 50 per month as the rent instead of Rs. 30 chargeable for the premises which also militated against his bona fides.

4. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the Lower Appellate Court was not justified in drawing the inference of mala fides from the facts stated above. I am inclined to agree with his contention. The appellant has been able to prove that he has a large family and has no other residential building in his possession suitable for his needs. The ordinary rule is that a landlord has a prerogative to obtain possession of his premises if he demands the same for personal use of himself or his children unless there is evidence that he is seeking to eject his tenant for ulterior motive.

5. It is however strenuously urged on behalf of the respondents that Chiraghuddin's house where the appellant was living at the time of the application had sufficient accommodation for the appellant and his family to satisfy their needs. It is however clear from the evidence that the house does not belong to the appellant and therefore he is putting up there with the courtesy of his son. Occupation of such accommodation even though suitable' for the needs of the appellant will not be relevant for purposes of section 13(3)(b) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1559. It was so held) in Ghulam Nabi v. Rao Muhammad Usman Ali Khan (1).

6. It was next contended on behalf of the respondent that admittedly the appellant before shifting to his son's house had vacated rented premises twice, which were not proved to have been vacated for a sufficient cause as required by section 13(3)(c) of the Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959. This contention is also devoid of force. !n Abdul Salam v. Najma Parvez (2), it was held "that the requirement that the landlord should not be in occupation of another residential building suitable for his needs at the time does not extend to cover rented premises, for otherwise, the result would be that no landlord would be able to get his own premises vacated for his own occupation unless he can show that he is actually on the streets and has no place to live at all." Although this reasoning was adopted by their Lordships for interpretation of clause (b) of subsection (3) of section 1.3 but it seems to me that it will prevail with equal force even while construing clause (c) of that subsection. Clause (c) of section 13(3)(i)(c) reads as under : "he has not vacated such a building without sufficient cause after the commencement of this Ordinance in the said urban area."

7. In Abdul Aziz v. Muhammad Ibrahim (3), their Lordships referred to the rule of interpretation for construction of the word `such' from Maxwell, as under: "Where the word 'such' occurs in a section it must not be ignored but must be read as referring back to the preceding provisions, even though this gives rise to a result which appears anamalous."

8. On the aforesaid rule, clearly the word "such building" in clause (c) would be construed to refer to clause (b) of the same subsection. As already pointed out, the building referred to in clause (b) does not include rented' premises and consequently in clause (c) also the landlord would not bed required to prove that he did. not vacate such rented premises in his occupation without sufficient cause.

9. Learned counsel for the respondents half-heartedly attempted to support the conclusion drawn by the lower Appellate Court that for the reasons stated by it the ejectment was sought by suppressing the fact that the appellant was occupying the house of his son. In the view that I have taken the fact of his occupying the said accommodation which did not belong to him is not material for the present purposes. Even otherwise no question in cross-examination was put to the appellant that he had attempted to suppress the fact by not disclosing his residential address in the application.

10. I also find no force in the contention that none of the children of the appellant was examined in support of the application to prove that the premises were required by the appellant also for the use of his children. The appellant's own evidence is sufficient for this purpose. Finally it was contended that the respondent in his evidence had stated that the appellant has other houses of his own at Hyderabad but this fact was not disputed'. The record does not bear out the submission. The appellant in his deposition has clearly asserted that he has no other house anywhere in Pakistan and that none of his children except Chiraghuddin has any property. The assertion made by the respondent is only a vague statement without disclosing particulars or evidence of the ownership of the appellant. (1) Law Notes 1977 S C 191 (2) 1976 S C M R 52 (3)PLD 1977SC442

11. In the result this appeal is allowed and the order of the Additional District Judge Hyderabad is set aside and that of the Rent Controller is restored. The respondents are however, allowed a period of four months to hand over possession of the premises to the appellant. M.A.K Appeal accepted.