1989 PLP 644 (PLC(CS))

‑‑‑ Rr. 6(f)(d) & 37‑‑Dismissal from service‑‑Cashier falling in category II‑ Authority to dismiss employees of category 11 vesting in Senior Executive Vice-President Administration Head Office‑‑Dismissal Order signed by Executive Vice‑President, was without lawful authority hence not maintainable. Mian Abdul Rashid for Appellant. M. Zaman Oureshi for Respondent. Date of hearing: 21st January, 1989. The appeal captioned above challenges the decision dated 14‑2‑1985 recorded by the learned Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court No.

7. Gujranwala, whereby the respondent was directed to be reinstated in service without back benefits.

2. The appeal was previously decided but as at that time the decision of the High Court was in the field to the effect that the persons removed from service were no longer workmen, the petition therefore, was ordered to be returned to the respondent. After the Supreme Court held that the Labour Courts had jurisdiction, the respondent went in writ petition to the High Court, wherefrom the appeal has been remanded."`

3. The allegation, for which the respondent was removed from service, was that he had put his own signatures on the CDRs without any authority. Learned counsel for the respondent has tried to argue that the respondent did not violate any provision of paragraph 258(2) of the Wage Commission Award, therefore, he by putting his signatures on the CDRs did not commit any misconduct. The respondent had admitted his signatures on the CDRs but the plea taken by him was that he did so on the asking of the Manager who had also signed it. He also said that since the amount was deposited in late hours. no other officer who had to put his signatures alongwith the Manager was present, therefore, on the asking of the Manager he had put his signatures. Every act constituting misconduct cannot be included in the rules, because it is not known what illegal acts an employee may commit. So, in the Wage Commission Award it is provided that an employee who is guilty of any other act of misconduct can be removed from service. The argument that since it was not shown that the bank suffered any financial loss, the act done by the respondent did not amount to misconduct, has no force. Causing of financial loss is a different offence and it does not mean that every act done by an employee must result in financial loss to constitute misconduct. No doubt no rule has been shown which may say that the respondent B was not authorised to sign the CDRs but since in the CDRs the word `officer' is printed, it was sufficient notice to the respondent that only an officer could put his signatures and he admittedly not being an officer but a cashier, was not authorised to put his own signatures. He does not appear to have put his signatures with good intention because he did not score off the word `officer' and describe his own designation. If he had done so, it could be said that he put his signatures without deceiving the depositor. The plea that he did so on the asking of the Manager is not sufficient. If a Manager asks an employee to commit an offence, it would not mean that the person doing the wrongful act would not commit any misconduct. So, the act done by the respondent constitutes misconduct. Since the admission of the respondent is contained in the very reply to the charge‑sheet, it was not necessary to prove it and the learned lower Court f has rightly held that the offence was established.

4. The other point argued by the learned counsel for the respondent is that the dismissal order has been passed by an incompetent authority. The dismissal order is signed by Executive Vice‑President but according to paragraph 12 of rule 37 of Habib Bank Rules, Senior Executive Vice‑President Administration, Head I Office is competent to remove persons belonging to category II. According to rule 6(ii)(d), a cashier falls in the category II. Learned counsel for the appellant has not been able to show that the order of dismissal was with authority.

5. However, I do not find any force in the argument of the learned counsel for the respondent that since the punishment was awarded nine months after the reply filed by the respondent to the second show‑cause notice, it was illegal. The I instructions referred to by the learned counsel for the respondent, copy of which is Exh. P‑16, are of 1978 when there were no rules. Learned counsel for the respondent has not been able to cite any such rule from the Habib Bank Rules.

6. As an incompetent authority passed the dismissal order, the same is not maintainable and on this ground the appeal has no merits. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed. A.E./661/Lb. P Appeal dismissed.