P L D 1967 Supreme Court 367 (PLP)

CORNELIUS, C. J.‑The appellant Abdul Rashid Qureshi was employed as a clerk in the Jhelum establishment of the Pakistan Tobacco Company and was General Secretary of the Employees' Union when on the 25th June 1963, be addressed to the Director, Labour Welfare, West Pakistan, a letter on behalf of the Union, making a reply to several matters that had arisen between the Com pany and the Employees' Union, and in particular a charge which had been made against Mr. Lal Khan, Propaganda Secretary of the Union. The following passage from the letter contains the entire material upon which the action was taken by the Company that has led to the present appeal. A copy of this letter was sent to the Branch Manager of the Company at Jhelum. "It is quite wrong that Mr. Lal Khan, the Union's Propaganda Secretary had some hand in the strike of casual labour and domestic servants. On the other hand it was Mr. A. A. Ahmad (Personnel Manager) who arranged the casual labour strike with the intention to make a public contract with Ch. Muhammad Aslam, a labour contractor of Kala Gujran (Jhelum). According to the unconfirmed report we have received he has taken about Rs. 4,000 from the contractor and in return he promised to give him Pukka contract for casual labours. Moreover, according to the same report be (Mr. A. A. Ahmad), Factory Personnel Manager, also promised the contractor to engage his 4 men in each board and that the contractor can have Rs. 200 from each and could easily earn more than Rs. 2,000 a month. According to the Branch Manager's discussion with the Union on the above, he informed the Union that they have only promised to have contractor's men for one month and he refuted the above report in very dramatic ways. However, Ch. Muhammad Aslam (contractor) was unable to supply the required number of men for the work of the Company, so he (Ch. Muhammad Aslam) made another partner (Mr. Sardar Khan), in his proposed contract but unfortunately this partnership has run only two weeks and proved fruitless. Both the contractors tried to create trouble in casual workers in the form of strike to win the confidence of the Company. This matter was reported to the local authority by the Management as the tussles, between the above‑mentioned two contractors had created bell of distur bances outside the factory and inside too. The local Police reached on the site and controlled the situation and decided between the parties that all the contractors will prepare lists of their men and furnish the same to the Company from which equal number of men of each contractor will be engaged on casual work out of the lists and equal number of men will be sent for board according to permanent vacancies in the factory. This Police decision is not unconfirmed report and Union can produce witness for this In the light of the above, it is quite wrong to suggest that Mr. Lal Khan had some hand in the above referred strike, but it is quite clear that instead of Mr. Lal Khan or any other member of the Union the member of Management had some hand in the above‑mentioned strike." The Branch Manager charged him upon this letter with miscon duct amounting to acts subversive of discipline as provided by the Factory Standing Order No. 21 (2) (h). Special stress was laid upon the passages which referred to corruption on the part of Mr. A. A. Ahmad, Personnel Manager, and charged the Manage ment with "trying to cause disruption and dissatisfaction among the workers." There was an enquiry and on the 16th July 1963, the Branch Manager issued a letter to Abdul Rashid Qureshi saying that he had been "adjudged guilty of misconduct under: Factory Standing Order No. 21 (2) (h)" and would be dismissed with effect from the 16th July 1963, "on receipt of permission from the Industrial Court, West Pakistan, to whom your case is being referred, as contemplated by section 30 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, 1959." The Industrial Tribunal heard the case and on the 28th September 1963, found that Abdul Rashid Qureshi was indeed guilty of acts subversive of discipline for having recklessly made a defamatory statement regarding the Personnel Manager on the basis of "unconfirmed reports" and that this action "tended to encourage a spirit of indiscipline among the workers of the factory". Accordingly, the permission sought by the Company was granted, and this was followed by the issue of an order by the Pakistan Tobacco Company on the 17th October 1963, to the appellant confirming that, on the strength of the permission granted by the Industrial Court, he stood dismissed from the service of the Company with effect from the 16th July 1963. Abdul Rashid Qureshi moved a writ before the High Court to call in question the order of the Industrial Court. A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the petition in limine holding that the misconduct proved was not merely in the nature of a false and misleading statement for which a workman could be fined up to half an anna in the rupee of his monthly wages only. The Tribunal had held that his conduct was subversive of discipline falling under clause (b) of para. 13 (3) of the Industrial and Commercial Employees (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1960, for which dismissal is one of the penalties provided. It may be mentioned that Standing Order No. 21(2)(h) refers inter alia to acts subversive of discipline. Standing Order No. 21(2)(c) refers to the making of false and misleading statements for which a minor punishment is prescribed. Leave was granted to Abdul Rashid Qureshi to appeal against the judgment of the High Court on two considerations firstly that "certain objections in writing were raised before the Industrial Court," which had failed to deal with them, and secondly, that the order ante‑dating the dismissal to the 16th July 1963, whereas the permission of the Industrial Court was only issued on the 28th September 1963, was illegal. It seems to be correct that the question whether Standing Order No. 21(2)(c) did not apply rather than Standing Order No. 21(2)(h) was raised before the Industrial Court and was not expressly pronounced upon. The order of the Industrial Court which is signed by the Chairman alone, however, finds that the statement against the Personnel Officer was defamatory and also tended to encourage a spirit of indiscipline among the factory workers. Mr. Abid Hasan Minto for the appellant has attempted to bring the matter within Standing Order No. 21(2)(c), but it seems plain, upon a reading of the letter that it was no mere lie or prevarication that was involved. The Propaganda Secretary having been placed under charge, the Union replied by a direct accusation against a superior officer, namely, the Personnel Manager, that he had deliberately fomented trouble among the factory workers in order to enable himself to make a corrupt arrangement with a contractor for the supply of labour. The arrangement failed, and disturbances followed, which had to be controlled by the Police. Although at the commencement of the offending passage, it was said that the accusation of corruption against the Personnel Manager was based on "unconfirmed report,") yet at the 6 end of the passage, it was said in direct terms as follows:‑ "It is quite clear that instead of Mr. Lal Khan or any other member of the Union, the member of the Manage ment had some hand in the above‑mentioned strike." Mr. Abid Hasan Minto found it impossible to argue that the offending statements were merely minor matters of prevarication or falsity. There was a direct attack on the probity of a superior executive officer of the Company directly concerned in the Management of the labour force, and a very grave accusation that this officer was himself engineering trouble among the workmen. There can be no question but that such conduct is calculated to be destructive of discipline. Mr. Abid Hasan Minto pointed out that the statement was not broadcast among the workers, but was contained in letters addressed to five responsible officers. The letter was being written on behalf of the workers and the damaging inferences it contained were based on "unconfirmed report" suggesting that information had been collected from different sources, most of which would undoubtedly be within the body of the workers themselves. Therefore, it is plain that the case fell under Standing Order No. 21(2)(h) and among the penalties invited was that of dismissal. No fault can be found with the conclusion of the Industrial Court on this point. But on the second point, namely, the effective date of the dismissal of the appellant, the Company is clearly in the wrong. The appellant being a Union official, his case was governed by section 30 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Ordinance, which provides that such a person cannot be dismissed "except with previous permission of the Court, but may, pending disposal of an application to the Court for such permission be placed under suspension". These words clearly import the necessity of previous permission of the Industrial Court to validate the dismissal of a worker, who is also a Union official. The Industrial Court's permission was accorded on the 28th September 1963, and the appellant's dismissal could not be ordered from any earlier date. It is urged by Mr. Mansur Alam for the Company, that the correction of an order made by a Company or a Company official cannot be made under Article 98 of the Constitution, unless enforcement of a fundamental right "conferred by Chapter I of Part II" of the Constitution be involved. No such right is shown to be involved here. That may be so, but under Article 2 of the Constitution, every citizen of Pakistan has the right to demand that he should be treated in accordance with law and only in accordance with law. The law on the point is perfectly clear and the appellant may demand from a competent Court, at the very least, a declaration that action taken against him is not in accordance with the law by which that action is governed. The power of this Court to make such order as may be necessary for doing complete justice in any matter before it, is placed beyond question by the provision in snb5c9tion (1) of Article #1 of the, Constitution. It is plain that under the law the earliest date from which, in consequence of the permission granted by the Industrial Court, the dismissal of the appellant could effectively be made, is the 28th September 1963, and we make a declaration accordingly. With that modification, we dismiss this appeal, but leave the parties to bear their own costs. A. H. Order modified.