1988 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

Additional Advocate‑General for Respondents. MUHAMMAD SIDDIQUE FAROOQI (CHAIRMAN).‑‑This appeal is directed against the order of the Government dated 26‑2‑1986, whereby the services of the appellant were terminated. The appellant stated that he was appointed as Private Secretary on 20‑12‑1978, against one of the posts of Private Secretary to Advisors in Pay Scale No. 16 and the order was given effect from 9 -11‑1978. He was assigned the duty of P.R.O. Refugees (Liaison Officer Refugees). He was assigned the additional duty of P.R.O. for the affairs of Gujar Bakarwal Tribes, vide order, dated 27‑5‑1979. Later on, vide order, dated 3‑9 1985, he was attached with the Minister Rehabilitation, although the pay was to be drawn, against the former post in Prime Minister Secretariat. The services of the appellant were terminated vide Notification No.Admn/A‑36(15)/86, dated 26‑2‑1986. The learned counsel for the appellant, after narrating the foretasted facts, contended that rules for discretionary posts were framed in 1983. In view of the contents thereof, the rules did not apply to the appellant. The learned counsel maintained that in the orders, dated 27‑5‑1979 and 3‑9‑1985, the appellant was shown as Liaison Officer for the refugees in the Prime Minister Secretariat and other additional duty namely: Liaison Officer for Gujar Bakarwal Tribes was assigned on 27‑5‑1979. The duty with the Rehabilitation Minister was assigned on 3‑9‑1985. These orders according to the learned counsel show that the appellant was basically treated as Laison Officer by the Government which in his opinion is a permanent post. Therefore, it should be held that the appellant was holding a permanent appointment in the Government. Regarding the contents of Government order, dated 20‑12‑1978, whereby the appointment was shown subject to the pleasure of the Chief Executive, it was argued that the appointment could be held as temporary and subject to the pleasure, so long as Ex‑Brigadier Muhammad Hayat Khan was in chair as Chief Executive and not thereafter. It was also argued that the nature of appointment was also changed, when he was described as Liaison Officer and the condition of service, being at the pleasure of Chief Executive, attached with the appointment as Private Secretary, no longer subsisted when the appellant was described as Liaison Officer in the orders issued later. It was further contended that in the Civil List for the year 1980, the appellant was shown as P.R.O. and the nature of post was shown permanent, alongwith the superannuation at the age of 60 years. This according to' him was an evidence of the nature of appointment held by the appellant. It was argued that the aforesaid appointment could have not been terminated, without a show‑cause notice and the proceedings under rules. The learned counsel relied on P L D 1982 AJ&K S C 1.24, P L D 1960 S C 536, P L D S C

208. Regarding the preliminary objection, taken in defence, the learned counsel maintained that the appellant proceeded on leave for attending his ailing mother at Sialkot. During his absence, the impugned order was passed, which came to his knowledge on his return on 26‑3‑1986. The appellant applied for the copies of the impugned order and certain other orders which were provided to him on 11‑4‑1986. Thereafter, he submitted a review petition on 8‑5‑1986. After waiting for 90 days, he brought the present appeal, within further 30 days, therefore, the appeal may be treated to have been submitted within time. According to the learned counsel, the affidavit submitted by the appellant regarding the facts, relating to limitation have not been denied. During the arguments, the facts in respect of appellant's service, prior to 9‑11‑1978 incorporated in the memorandum of appeal were not discussed and no claim was made in respect of that service. The appellant and his counsel admitted that the earlier appointment made in 1975 had been terminated w.e.f. 11‑8‑1977. The Additional Advocate‑General, counsel for the respondent reiterated that the review petition before the Government was submitted beyond the period of limitation, therefore, the appeal may be declared incompetent. He further maintained that the appointment of the appellant was on a discretionary post, which could be terminated at the pleasure of the Prime Minister, who succeeded the Chief Executive in his office. We have gone through the record. The order of Government dated 20‑12‑1978, whereby the appellant was appointed to service, in grade 16 against one of the posts of Private Secretary created for Advisors. The same is reproduced below:‑‑ It is clearly mentioned in this order that the appointment was made subject to the pleasure of the Chief Executive. In the orders, passed on 27‑5‑1979, the appellant was described as Liaison Officer Refugees and the duty of Liaison Officers for Gujar Bakarwal Tribe was added to his charge. In the order dated 3‑9‑1985, he was shown as Liaison Officer for refugees with Prime Minister Secretariat and temporarily attached with Minister for Rehabilitation. In none of the orders passed on 27‑5‑1979 or that on 3‑9‑1985, the nature of appointment of the appellant was changed. The assignment of duty or describing the designation of officer per se does not convert the temporary nature of appointment to permanent one, we have even otherwise enquired from the appellant, whether the post of Liaison Officer was created on permanent basis, to which no satisfactory answer was furnished, nor any record was produced to show that the post of Liaison Officer was in any way permanent. The entry in Civil List for the year 1980 is no relevant evidence to support the contention that the post held by the a appellant was permanent. The entries seem to have been made inadvertently by some official but on the face of the original documents, relating to the service of the appellant, being available on the Civil List, these cannot be accepted as evidence about the fact in question. The assertion of the learned counsel that the nature of appointment was changed, when Ex‑Brigadier Muhammad Hayat Khan (later on honorary Major General) parted with the office of Chief Executive is not correct. The nature of appointment was not conditional with the person of Brigadier Muhammad Hayat Khan. The post was subject to the pleasure of the Chief Executive. The Prime Minister happens to be the Chief Executive of Azad Jammu & Kashmir under the provisions of section 12 of the Interim Constitution of Azad Jammu & Kashmir as such he succeeds in office to the earlier Chief Executive. The contention as to the nature of appointment is, therefore, repelled. If a person holds the appointment subject to the pleasure of authority, his services can be terminated at any time, when the authority so desires. The case law relied upon, by the learned counsel has been also looked into. In the case Rafiq Akhtar Chaudhry v. Azad Government P L D 1982 S C (AJ&K) 124, the matter of ad hoc appointment came before the learned Court. It was opined that the issuance of show‑cause notice was necessary when the appointment was held by a person, beyond the statutory period of months, prescribed for ad hoc appointments. This authority has no application to the instant case. Similarly, the cases, P L D 1966 S C 214 and P L D 1965 S C 208 do not deal with the cases of civil servants holding the posts subject to the pleasure of any authority. Even, these authorities have no bearing on the facts of the case, before us, accordingly hold that a show‑cause notice was not necessary for the for the termination of service of a person, who was holding an appointment, subject to the pleasure of Chief Executive of Azad Jammu & Kashmir and his successor‑in‑office enjoying the powers vested in any one of the predecessor unless such powers were expressly taken away or circumvented by the statutory provisions for which no instance has been brought to light before us. In the matter of limitation, we have observed that the order, dated 20‑12‑1986 was passed by the Services & General Administration Department and a copy was endorsed to the appellant as per entry at S.No. 8 but no address has been given after the name of the appellant, nor any despatch register or stamps register was produced to show that a copy was in fact sent the appellant. Any other document showing the delivery of letter to the appellant in person was also not produced. The presumption of service of a document letter arises only when it is shown that it was despatched through a prepaid postal envelope on a correctly written address of the appellant. The facts relating to the leave of the appellant at the relevant time have not been satisfactorily denied ill the written statement. It is, therefore, held that the appeal is not time‑barred. Another preliminary objection also finds place in the written statement I but it was not stressed before the Tribunal at the time of arguments, nor the, circumstances were stated, which made the appeal incompetent, therefore, the objection does not sustain. Before concluding the judgment, we deem it proper to point out that the appellant was appointed to service in 1975 by the Peoples' Party Government in 1977. He was appointed to service again by the same Government He also worked under the Government of Major General (Retd.) Abdul Rehman Khan and then for 8 months with the present Government. His services terminated on 26‑2‑1986, but again this Government appointed him. Thus he worked as Liaison Officer with four Governments. The suitability of such a person for service cannot be denied. He was capable of handling the sensitive job with Governments coming in power with different slogans and ideological background. He was capable of working with persons at the helm of affairs having different temperaments. It wilt be proper to accommodate such a person on a permanent post and utilise his services on his present assignment or to declare one post of this nature as permanent. The appellant is a citizen the State. Even, after putting in more than a decade in service, there appears reason to keep him in such service, which is at the pleasure. The Government cam in its discretion condone the breaks in the service of the appellant and can also allow such service to be connected for the person, as a special case. The appeal before the Tribunal is, however, on different grounds which IE do not prevail. Hence, it is dismissed without any order as to the cost. A.A./63/Sr.A Appeal dismissed.