P L D 2005 Peshawar 16 (PLP)

2. The short facts of the case are that the petitioner Abdul Khaliq tiled a declaratory suit in the Civil Court of Haripur against Chairman Evacuee Trust Property assailing the Notice No.250 dated 12-5-1998 (as mentioned in the plaint) whereby a sum of Rs.69,136 was demanded as rent amount from the petitioner as the petitioner was a lessee of Plot bearing No.50-C situated in Haripur. The respondent on their appearance made an application before the learned trial Court asking of the rejection of the plaint on the ground that the civil Court had no jurisdiction over the matter. The application was, however, rejected by the learned trial Court on 28-4-2000. The respondent was, therefore, obliged to file an appeal before the learned District Judge.

3. After hearing the parties the learned District Judge came to the conclusion that in view of section 14 of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act No.XIII of 1975 (hereinafter called as the Act) the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts is barred. Owing to its relevancy section 14 is quoted bellow:-- "

14. Bar of Jurisdiction.

Save as otherwise provided in this Act, no Civil Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any matter which the Federal Government or an officer appointed under this Act is empowered under this Act to determine, and no injunction, process or order shall be granted or issued by any Court or other authority in respect of any action taken or to be taken in exercise of any power conferred by or under this Act." The learned District Judge on the analysis of the relevant law and seeking guidance from the judgments reported as 1992 SCMR page 1313, 1996 SCMR 250 and 1999 MLD 2505 (Peshawar) allowed the appeal of the respondents and the plaint was returned to the petitioner for its presentation before the competent forum.

4. The learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner has vehemently argued that as the matter pertained to a dispute with regard to the enhancement of rent, therefore, it did not fall within the domain of section 14 ibid and the learned District Judge had landed in error in allowing the appeal of the respondents. He maintained that the Civil Court had the jurisdiction to decide the controversy between the parties.

5. On the other hand the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents has argued that the instant matter is patently governed by Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act (XIII of 1975) and section 14 thereof read with section 9 of C.P.C. oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts and the matter was exclusively governed by the Act stated above. He reiterated the judgments of Honourable Supreme Court reported as 1992 SCMR 1313 and also referred to 1995 SCMR 1748. He also made reference to clauses 8 and 9 of the agreement deed between the parties and argued that clause 8 provides that in case of any dispute the decision of the Chairman (figuring in the Act) shall be final. Similarly clause 9 provides, that lease shall be governed by the provisions of the Evacuee Trust Properties (Management and Disposal) Act, 1975.

6. I have considered the arguments of the learned counsel for the parties in the light of the record that has been gone through. The learned counsel for the petitioner although made hectic endeavour to take the matter out of the provision of section 14 referred above but I am afraid his arguments do not carry and force. The matter is squarely governed by the Act and section 14 thereof clearly puts a bar on the jurisdiction of civil Court with regard to the matter enshrined therein which undoubtedly includes the instant controversy. Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code (Act V of 1908) confers general jurisdiction upon the civil Court to try all suits of civil nature and whenever the object of proceedings is the enforcement of civil rights a civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Section 9 of C.P.C. conferring general jurisdiction on the civil Courts also creates an exception for the suits the cognizance whereof is either expressly or impliedly barred. In the instant case section 14 ibid provides an express bar on the jurisdiction of civil Courts. Thus the reading of section 9 of C.P.C. and section 14 of the Act leaves no doubt in formulating a view that the jurisdiction of the civil Court in the instant matter is expressly barred. Apart from above when the question that I am confronted with is examined in the light of clause 9 of the agreement which has been executed by the parties, the answer would come in support of the above expressed view. Owing to its relevancy the said clause is quoted below:-- "9.

That the lease shall be governed by the provisions of the Evacuee Trust Property (Management. & Disposal) Act, 1975 and the rules/regulations made thereunder from time to time."

7. It is also an outstanding feature of the case that uncontrovertedly the petitioner had filed an appeal under section 16 of the Act before the Chairman and the same was dismissed against which though a revision petition could be filed in terms of section 17 of the Act but the same was not availed. The very filing of appeal by the petitioner would lead to the conclusion that the petitioner himself yielded to the provisions of the Act and the matter was accepted to be within the domain thereof. Now at this stage even by his conduct the petitioner cannot raise the argument against the application of Act and plead for the amenability of the matter to the jurisdiction of the Civil Courts. The judgments that are cited by the learned counsel for the respondents also lend strong support to the case of the respondents.

8. In the ultimate analysis I am of the firm view that the judgment of the learned District Judge does not suffer from any infirmity or the jurisdictional defect within the contemplation of section 115, of C.P.C. Resultantly, this revision petition is dismissed with no order as to costs. Announced. H.B.T./252/P Revision dismissed.