1988 PLP 1160 (SCMR)

(On appeal from the judgment, dated 23rd December, 1979 of the Peshawar High Court, Peshawar in R.F.A. No.103 of 1975). (a) Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑‑ ‑‑‑Art.185(2) (e)‑‑Supreme Court Rules. 1956,O.XII, R.6‑13‑‑Limita tion‑‑Direct appeal to Supreme Court‑‑No specific Rule dealing with period of limitation in direct appeals to Supreme Court under Art.185(2) (e) having been prescribed. practice of Registry was to consider 30 days to be period prescribed for such appeals‑‑Supreme Court, in view of uncertainty about exact Rule applicable previously condoned delay of 25 days‑‑Following same course delay of 15 days and 19 days was also condoned by Supreme Court. (b) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)‑‑ ‑‑‑Ss.50 (2) & 18‑‑Award‑‑Award made by Land Acquisition Collector, held, would become final so far as local authority or company was concerned and that such local authority or company was obliged to give effect to it, since it had no right to question it by way of appeal‑‑Order of High Court allowing appeal of such local authority/ company was set aside in circumstances. Pir Khan v. Military Officer, Abbottabad and others P L D 1987 S C 485 rel. (c) Land Acquisition Act (I of 1894)‑‑ ‑‑‑Ss.50 (2), 22‑A & 18‑‑[Land Acquisition (West Pakistan Amendment) Ordinance (XLIV of 1969) ]‑‑Appeal‑‑Cross‑objection against award of Collector‑‑Central Government not included amongst those who had been given right to file a cross‑objection against award of Collector‑ Question of filing appeal against rejection of its cross‑objection, held, would not arise. Respondents No.3: Ex parte (in Civil Appeal No.5 of 1980). Kind of land Rates Rewarded Churri Rs. 5,081.67 per kanal Kund Rs.1,927.53 " " Maira Rs .1,226.60 " " Rakkar Rs. 700.92 " "' Ghair Mazrooba Rs. 175.23 " "' While the appellants were satisfied with the above judgment and decree of the learned Senior Civil Judge, the same was not acceptable to the Pakistan Ordnance Factory and the Central Government. Accordingly, they challenged it by an appeal (R.F.A. No.103 of 1975) before the Peshawar High Court. The appeal was taken up for consideration alongwith 14 other Regular First Appeals including R.F.A. No.28 of 1975, which were all disposed of by a common judgment dated 23‑12‑1979, whereby the compensation awarded by the learned Senior Civil Judge was reduced. It is, however, relevant to mention that during the hearing of the appeals the appellants herein raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the appeals submitting that neither the Military Estate Officer nor the Central Government were competent to file the appeals, notwithstanding the fact that the land was being acquired for their benefit. The said plea was .rejected by the High Court in its judgment delivered on 23‑12‑1979. Hence these appeals before us. Mr. Siraj‑ul‑Haq, learned counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No.5 of 1980 and Mr. Samad Mahmood, learned counsel for the appellants in Civil Appeal No.12 of 1980 have pointed out that the impugned judgment was also impugned before this Court by another appellant whose case was heard alongwith the case of the present appellants by the High Court (in R . F . A . 28 of 1975) and that this Court has allowed that appeal (Civil Appeal No.3 of 1980) by its judgment delivered on 8th April, 1987 , wherein the objections being raised by the present appellants namely that neither the Military Estate Officer nor the Central Government had the right of appeal to the High Court against the judgment and decree passed by the Senior Civil Judge were raised and the said objections upheld. This judgment is now reported as Pir Khan v . Military Officer, Abbottabad and others P L D 1987 S C

485. According to this Court's judgment in Pir Khan's Case, the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector becomes final, so far as the local authority or the company is concerned and that sue local authority or company is obliged to give effect to it since it has no right to question it by way of an appeal. This conclusion wag based on the reasoning that as such authority or company has neither) the right to ask for reference under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act it could not, on a parity of reasoning, possess a right to prefer an appeal against the decision made upon such a reference. The Court went on to observe "that the order of the Civil Court on reference made to it by the Land Acquisition Collector is not an, independent order but merely a substitutive order, whereby the award of the Land Acquisition Collector is substituted by the order of the Civil Court, which order :then becomes the award. Since, by virtue of subsection (2) of section 50 of the Act, the award made by the Land Acquisition Collector is final and cannot be challenged except by a party which has expressly been conferred the right of appeal; hence respondents Nos.l and 2 who did not have any such right expressly conferred on them, did not have any‑ locus standi to file an appeal" . It was further observed that no such right is to be assumed on any a priori ground because a right of appeal can be exercised only if it has been expressly conferred on a party by statute. It is manifest that the above judgment is fully applicable t the present appeals; in fact, it has been given in respect of the very same judgment‑of the High Court which is being now impugned before this Court. These appeals are entitled to succeed on that short ground. However, Mr. Raza A. Khan, Deputy Attorney‑General, has submitted that in the precedent case this Court did not consider the effect of the provisions of the Land Acquisition (West Pakistan Amendment) Ordinance, 1969 (Ordinance XLIX of 1969), which was still in force and, therefore, the matter still required consideration. We have, therefore, examined the provisions of this Ordinance with the assistance of the learned counsel but are of the opinion that none of its provisions affect the reasons given in the judgment in Pir Khan's Case P L D 1987 S C 485 in reaching the conclusion that neither the Pakistan Ordnance Factory nor the Central Government had the right to file any appeal before the High Court. The only provision of the amending Ordinance. which could conceivably be invoked is contained in section 15 of the amending Ordinance. By this provision section 22‑A has been inserted in the Act after section 22 of the Land Acquisition Act. This provision is in the following words: ‑ ''22‑A. Cross‑objection.‑‑The Provincial Government, or a local authority or a Company for which land is being acquired, may lodge a cross‑objection to the objection made by any person interested and the Court may reduce the amount awarded by the Collector if it considers it just and proper." According to this provision, a Provincial Government or a Local Authority or a Company for which the land is being acquired can lodge a cross‑objection to the objection raised by any person interested (whose land or interest therein has been acquired) and on such cross‑objection the Court may reduce the amount awarded by the Collector to the land‑owner, in proper cases. If such a cross -objection is not decided to the satisfaction of the Provincial Government) or Local Authority or a Company it could file an appeal before the, High Court; but in the instant case the land was being acquired for Pakistan Ordnance Factory (which is a project of the Central Government) and it is the Central Government which is dissatisfied with the order of the Civil Court as it has raised the amount of the compensation assessed by the Land Acquisition Collector by accepting the objections against the amount assessed by him. The Central Government, however, is not included amongst those who have been given the right to file a cross‑objection against the award of the Collector. Accordingly, the question of filing an appeal against the rejection of its cross‑objection does not arise. The Pakistan Ordnance' Factory, which also filed an appeal before the High Court through the Military Estate Officer, is admittedly neither a Local Authority nor a Company. Hence it cannot also avail the provisions of section G2‑A. The result is that no ground exists for reconsidering our earlier judgment in the case of Pir Khan v . Military Estate Officer Abbottabad and others P L D 1987 S C

485. These appeals must, therefore, succeed and are allowed with costs. The judgment and) decrees dated 23‑12‑1979 passed by the High Court are set aside. M. Y. H. /B‑47/S Appeals allowed.