PLC(CS) 2004

2004 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

LIAQUAT ALI KHAN Versus UNIVERSITY OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY and others

Jurisdiction / Court
Lahore High Court
Decided Date
Writ Petition No. 1704 of 2001, decided on 18th March, 2002.
Honorable Judges
Maulvi Anwarul Haq, J
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 2004 PLP (C (PLC(CS))
Forum / Court Lahore High Court
Bench Members Maulvi Anwarul Haq, J
Parties LIAQUAT ALI KHAN Versus UNIVERSITY OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY and others
Primary Law Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2004 PLP (C (PLC(CS))?

This judgment primarily cites: Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2004 PLP (C (PLC(CS))?

The case was heard and decided by the Lahore High Court bench comprising: Maulvi Anwarul Haq, J.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 2004 PLP (C (PLC(CS)) (LIAQUAT ALI KHAN Versus UNIVERSITY OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY and others). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

Constitution of Pakistan (1973)‑

Representation

  • Sh. Munir Ahmad for Petitioner.
  • Sajjad Hussain for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing: 18th March, 2002.

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑‑‑Art. 199‑‑‑Constitutional petition‑‑‑Civil service‑‑‑Dismissal from service‑‑‑Civil servant having been dismissed from service, filed Constitutional petition against his dismissal order‑‑‑High Court remanded case to the Authority for decision afresh after hearing petitioner‑‑‑In pursuance of said order of High Court a notice was served upon petitioner by the Authority and in said notice petitioner was described as `dismissed )(EN'‑‑‑Petitioner filed Constitutional petition which was allowed inasmuch as notice of Authority treating petitioner to be an ex- employee of 'respondent was declared to be illegal‑‑‑On filing Constitutional petition by Authority against said order of High Court, it was ordered by High Court that in future when a notice of hearing would be issued to the petitioner, he would be described as "under suspension XEN" and not as an "ex‑employee" till final order was passed by the Authority after hearing petitioner‑‑‑Petitioner could not urge that he was reinstated in service at any time because order of his dismissal was never set aside‑‑‑In earlier Constitutional petition filed by petitioner his grievance was that he should not be described as an ex‑employee in notice to be issued to him by Authority, High Court directed that he should be described as an "employee under suspension" which would not at all mean that petitioner was reinstated or in fact suspended

Judgment & Decree

The petitioner, an employee of the respondent University was dismissed from service on 26‑2‑1991. He filed Writ Petition No. 1828 of 1991 in this Court which was disposed of in the following terms on 30‑6‑1997:‑‑‑ "In view of above, this petition is allowed to the' extent that the matter is remanded to the Syndicate of the University of Engineering and Technology for decision afresh after hearing the petitioner." Pursuant to the said order a notice was served by the Syndicate of the University upon the petitioner. In this notice he was termed as a dismissed XEN. Feeling aggrieved of this description he filed Writ Petition No. 16970 of 1997. This writ petition was heard on 13‑5‑1998 and allowed inasmuch as the notice/order of the Syndicate treating the petitioner to be an ex‑employee of the University was declared to be illegal. The respondent filed Civil Petition No. 1658‑L of 1998 against the said order of this Court. This Civil Petition was decided in the following manner on 20‑12‑1999:‑‑ (3) Learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contends that he would not ask for reinstatement into service at this stage if his grievance is redressed to the extent that in the notice issued for appearance before the Syndicate for personal hearing, he be not termed as an ex‑employee of the petitioner instead he may be described as an under suspension XEN, till the decision afresh by the Syndicate in the light of the order dated 30‑6‑1997. (4) By consent of the parties, this petition is converted into appeal and allowed to the extent that appellant is directed than in future when a notice for hearing is issued to the respondent, he shall be described as under suspension XEN and not as an ex‑employee till the final order is passed by the Syndicate., after hearing the respondent. No order as to costs. The petitioner was then called upon to appear before the Syndicate. He again took up a cudgel that he should first be reinstated, paid his emoluments and until then he would not appear before the Syndicate. The refusal of the respondents to accede to the said request led to the filing of Writ Petition No. 12110 of 2000. This petition came up before; the Court on 19‑12‑2000 when the Court was informed by the respondent that the matter is fixed before the Syndicate on 22‑12‑2000. This Court directed the petitioner to appear before the Syndicate of course without prejudice to his said rights. Despite the said direction of the Court and being fully aware of the said date the petitioner opted not to appear before the Syndicate. Consequently, the matter was decided and result was that his earlier order of dismissal dated 26‑2‑1991 maintained. The decision was conveyed to the petitioner vide letter 16‑1‑2001 (Annexure G).

2. Learned counsel for the petitioner argues that the impugned decision is bad inasmuch as it has been passed with retrospective effect. Learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, states that the earlier order as such was never set aside nor was declared to be without lawful authority and this Court had only directed a re hearing of the matter by the Syndicate. According to the learned counsel this is the tenor of the earliest order passed by this Court on 30‑6‑1997. The precise contention is that after the re consideration of the matter the earlier order of dismissal was maintained and since the said order had taken effect, it cannot be said that a fresh order for dismissal has been passed with retrospective effect.

3. I have gone through the copies of the several documents appended with this writ petition, with the assistance of the learned counsel for the parties. I have already reproduced the order dated 30‑6‑1997 as also the order of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in Civil Petition No. 1658‑L of 1998. A plain reading of the said two orders clearly gives the impression that in the first instance Writ Petition No. 1828 of 1991 was allowed "to the extent" mentioned therein. This order does not at all state that the dismissal order challenged before the Court had been set aside or declared to be without lawful authority. However, in the second writ petition i.e. Writ Petition No. 16970 of 1997 this Court did declare that the petitioner is not to be treated as an ex‑employee in the notice or order of the Syndicate. The order was challenged and finally with the consent of the parties the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed that in future whenever a notice for hearing is issued he shall be described as an under suspension XEN and not an ex‑employee till the final order is passed by the Syndicate. Now the learned counsel for the petitioner (respondent in the Civil Petition) clearly stated at the bar that he would not be asking reinstatement in service.

4. In the above established state of facts on record the petitioner cannot urge that he was reinstated in service 'at any time because the order of dismissal was never set aside. On the other hand, his grievance was that he should not be described as an ex‑employee and for the purposes of his description in the notice to be issued by the Syndicate, the apex Court directed that he should be described as an employee under suspension. This does not at all mean that he was reinstated or was in fact suspended. I, therefore, do not find any force in this writ petition which accordingly is dismissed leaving the parties to bear their owns costs. Il.B.T./L‑78/L Petition dismissed.