P L D 1954 Lahore 439 (PLP)
CENTRAL EXCHANGE BANK LTD., LAHORE — ‑Petitioner Versus THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE‑Respondent
| Citation | P L D 1954 Lahore 439 (PLP) |
| Forum / Court | |
| Bench Members | : B. Z. Kaikaus and Akhlaque Husain, JJ. |
| Parties | CENTRAL EXCHANGE BANK LTD., LAHORE — ‑Petitioner Versus THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE‑Respondent |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in P L D 1954 Lahore 439 (PLP)?
This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case P L D 1954 Lahore 439 (PLP)?
The case was heard and decided by the bench comprising: : B. Z. Kaikaus and Akhlaque Husain, JJ..
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: P L D 1954 Lahore 439 (PLP) (CENTRAL EXCHANGE BANK LTD., LAHORE — ‑Petitioner Versus THE COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, LAHORE‑Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Representation
- M. Anwar, M. A. Rahman and Fazal Din, for Petitioner.
- Muhammad Hussain, for Respondents.
Headnotes / Summary
Case referred under section 66 (1) of the Income‑tax Act (XI of 1922) as adapted by the Pakistan (Adaptation of Income‑tax, Profits Tax and Revenue Recovery Acts) Order 1947 by the Income‑tax Appellate Tribunal, Pakistan, Lahore, for decision of certain questions of law arising in the case. (a) Income Tax Act (XI of 1922), S. 66‑Powers of High Court, stated. A duty is cast upon the High Court to decide the questions of law raised by a statement of the case drawn up by the Appellate Tribunal and referred to it. The only other jurisdiction, besides that of deciding the questions referred, which the High Court possesses under this sub section is to satisfy itself (1) that the questions referred are questions of law and (2) that they are "raised" by the statement of the case submitted by the Appellate Tribunal. Under subsection (1) the High Court possesses the further jurisdiction to see whether the questions of law referred arose out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal deciding the appeal before it; because if they do not so arise the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to make a reference. Beyond this, and that of requiring the Tribunal under subsection (4) to make additions to or alterations in, the statement of the case, a High Court possesses no jurisdiction under section 66 when considering a reference by Appellate Tribunal. (b) Income Tax Act (XI of 1922), S. 8‑Interest on securi ties of Central Government of India is not taxable under S. 8 India Independence (Rights, Properties and Liabilities) Order, 1947, Art.
9. The expression ` Central Government' when used in any law of a particular country means the Central Government of that country and would, therefore, when used in the Pakistan Income‑tax Act, means the Central Government of Pakistan. The Intention of section 8 is to bring only the interest receivable on the securities of the country within its purview; and to exclude from it interest on the securities of foreign Governments, which would fall under either section 10 or section 12 of the Act. "Article 9 of India Independence (Rights, Properties and Liabilities) Order, 1947 " makes it clear that after the appointed day the liability in respect of the securities created by the Central Government of India before that day, was cast upon the Dominion (now Re public) of India, and the Federation of Pakistan exonerated from the same. The securities being unquestion ably those of the present Government of India the first ques tion referred to us must be answered in the negative. (c) Income Tax Act (XI of 1922), S. 8‑Section is not charging section, it 'is only machinery section‑Income Tax is chargeable on income as defined in S.
4. Section 8 is not a charging section it is only a machinery section and is an explanation, or definition, of the second head of the charge of income set forth in section 6 of the Act. Before income‑tax is charged on any particular amount it must be shown to be income under section 4 of the Act. Firm of Narayandas Kedarnath v. Commissioner of Income tax Central A I R 1952 Bom. 459 relied on.
Judgment & Decree
(1) Whether interest on securities of the Central Government of India, as it existed prior to partition, is taxable in Pakistan under section 8 of the Income‑tax Act as adapted by the Pakistan (Adaptation of Existing Pakistan Laws) Order, 1947 ? (2) Whether, in the circumstances of the case, the amount of Rs. 16,200 has been rightly assessed as interest on securities " receivable " by the assessee during the account year, within the meaning of section 8 of the Income‑tax Act as adopted by the Pakistan (Adaptation of Existing Pakistan Laws) Order, 1947 ? Learned counsel appearing for the respondent, the Commissioner of Income‑tag Punjab and N.‑W.F.P., has raised a preliminary objection to this reference. He con tended that the questions referred to us are purely academic in nature and would have no effect, one way or the other, on the final assessment because Income‑tax on the amount in question could be charged under the provisions of the Act other than those contained in section
4. In order to convince us of the validity of the second part of his con tention he requested us to construe certain other sections of the Act in other words he wanted us to formulate another question of law and to decide it. It is apparent from the facts stated by us, and contained in the statement of case submitted by the Tribunal, that the income‑tax officer and the two appellate Courts decided the matter in issue merely on the basis of the propositions of law con tained in the two questions referred to this Court, and that they did not rest their decision upon any other ground. Under subsection (1) of section 66 of the Income‑tax Act the Appellate Tribunal is required to refer to the High Court, at the instance of either party before it, "any question of law arising out of such order " (i e., the order of the Appellate Tribunal deciding the appeal before it) and to " draw up a statement of the case and refer it to the High Court ". Subsection (5) lays down :‑ "The High Court upon the hearing of any such case shall decide the questions of law raised thereby and shall deliver its judgment thereon .". It would thus appear that a duty is cast upon the High Court to decide the questions of law raised by a statement of the case drawn up by the Appellate Tribunal and referred to it. The only other jurisdiction, besides that of deciding the questions referred, which the High Court possesses, under this subsection is to satisfy itself (1) that the questions referred are questions of law and (2) that they are "raised" by the statement of the case submitted by the Appellate Tribunal. Under subsection (1) the High Court possesses the further jurisdiction to see whether the questions of law referred arose out of the order of the Appellate Tribunal's deciding the appeal before it; because if they do not so arise the Tribunal would have no jurisdiction to make a reference. Beyond this, and that of requiring the Tribunal under subsection (4) to make additions to or alterations in, the statement of the case, a High Court possesses no jurisdiction under section 66 when considering a reference by the Appellate Tribunal. The two questions referred to us are unquestionably questions of law, which did arise out of the appellate order of the learned Tribunal and have been fairly and unambiguously raised by the statement of the case submitted to this Court. We, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection raised by the respondent. So far as the decision of the first question is concerned, it presents little difficulty. The relevant portion of section 8 of the Income‑tax is as follows:‑ "The tag shall be payable by an assessee under the head Interest on Securities" in respect of the interest receivable by him on any security of the Central Govern ment ......... The expression `Central Government' when used in any law of a particular country means the Central Government of that country and would, therefore, when used in the Pakistan Income‑tax Act, mean the Central Government of Pakistan. The intention of section 8 is to bring only the interest receivable on the securities of the country within its purview ; and to exclude from it interest on the securities of foreign Governments, which would fall under either section 10 or section 12 of the Act. Therefore the sole question falling for decision is whether the securities in question are those of the Central Government of Pakistan. This is purely a question of fact and it is not denied by either party to the reference that the securities are of the Government of India. Had it been only conceded that the securities in question were created by the Government of India before August 15, 1947, it would still have to be determined whether they belong to it even now. But in the question referred to us it is expressly stated that they are even now "of the Government of India ". In the question referred to us for our decision the Tribunal has mentioned the Pakistan (Adaptation of Existing Pakistan Laws) Order, 1947. There is nothing either in the statement of case or in the question itself to indicate which of the provisions of that order the Tribunal had in mind. Learned counsel appearing for the Income‑tax Department has referred us to the Schedule to that Order by which the original section 3 (8ab) of the General Clauses Act (X of 1897) has been substituted by the follows:
" (8ab) " Central Government " shall‑
(a) in relation to anything done before the commence ment of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935, mean the Governor‑General in Council or the authority competent at the relevant date to exercise the functions corresponding to those subsequently exercised by the Gover nor‑General ; (b) in relation; to anything done after the commence ment of Part III of the said Act, but before the establishment of the Federation of Pakistan, mean as respects matters with respect to which the Governor- General was by or under the provisions of the said act then in force required to act in his discretion, the Governor‑General and as respects other matters, the Governor‑General in Council; and (c) in relation to anything done or to be done after the establishment of the Federation of Pakistan, mean the Governor‑General : .." These provisions are hardly of any assistance in deciding the question. This section only defines the authority which should be considered as " Central Government " with reference to anything done before the commencement of Part III of Government of India Act 1935 after that date and after the establishment of the Federation of ' Pakistan. With reference to the first period it means the Governor‑General in Council : the second Governor‑General or the Governor General in Council as the case may be and the third the Governor‑General. There is nothing in the amended section (8ab) of the General Clauses Act to show that the securities which before the 15th of August 1947 belonged to Government of India and even now continue to belong to it should he considered to be the securities of the Central Government within the meaning of section 8 of the Income‑tax Act. In fact the expressions " Governor‑General in Council " and "Governor‑General " as used in clauses (a) and (b) of the amended section 3 (8ab) of the General Clauses Act must necessarily mean the Governor‑General in Council and the Governor‑General of the undivided India, as the undivided India and its Government were legal and, constitutional entities distinctly different from those of Pakistan and its Government. A reference to Article 9 of the India Independence (Rights, Properties and Liabilities) Order, 1947 would set at rest the dispute whether the securities in question became the securities to the Government of India after the 15th of August, 1947. This article provides as follows:‑ "All liabilities in respect of such loans, guarantees and other financial obligations of the Governor‑General in Council ..as are outstanding immediately before the appointed day (i.e., the 15th of August 1947) shall as from that day,‑(a) it, the case of liabilities of the Governor‑General in Council, he liabilities of they' Dominion of India; . This article makes it clear that after the appointed day the liability in respect of the securities created by the Central Government of India before that day, was cast upon the Dominion (now Republic) of India, and the Federa tion of Pakistan was exonerated from the same. The securities being unquestionably those of the present Government of India the first question referred to us must be answered in the negative. As regards the second question referred to us by the Tribunal, it might well be answered as the decisions of the Income‑tax Officer and the Appellate Assistant Com missioner rested mainly on the interpretation of the word " receivable " in section 8 ; and as it was decided by the Appellate Tribunal and has been raised in the statement of the case. Strictly speaking, our answer to the first ques tion should be quite sufficient to dispose of the case. The second question must also be answered in the negative assuming of course that the securities are of the Central Government of Pakistan and, therefore, come within the ambit of section 8 of the Income‑tax Act. Section 8 is not a charging section ; it is only a machinery section and is an explanation or definition, of the second head of the charge of income set forth in section 6 of the Act. Before income‑tax is charged on any particular amount it must be shown to be income under section 4 of the Act. We are fortified in our opinion on this point by the decision of the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court reported in Firm of Narayandas Kedarnath v. Commissioner of Income- tax Central (A I R 1952 Bom. 459.). The assessee will be entitled to his costs in this Court. K. M. A. Reference answered.