1999 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

"(III)The Government shall have the right to terminate his services at any time without assigning any reason thereof during the period of ad hoc appointment. " The Petitioner has impugned the termination order dated 28‑5‑1997 under Notification No. S.O.(A‑11)6‑229/91. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the petitioner's service has been terminated on the direction of respondent No. l and is politically motivated and, as such, illegal, ultra vires and in violation of the Petitioner's fundamental rights as no show‑cause notice was issued nor any opportunity of hearing was afforded to him. The learned counsel relied on the cases of Sheikh Mudassar Ahmad v. Government of Pakistan (1991 PLC (C.S.) 1047) and Abdul Jabbar v. Secretary, Government of Punjab and another (1995 PLC (C. S.) 449). Mr. Munib Ahmed Khan, the learned A.A.‑G., on the other hand, has challeng6d the maintainability of this petition as, according to trim, the jurisdiction of this Court is barred in view of the fact that the matter pertains to the service of Government servant and under Article 212, the Service Tribunal only has power to deal with such matters. The learned A.A.‑G. has relied on the case of Abdul Bari v. Government of Pakistan and others (PLD 1981 Karachi 290), wherein it was held that "all grounds of attack urge, before the Service Tribunal including grounds of mala fide, ultra vires or coram non judice can be dealt with and determined by the Service Tribunal." In the present case since orders of termination had been issued by the authority concerned and it pertains to the terms and conditions of service even if mala fides are attracted in passing of the termination order, the same can be dealt with by the Service Tribunal. We have heard both the learned counsel and have perused the Notifications and relevant record. At the very outset we may mention that the order dated 23‑5‑1997, impugned herein, does not reflect that the decision had been taken on the recommendation of any authority. The notifications simply says "with the approval of the Competent Authority" and, in our opinion, the approval of the Competent Authority for the purpose of issuing this order is as required by law. Now, coming to the case of Sheikh Mudassar Ahmad referred to by the counsel for the Petitioner, the orders in the case referred to were passed on the direction of Cabinet and it was observed that "the impugned orders were not passed by departmental authority within the contemplation of the explanation given under section 4 of the Service Tribunal Act. The orders had been simply implemented pursuant to a policy decision of the Cabinet and the departmental authority had simply implemented the decision without application of its mind." In the case of Abdul Jabbar the counsel representing Government of Punjab conceded that orders of termination were not justified on the ground of their violation of principles of natural justice. In the instant case the orders have been passed by the departmental Secretary with the approval of the competent Authority, as such, the cases referred to are distinguishable from the present case. Further, that the Government concerned is contesting and no such ncession has been made. Article 212 of the Constitution clearly excludes cases from the jurisdiction of the High Court which fall within the purview of Service Tribunal. Under section 4(1) of the Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973), "an appeal by a civil servant is competent to the Service Tribunal against any final order, whether original or appellate, made by a departmental authority respecting his terms and conditions of service". In view of clear law, we are of the view that we have no jurisdiction in this matter and sustain the objection raised by the learned A.A.‑G. Under the circumstances, this petition, having no force, is dismissed in litmine alongwith the miscellaneous application. However, the petitioner will be free to take any legal steps to safeguard his interest as provided under the law.