1978 PLP 115 (PLC)

This is an appeal against the decision dated, 31‑7‑1976 of Punjab Labour Court No. 2, Lahore.

2. Dildar Mohammad Pervez, respondent joined service of the Allied Bank as a Clerk and has 19 years service to his credit. He was promoted as an officer and posted as a Manager on 25‑10‑1969 at Mandi Shaban Singh Wala Branch, District Sheikhupura. He served there in that capacity till 6‑8‑1973 and, thereafter, was transferred to Nowshera Virkan Branch, District Sheikhupura. He remained there till 19.4‑1974. While he was posted at Mandi Dhapan Singh Wala Branch, a fraud was detected and a case was registered against the cashier of the Bank. On 15‑10‑1975 while he was officiating as Manager of the Bank at Chuharkana Branch, he received a letter dated 14‑10‑1975 Exh. P‑6, terminating his services with effect from 15‑10‑1975 on the ground that he was no longer required. On 22‑10‑1975 he made representation Exh P‑7 against the ter mination of his service. The Management replied vide letter dated 4‑11 1975 Exh P‑R, rejecting the representation. On 13‑11‑19'15 he made another representation Exh. P‑9. which was also rejected by the Management, vide letter Exh. P‑10 dated 24‑11‑1975. On 12‑12‑1975 he sent a grievance notice Exh P‑11 which was rejected by the Management vide letter Exh. P‑12 dated i9‑12‑1975. On 26‑12‑75 the Management sent a letter Exh. P‑13 to the respondent, intimating that he was relieved from duty with immediate effect and that be should have over charge to Mr. Rashid Ahmad Accountant Incharge of that Branch. This letter was served on the respondent on 23‑1‑1976 and that he thereupon vide Exh. P‑14 dated 23‑1‑1976 handed over charge to Mr. Rashid Ahmad. On 23‑2‑1976 the respondent filed a petition under section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1569 for re‑instatement with back benefits. In paragraph 4 of the petition he stated that on 14‑1C‑1975 his services were terminated by the Second, Vice‑President of the Bank without assigning any reason. In paragraph 5 of the petition he challenged the order dated, 14‑10‑1975 on the grounds mentioned in the petition. Alongwith that petition he also filed an application under section 65‑B of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 for condonation of delay in filing the main petition. In that applic ation he reiterated that his services were terminated by the Second Vice‑President of the Bank vide letter dated 14‑7 0‑1975, that he made representations to the President of the Bank on 22‑101975 and 13‑11‑1975 which were rejected and that, thereafter, he sent grievance notice on 12‑12‑1975, the reply to which was received back on 25‑12‑1975. The learned Labour Court, without dealing with the application for condonation of delay, proceeded to hear the petition on merits, vide decision under appeal the Labour Court accepted the petition and directe.5 that the respondent be re‑instated with back wages.

3. Aggrieved by the above decision, the appellant has preferred this appeal.

4. The learned counsel for the appellant raised a legal objection to the effect that since the petition under section 25‑A was not filed within two months of 14‑10‑75 when the services of the respondent were terminate it was barred by time in vie v of subsection (6) of section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The learned counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the cause of action arose on 23‑1‑1976 when the respondent relinquished charge and, therefore, the petition under section 25‑A, which was filed on 23‑2‑1976, was within time.

5. From the perusal of the petition under section 25‑A and the applica tion for condonation of delay, it is clear that the cause of action arose from 14‑10-1975 because it is nowhere mentioned that he had relinquished charge on 23‑1‑1976 and against that he had filed the petition.

6. It is well established, rule that a party is bound by its pleadings and that if a plea of fact is not pleaded no case can be founded on it. I am fortified in this view by the judgment of the; Supreme Court in the case, Government of West Pakistan (Now Punjab) through Secretary, Rawalpindi v. Haft Mohammad (P L D 1976 S C 469).

7. In the case, Messrs Chaudhary Brothers Ltd., Sialkot v. Jaranwala Central Co‑operative Bank Ltd., Jaranwala (1968 S C M R 804), it was observed that no evidence should have been allowed to be adduced on facts which had not been raised in the pleadings or incorporated in the issues framed.

8. In the present case as already mentioned above, the respondent had only challenged the, order of termination of his services dated 14‑10‑1975 and there is no mention about his cause of action arising on 23‑1‑1976 when he relinquished charge. Therefore, he is bound by his pleadings and that no case can be founded on the plea of fact not pleaded by him. As the respondent had challenged the order of termination of his services on 14‑10‑1975, he should have filed his petition under section 25‑A& within two months of that date. Since it was not done, his petition was barred by time in view of subsection (6) of section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 as already' held by me in the case, Muslim, Commercial Bank Ltd (Regional Office), Gujranwala v. Mohammad Tayyab Khan, decided on 3‑6‑1977.

9. The learned counsel for the respondent further contended that the delay in filing the petition can now be condoned. It is well established that a delay can only be condoned if a sufficient cause is shown. In the case, Abdul Ghani v. Ghulam Sarwar (PLD1977SC102) it was held that "sufficient cause" means circumstances beyond the control of party concerned. In the instant case, the circumstances were not beyond the control of the respondent. In the case, Nagina Silk Mills, Lyallpur v. Tire Income‑tax Officer, B‑Ward, Lyallpur and another (PLD1963SC322) it was observed: "It is a well‑recognised principle of the law of limitation that once time begins to run from a specified date it cannot be interrupted or extended unless the Legislature intervenes and makes express pro vision to the contrary."

10. In any case, no explanation for not filing the petition from 24‑1‑1976 when he had relinquished charge to 23‑2‑1976 was furnished. Under these circumstances, the delay at this belated stage cannot be condoned.

11. I, accordingly, accept the appeal, set aside the decision of the Labour Court and dismiss the petition of the respondent filed under section 25 .A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.