PLC 1995

1995 PLP 188 (PLC)

SHER MEHMOOD KHAN Versus CHAIRMAN, LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL N.W.F.P., PESHAWAR and 5 others

Jurisdiction / Court
Peshawar High Court
Decided Date
Writ Petition No. 77 of 1993, decided on 19th December, 1994.
Honorable Judges
Sardar Muhammad Raza Khan and Shakirullah Jan, JJ
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1995 PLP 188 (PLC)
Forum / Court Peshawar High Court
Bench Members Sardar Muhammad Raza Khan and Shakirullah Jan, JJ
Parties SHER MEHMOOD KHAN Versus CHAIRMAN, LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL N.W.F.P., PESHAWAR and 5 others
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1995 PLP 188 (PLC)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1995 PLP 188 (PLC)?

The case was heard and decided by the Peshawar High Court bench comprising: Sardar Muhammad Raza Khan and Shakirullah Jan, JJ.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1995 PLP 188 (PLC) (SHER MEHMOOD KHAN Versus CHAIRMAN, LABOUR APPELLATE TRIBUNAL N.W.F.P., PESHAWAR and 5 others). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Abdul Wahid Khan assisted by Dost Muhammad Khan and Shah Nawaz Khan Sikandri for Petitioner.
  • Faizullah Khan Sadozai for Respondents Nos. 4 to 6.
  • Date of hearing: 19th December, 1994.

Headnotes / Summary

Workmen's Compensation Act (VIII of 1923)‑‑ ‑‑‑‑Sched. II, Sr. No. (XIII)‑‑‑Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S. 25‑A‑‑‑Civil Servants Act (LXXI of 1973), S. 2(1)(b)(iii)‑‑‑Postman‑‑ Termination of service‑‑‑Jurisdiction of Labour Court ‑‑‑Competency‑‑ Postman whether a "workman" or a "civil servant"‑‑‑‑Schedule II of Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923 at Serial No. XIII provides that a person employed in any occupation ordinarily involving outdoor work in the Posts and Telegraphs Department is a "workman"‑‑‑Postman was thus, covered by such description and being a "workman" could invoke jurisdiction of Labour Court under S.25‑A, Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969‑‑‑Postman was not a civil servant and was not governed by provisions of Civil Servants Act, 1973‑‑‑Where Labour Court had ordered re‑instatement of workman on basis of evidence on record, Labour Appellate Tribunal had not given its finding on merit but disposed of appeal by holding that postman was not a "workman" but a civil servant‑‑‑Decision of Labour Appellate Tribunal was set aside with direction to give finding afresh on merits. Superintendent of Post Offices v. Allah Wafhayo 1988 PLC 114; 1993 PLC 88; 1993 PLC 825 and Superintendent, Post Offices Lahore Division v. Muhammad Yaseen 1984 PLC 979 rel.

Judgment & Decree

Faizullah Khan Sadozai for Respondents Nos. 4 to

6. Date of hearing: 19th December, 1994. SARDAR MUHAMMAD RAZA KHAN, J: ‑‑Sher Mehmood Khan appointed as Postman at Bannu on 1‑7‑1991, regularised on 10‑6‑1992, his services were terminated on 22‑6‑1992 and hence, under section‑.25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969, he made a grievance petition before the Presiding Officer, Labour Court, Bannu.

2. Vide his order dated 24‑2‑1993, the Labour Court reinstated Sher Mehmood Khan with full back benefits and rejected the arguments that the postman was a "civil servant" and that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to try the matter. The Chairman, Pakistan Postal Corporation, Islamabad and others went in appeal before the Chairman, Labour Appellate Tribunal, N: W.F.P., Peshawar who, vide his judgment dated 10‑6‑1993, accepted the appeal holding that the postman was a "civil servant" and that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the grievance petition. Sher Mehmood Khan has challenged such verdict before this Court under its Constitutional Jurisdiction flowing from Article 199.

3. It is to be stated at the very outset and we feel concerned about it that the Labour Court had decided the petition on merits as well as on the question of jurisdiction but before the learned Appellate Tribunal, the learned counsel did not agitate the merits and confined himself to the question of jurisdiction. This would lead to an inference that the learned counsel had nothing to say on merits and thus had chosen the singular argument about jurisdiction. We cannot say that he was so sure of the point of jurisdiction that he attached least importance to any other issue. The arguments addressed before us have led us to conclude altogether differently.

4. The learned Appellate Tribunal was of the view that a postman is a "civil servant". For that purpose the Hon'ble Tribunal referred to the definition of civil servant as provided in Civil Servants Act, 1973. The reproduction of such definition in para. 5 of the impugned judgment would reveal that the learned counsel had failed to assist the Hon'ble Tribunal in a proper manner and even the complete definition of the word "civil servant" was not unfolded before the Hon'ble Tribunal. Section 2(l)(b) (iii) of the Civil Servants Act, 1973 would suggest that a civil servant is the one whose characteristics are given in portion (b) of the section but it does not include (as portion iii) "worker" or "workman" as defined in the Factories Act, 1934 or the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923.

5. Adverting to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, the definition of "workman" is provided in section 2 (1) (n) sub‑clause (i) meaning any person who is excluded under sub‑clause (n) and who also is not employed in any capacity as is specified in Schedule (II) of the Act. The Schedule at Sr. No.(XIII) clearly provides that a person employed in any occupation ordinarily involving outdoor work in the Posts and Telegraphs Department, is a "workman". One does not require any amount of effort to know that the only person entrusted with outdoor work in the Posts and Telegraphs Department is most certainly a "postman", if not any one else as well. The above probe through definition of the word "civil servant" has brought us to a definite conclusion that a "workman" is not a "civil servant" and that a postman is decidedly a "workman". The learned Labour Court had the jurisdiction to entertain the grievance petition under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance. The Hon'ble Appellate Tribunal was not taken through the detailed definitions involved.

6. A similar question had arisen before the Labour Appellate Tribunal, Sindh in the Superintendent of Post Offices v. Allah Wafhayo (198 PLC 114) where even a Sub‑Postmaster was held entitled to agitate his grieance before the Labour Court. In still other petitions by Nadeem Ahmed and Munir Ahmed before Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal, the peons of Post Office Department were considered to be "workmen" despite the fact that such department had been working under the authority of the Federal Government (1993 PLC 88 and 825) was cited. In Superintendent, Post Offices Lahore Division v. Muhammad Yaseen 1984 PLC 979 a postman was held to be ousted from definition of "civil servant."

7. Apart from above rulings even if one attends to the definitions of the word "civil servant" in the Civil Servants Act and "workmen" in the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, one can conveniently conclude that a postman is a "workman" and not a "civil servant".

8. Having arrived at the above conclusion we feel at loss to decide the writ petition because the Hon'ble Labour Appellate Tribunal, N: W.F.P. in the impugned order, has not touched the merits of the case. We therefore, accept this writ petition, set aside the impugned judgment dated 10‑6‑1993 and restore Appeal No. 36 of 1993 before the Hon'ble Tribunal with direction that it be decided on merits, considering Sher Mehmood Khan (respondent before the Tribunal) to be a "workman" and not a civil servant. No order as to costs. A.A./1704/P Case remanded.