1994 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

JUSTICE (RETD.) MUNAWARALI KHAN (CHAIRMAN).‑‑‑ The appellant Akhtar Hussain was a police Constable at Hyderabad when he was dismissed from service vide S.S.P. Hyderabad's order dated 22‑10‑1988. As disclosed in the said order he was given a show‑cause notice based on the charges that he had been involved in two criminal cases; (1) Crime No. 50/87 under section 13‑D, Arms Ordinance (2) FIR 51/87 under section 13‑D, Arms Ordinance of P.S. Latifabad. As he had remained absent since 11‑8‑1988, the show‑cause notice could not be served on him. However, the D.S.P., Headquarter conducted formal enquiry and submitted his report which clearly indicated that not only the appellant was involved in the above two cases but Klashnikov was also recovered from his possession. As per said report since the appellant was a hardened criminal and was unlikely to prove a good police officer, he was dismissed from service. The appellant challenged the order of his dismissal in departmental appeal filed before the D.I.G.P who by his order dated 28‑5‑1989 rejected his appeal. Thereafter, instead of coming to this Tribunal, the appellant once again approached the same authority namely the D.I.G.P., this time for his reinstatement in service but his request was turned down vide D.I.G.P's order dated 8‑1‑1992. Then he took the matter to the I.G.P. in revision but he too rejected his petition vide I.G.P's. order dated 9‑2‑1993. It is the latter order, which has been challenged in the present appeal filed on 8‑3‑1993: We heard Mr. Hameed‑ud‑Din Khan for the appellant at‑great length and Mr. Habib Rasheed made his arguments on behalf of the official respondents. We also went through all the relevant documents and authorities cited at the bar. Before touching the merits of the case, we proceed to deal with the objection raised with regard to the limitation. The SSP Hyderabad's order whereby the appellant was dismissed from service was passed on 22‑10‑1988, whereas the appellant approached this Tribunal against the said order on 8‑3‑1993. Obviously the appellant owed an explanation for the delay of more than five years ht took in filing the present appeal. We have come across two orders of the D.I.G.P., first dated 28‑5‑1989 and second dated 8‑1‑1992, which clearly indicate that the appellant approached the said authority twice. It was quite understandable that for the first time he would have gone to the D.I.G.P. in departmental appeal against the order of his removal. Although a copy of the appellant's departmental appeal is not placed before us yet the D.I.G.P's. order by which his departmental appeal was rejected is available on record. The said order is dated 28‑5‑1989. Having thus exhausted his right of one departmental appeal, the appellant was required to seek further remedy from the Service Tribunal. Accordingly his present appeal should have been filed latest by 26‑6‑1989. But he actually, game to this Tribunal on 8‑3‑1993, after the delay of over three and half years. It is this delay, which has not been satisfactorily explained. In many cases of police personnel we have observed that after their first appeal is rejected by the DIGP, they usually take their case to higher authority i.e. I.G.P., either deliberately or through ignorance of the prescribed procedure. But contrary to that practice, the appellant in the instant case approached the D.I.G.P. second time before taking his case to the IGP. Even the petition made to the D.I.G.P. second time has not been placed on record. It is therefore no known what made the appellant to approach the D.I.G.P second, time. However, the second order passed by D.I.G.P only reminded the appellant that his appeal against the order of his dismissal had already been rejected. The gap between the D.I. G.P's. two order is more than two and half years, which seriously reflects on the appellant's lack of vigilance, tending to show as if he was not so serious in pursuing his case. As stated above the appellant was not supposed to approach the I.G.P. after his first appeal was rejected by the D.I.G.P. This Tribunal has taken this view consistently in scores of cases. In one case, the above view was challenged in appeal before the Supreme Court. Upholding the said view that Supreme Court was pleased to hold that only one appeal could be filed against the original order and the order of appellate Authority would be final. It was further held that time spent in filing further appeal 'before the higher departmental Authority was not warranted by law and time spent in filing and prosecuting such appeal could not be taken into consideration in computing limitation. Even rule 16.29 (2) of Police Rules speaks of one appeal. It reads as under:‑ "(2) There shall be one appeal only from the original order, and the order of the appellate Authority shall be final." Apart from above, even the appellant's revision petition filed before the I. G.P. was prima facie unduly delayed. He did not go in revision to the I.G.P. against the first order of the D.I.G.P. passed on 28‑5‑1989. But instead he kept wasting, time and it was after lapse of more than two and half years when he was informed by the second order of the D.I.G.P. that his appeal had already been rejected that he approached the I.G.P. In the circumstances explained above, the time wasted by the appellant ever since the passing of the first order of the D.I.G.P. (i.e. 28‑5‑1989 cannot be condoned and as such his appeal being hopelessly time‑barred is liable to be dismissed on the above ground of limitation. Even on merits the appellant does not seem to have a good case. He was admittedly involved in two criminal cases filed against him under section 13‑D Arms Ordinance. In one case a Klashnikov was allegedly recovered from his possession. Of course in the lower Court he was acquitted in one case on the ground that the prosecution was unable to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt but the other case ended in his conviction. No doubt the said conviction was set aside by the High Court but it was clear from the judgment of the High Court that the appellant's acquittal was not honourable because he was let off by giving him benefit of doubt. So, in bath the cases his exhoneration was based not on giving him a clean slate but on benefit of doubt. This was precisely the reason that it was expressed in the punishment order and very rightly that the appellant was unlikely to prove a good police officer. If a member of security service, like the appellant was involved in two criminal cases, one after other and in one case 1e was even convicted by lower Court such a person was definitely unfit for police service. From the above discussion, we are of the view that this appeal is fit to be dismissed. It is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. H.B.T./428/Sr.S Appeal dismissed.