P L D 1979 Karachi 706 (PLP)

‑‑‑ S. 9‑Civil Courts‑Jurisdiction‑Civil Courts, unless their jurisdic tion specifically or by implication curtailed, held, have jurisdiction to decide every dispute.‑[Jurisdiction]. Memon Abdul Latif for Appellant. Date of hearing : 4th November 1978. MUHAMMAD ZAHOORUL HAQ, J: These are six Revision Application filed by the petitioners against the orders passed by the First Additional District Judge, Karachi in Civil Appeals Nos. 217, 218, 219, 220, 221 and 222 of 1977, arising out of the judgments and decrees dated 31‑7‑1977, passed by the Senior Civil Judge, Karachi, in Suit Nos. 638, 557, 556, 558, 559 and 560 of 1977. Since, there is a common law point involved and all the orders under appeal were passed in the same judgment, therefore, all these revisions are being decided together.

2. Facts leading to these petitions are that the petitioners had filed their claims under Registration of Claims Act, 1956 before the Claims Authorities and they were verified in due course and the petitioners were issued compensa tion books for their respective claims. In 1960 or thereabout, the claims compensation books were utilised by the petitioners by adjustment of their claims towards price of various properties which had been acquired from the Settlement Department by different parties and those parties purchased the compensation books from the present petitioners. The petitioners were informed in 1977 by their respective purchasers that some adverse order had been passed in respect of their claims and their claims had been cancelled. On an enquiry they learned that an order had been passed by the Deputy Settle ment Commissioner, Central Settlement Cell at Karachi, whereby their compensation books were cancelled. The petitioners filed these suits in 1977 being Nos. 638, 556, 557, 558, 559 and 560 of 1977 before VI Senior Civil Judge, Karachi wherein they challenged the orders of cancellation of their claims by Settlement Authorities‑cum‑Claims Authorities as being without jurisdiction and having been passed without any notice of them. All these suits were decided by a common judgment on 31st July, 1977 wherein the learned Judge took the view that order had been passed after thorough enquiry by the Settlement Authorities and notices were issued to the holders of the compensation books at the address given in the compensa tion books, but none of the petitioners appeared in response of those notices and on that ground, it was held that proper opportunity had been provided to the petitioners to appeal before the Settlement and Claims Authorities. The learned Civil Judge took the view that defendants had acted within their jurisdiction in passing the impugned order and that if any order is passed by civil Court, it will hamper their day to day working. The Civil Judge also took the view that the petitioners had made no representation or filed any appeal before the Settlement Authorities and therefore, there‑was no justification to file the suit. The learned Additional District Judge, Karachi, dismissed the appeal of the petitioner on the ground that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in cases the remedy of Special Tribunal is provided within the same enactment, and therefore, civil Court had no jurisdiction. The contention of Mr. M. A. Latif, the learned counsel for the petitioner is that by section 2 (i) of Ordinance XV of 1974, all the laws in respect of Evacuee properties including registration of Claims (Displaced Persons) Act, 1966 were repealed w. e. f. 1‑7‑1974, and only pending proceedings were allowed to continue by the said Ordinance. His contention is that there were no proceedings in respect of these claims before any Claims or Settlement Authorities upto July, 1974, and therefore, the Settlement Authorities were not empowered in law to take any action in respect of these claims. The counsel has relied upon P L D 1978 Kar. 109 where Mr. Justice Zaffar Hussain Mirza of this High Court has taken the view that it is only the pending proceeding which can be disposed of under Ordinance XV of 1974. The learned counsel has also relied upon P L D 1976 Lab. 17, P L D 1977 Lab. 761 and 1974 S C M R 8 where d has been held that after issuance of P. T. D. an aggrieved party can challenge the same before a civil Court only and the Settlement Authorities have no jurisdiction to deal with such matters. There fore, the position is that if the contention of the petitioner was correct that there was no proceeding pending in respect of their claim before 1st July, 1974, the authorised officer under Ordinance XV of 1974 will have no power to deal in such matter and even, if there is anything wrong with the verification of the claims then the same can only be gone into in a civil suit. Therefore, these allegations of the petitioner had to be investigated by the Civil Court before it came to the conclusion that it will have no jurisdiction. Dismissing the suit on the ground that the order of civil Court will interfere with the working of the Government Department amounts to refusal to exercise a jurisdiction, if there is a challenge in the suit to the very basis of the jurisdiction of the Claims and Settlement Authorities which was the case in these suits. It is only after the Civil Court had come to the conclusion that the proceedings were pending on Ist July, 1974, that they could not deal with the merits of that order and the suit could have been dismissed. Another point on which the civil Courts had declined jurisdiction is that there has been no appeal filed before the Appellate Authorities. In this respect Mr. M. A. Latif referred to P L D 1978 Lab. 1247 wherein it has been held that b under Ordinance XV of 1974, the powers of authorised officer acting under the said Ordinance are not subject to appeal or revision, In such view of the matter, the petitioner could not have gone before any Appellate or Revisional Authorities. They could have, however made a representation to the same officer, who mad ex-parte order against them for re‑considering the matter, and for this view there is an authority in P L D 1979 Kar.

497. However they could not be non suited only on account of not having filed an application for review before the Deputy Claims Commissioner concerned, if the contention was that there was no jurisdiction at all in that officer to deal with these claims after 1‑7‑1974. It is an established proposition of law that civil Courts have jurisdiction to decide every dispute unless their jurisdiction is specifically or by implication curtailed. There is, however, no such restriction in Ordinance XV of 1974, expressly and if it was argued that by necessary implication such restriction should be presumed, then the same can be met by argument that there was complete lack of initial jurisdiction in the relevant authorised officer, if it was correct that there was no proceeding pending on 1‑7‑1974. I do not want to comment on the question whether there was any pro ceeding pending on 1‑7‑1974, as it would be for the Civil Court concerned to come to the decision after hearing of parties. In such view of the matter, I would accept the revisions and set aside the judgments and decrees of the two Lower Courts below and remand the case to the Civil Judge concerned in Karachi for decision of the suits on merit, after hearing the parties. S. A. H. Revision accepted.