2004 PLP 1476 (YLR)

(2) Whether the suit is maintainable in the present Form? OPP (3) Whether the plaint is deficient in court‑fee, its effect? OPD (4) Whether this Court does not have the jurisdiction? OPD (5) Whether the plaintiff is the owner of the disputed property? OPP (6) Relief, special costs. The parties led the evidence and ultimately the learned trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 10‑4‑1976. The appellant assailed the said judgment before the appellate forum, but without any success as his appeal was dismissed on the ground of jurisdiction by the learned Additional District Judge vide judgment and decree dated 27‑9‑1978, hence the present appeal.

3. Learned counsel for the appellant, while referring to certain judgments, has submitted that the Civil Courts, being the Courts of ultimate jurisdiction, have always the jurisdiction to try the suit and the impugned judgments and decrees are not sustainable. Conversely, the learned counsel for the respondent has submitted that as, admittedly, the suit property is an evacuee property, the Civil Courts had no jurisdiction and thus, both the judgments are not liable to be interfered by this Court, which are concurrent in nature.

4. Upon the examination of the impugned judgments and the available record I am of the view that virtually the question, around which whole of the controversy revolves is that whether the house in dispute is the evacuee property or not. The‑claim of the appellant is based on a consent decree (Exh.P.2) and the Jamabandies relating to the year 1968‑69 (Exh.P.1). In order to rebut that the respondent, in addition to other documents, has relied upon the confirmation order, through which the house in dispute was transferred to him under some settlement scheme. Both the Courts below, after taking into consideration various documents, produced by the respective parties, came to the conclusion that the Rehabilitation Authorities had permanently transferred the house in dispute to the respondent treating it as an evacuee property. When the status of the property has already been determined as an evacuee property obviously the Civil Courts, in view of section 41 of the Pakistan Administration of Evacuee Property Act, 1977 and sections 22 and 25 of the Land Settlement Act, had no jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the matter. The learned Additional District Judge has properly comprehended the issue involved in the case and rightly held that the Civil Courts have no jurisdiction.

5. Both the parties relied upon various judgments, however, in the latest judgment reported as Muhammad Sarwar and 5 others v. Muhammad Ali and 18 others 2002 SCMR 829, the apex Court of the country while dealing with sections 22 and 25 of the Displaced Persons Land Settlement Act, 1958 has held as under:‑‑ ...."It is an established law that an order passed by the settlement, authorities under Displace Persons (Land Settlement) Act, 1958, would attain finality if it is not challenged in the same hierarchy and the Civil Court would have no jurisdiction either to determine the character of the property under said law or entitlement of a person for allotment due to the statutory bar. In the present case, the High Court without keeping in view the scope of the jurisdiction of the Civil Court only attended second question relating to the nature of the property on the assumption that the suit was maintainable before the Civil Court whereas the two Courts concurrently, under Issue No.3 held that the suit was not maintainable due to bar of jurisdiction. A somewhat similar question cropped up in the following cases:‑‑ (1) Abdul Hakim v. Muhammad Azam Khan 1991 SCMR 1976; (2) Faizuddin Ahmad v. Muhammad Yosaf 1988 SCMR 1289; (3) Qamar Zaman v. Ejazi Begum 1997 MLD 2408 and (4) Zafar Hassan v. Muhammad Kalim 1993 SCMR 2028. "

6. In the above perspective, I have examined both the judgments and find that both the Courts have embarked upon each and every aspect involved in the case, appreciated the record in its true perspective and reached to the proper conclusions, which are not open to B exception by this Court in second appeal. The learned counsel could not point out any legal ' flaw or grave infirmity in the impugned judgments so as to unsettle concurrent findings of facts given by both the Courts below on the question of jurisdiction. In the present set of circumstance, I am not inclined to interfere in the impugned judgments, which are hereby maintained. Upshot of the above discussion is, that the present appeal is devoid of merits, thus, dismissed leaving the parties to bear their own costs. M.I./A‑1005/L Appeal dismissed.