P L D 1958 Supreme Court (Pak (PLP)

SHAHABUDDIN, J.‑This is an appeal under Article 159 (d) of the Constitution from the judgment of the High Court of Dacca by which the appellants Abdus Salam, Editor, Pakistan Observer, Dacca, and Shainul Islam, Printer and Publisher of the said daily were convicted of contempt of the High Court and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 50 each. The charge against the appellant was that with regard to a case of contempt of Court against one Lakitullah which was heard by the High Court of Dacca on the 19th November 1957, it was reported in the Pakistan Observer dated 20th November 1957 that the proceedings had been dropped in view of the unqualified apology tendered by the delinquent while, as a matter, of fact, the learned Judges who heard that case had reserved orders. As to what happened it) that case on the 19th November was stated by the learned Judges in the following words "After hearing the learned advocate and examining the contemner, we indicated that we were inclined to accept his apology but reserved passing of our orders in that case for the next day". The explanation given by the appellants was that from the course of the arguments and the observations made by the Court it was gathered that the learned Judges had accepted the apology of Lakitullah and that, therefore, the contemner would be excused and no action would be taken against him. It was also stated in the affidavit that "this was confirmed from the enquiry made from the learned Senior Advocate appearing for the contemner". The learned Judges held that the report in the Pakistan Observer was a misrepresentation of the proceedings of the High Court and though it might not have actually pre judiced the parties, it did have the tendency to cause such pre judice and therefore the appellants were guilty of contempt. Mr. Hamidul Huq for the appellants contended before us that their action did not amount to contempt as they did not have the intention to misrepresent the proceedings or in any way interfere with due course of `justice. In this connection reliance was placed on the observation made by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Devi Prasad v. Emperor (A I R 1943 P C 202) that the test to be applied in such cases is whether the words complained of were in the circum stances "calculated to obstruct or interfere with the course of justice and the due administration of the law". But the word "calculated" does not in the context in which it is used mean `intended'. This word has two meanings one is `devised with forethought' and the other is `of a nature or character proper or likely to'. (See the, Oxford Dictionary). It is clear that the word "calculated" in the above observation, ways, used in the latter sense. That intention to cause prejudice is not a necessary ingredient has been held in more than one case In a later decision of the Privy Council Parashuram Detaram `v. Emperor (A I R 1945 P C 134 at p. 135) which was relied on by Mr. Hamidul Huq for his: second con tention namely that the Courts should in the exercise of the power of punishment for contempt should not 'be over‑sensitive, the principle to be applied in cases of contempt is staled thus:‑ "For words or action used in face of the Court, or in the course of proceedings, for they may be used outside the Court, to be a contempt, they must be such as would interfere or tend to interfere with the course of justice. No further definition can be attempted". There is nothing in this definition to 'indicate that, intention is a necessary ingredient. The same view was taken by thus Court in S. Israr Hussain v, The Crown (P L D 1954 F C 313) (See the judgment of; the learned Chief Justice). The next contention of Mr. Hamidul Huq as indicated already was that the Court should not be over‑sensitive in such matters, but should take action only in serious cases and not where the contempt is merely technical. For this position he relied on the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Parashuram Detaram v. Emperor (A I R 1945 P C 134) to which reference has already been made, and where the following observation occurs " Their Lordships would once again emphasise what has often been said before, that this summary power of punishing for contempt should be used sparingly and only in serious cases. It is a power which a Court must of necessity possess; its usefulness depends on the wisdom and restraint with which it is exercised, and to use it to suppress methods of advocacy which are merely offensive is to use it for a purpose for which it was never intended. The Bar can surely maintain its dignity and prestige without having to invoke this jurisdiction." In that case what was complained of as contempt of Court was that the alleged contemner, an unsuccessful plaintiff in a suit in the High Court who had been ordered to pay costs, while supporting his objections in a summons which he took to review the taxation, stated when the counsel opposing him had alleged that he was misleading the Court; " I do not kept anything back at all. My fault is that I disclose everything, unlike members of the Bar, who are in the habit of not doing so and misleading the Court". On a protest from the opposing counsel the alleged contemner apologized, but after the conclusion of the argument the opposing counsel moved the Court to punish him for contempt. With regard to the Taxing Master's state ment the alleged contemner had said. "It is customary for the Taxing Masters to write what is written at the end of the para graph, but is it considered at all? " There was no protest when he made this statement, nor wall the Court moved to take action with regard to this statement, but the learned Judge who dealt with the application for action for contempt took notice of this statement also. Their Lordships of the Privy Council held that the first statement did not amount to contempt of Court as it referred only to the opposing counsel. As regards the words used in respect of the Taxing Master's statement, their view was that they amounted only to a suggestion that Taxing Masters were apt to deal with such matters somewhat summarily, and that they were not sufficient for adjudging the appellant before them guilty of so grave an offence as contempt of Court. It was with reference to these facts that they made the above mentioned observation. But the facts of the present case were entirely different. What the appellants did here was to anticipate the judgment that' had been reserved, which was certainly a serious matter. It so happened that the ultimate order in the case was practically to the same effect as was anticipated by the appellants, for, the learned Judges accepted the unqualified apology, and while convicting Lakitullah of contempt did not impose any punishment. But the final order could have been otherwise, as the learned Judges were at liberty to change their opinion till the delivery of the judgment regardless of the observations made by them during the hearing; and if they had done so the report published in the press would have embarrassed them. As observed in Roach v. Garvan (or Hall) (26 E R 683) "Nothing is more incumbent upon Courts of justice than to preserve their proceedings being mis represented". We, therefore, consider that there was no over sensitiveness in this case, but that the learned Judges were right in taking the action they did. The fact that there was no malice on the part of the appellants was given due consideration in assessing the sentence, which was not at all severe. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs. K. B. A. Appeal dismissed.