1992 PLP 1511 (CLC)

ALLAHDINO MEMOM, J.‑‑‑This First Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 18‑7‑1985, passed by the learned Presiding Officer, Special Court (Banking) Sindh at Karachi, constituted under Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979, being suit No.493 of 1984, dismissing the suit filed by the appellant for recovery of Rs.33,

356. The brief facts giving rise to the present First Appeal are that, appellant is a Banking Company and has its branches all over the Pakistan. The respondent had a current account No. 628 in the branch of the appellant at Khipro, District Sanghar. The plaintiff filed a suit for the above amount against the plaintiff/defendant and interest thereon. The loan was advanced on the basis of request of defendant No.l, and the defendant No.l had executed Promissory Note and other necessary documents in favour of the Bank. The appellant filed a suit before the District Judge, Sanghar, on 12‑12‑1983, under the provisions of Order 37, Rule 3, C.P.C. as the suit was based on pronote. The defendant was served with notice; however, the plaint was returned by the Court to the plaintiff on 28‑5‑1984, under Order 7, rule. 10, C.P.C. for presentation before the Court having jurisdiction. The plaintiff filed the plaint before the learned Presiding Officer, Special Court (Banking) at Karachi on 16‑9‑1984. Since by that time, the suit had become time‑barred, the plaintiff moved an application under section 6‑A of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979; stating therein that the delay in presenting the plaint before. the Special Court was due to procedural routine security, and the approval of the competent authority for presenting the plaint in the Court, which took considerable time in presenting the same before the Court. The delay was neither deliberate nor wilful and, therefore, it was sought to be condoned. The learned Presiding Officer was not satisfied with the explanation and, therefore, the suit was dismissed as time‑barred. The present appeal is directed against the above judgment. We have heard Mr.

1. M.I Patel, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, Mr. Muhammad Yousuf Leghari, learned counsel appearing for the respondents and have gone through the R Sc P of the case. It was contended by Mr. I.M. Patel, learned counsel appearing for the appellant that the delay in presenting the suit before the learned Special Court was only for‑forty‑five (45) days, and the learned Presiding Officer has erred in holding that the suit was time‑barred. He has further contended that after the plaint was returned by the District Judge, Sanghar, to the counsel for the appellant, it took sometime to comply with the formalities before presenting the plaint and, therefore, the delay, if any, ought to have been condoned as envisaged by section 6‑A of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979. He has further contended that since the respondent had current account with the appellant which was open and mutual and, therefore, Article 85 of the Limitation Act was applicable in this ease, and actually there was no delay in filing the suit. Mr. Yousuf Leghari, learned counsel appearing for the respondent has contended that after the plaint was returned 'to the counsel appearing for the appellant, the same had to be presented before the Presiding Officer Special Court (Banking) immediately, and the delay which took place in presenting the plaint could not be condoned and the suit was rightly dismissed. We have considered the contentions. There is no doubt that the respondent had a current account with the appellant Bank, but the copy of account produced by the appellant shows that the respondent never deposited any amount in the said account and, therefore, it could not be said to be open and mutual. The loan was advanced to the respondent and he executed promissory note on I4‑2‑1981 and the suit was filed before the District Judge, A Sanghar quite in time. However, the plaint was returned to the learned counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff on 28‑5‑1984, and the same was presented before the learned Special Court (Banking) for Sindh, at Karachi on 16‑9‑1984, for which there is no explanation. The law required that the plaint should have been presented before the learned Special Court (Banking) immediately after the same was returned, to the learned counsel. We are not satisfied with the argument advanced by Mr. I.M. Patel that it took sometime for the appellant to comply with the formalities as the appellant has number of Advocates on its panel at Karachi. The plaint was already drafted and all the necessary documents were already annexed thereto. Even the stamp was already purchased and produced alongwith the plaint before the learned District Judge Sanghar. No doubt according to Article 85 of the Limitation Act the period for filing that is three years from the close of the year in which the last item admitted or provided is entered in the account, such year to be computed as in the account for the balance due on a mutual; and current account, where there have been reciprocal demands between the parties. However, since the account was not open and mutual as observed earlier Article 85 of the Limitation Act was not applicable to the facts of the present case. The plaint was returned to the learned counsel for the plaintiff on 28‑4‑1984 arid it was presented before the learned Special Court Banking for Sindh at Karachi on 16‑9‑1984, and thus the actual delay in presenting the suit before the learned Special Court (Banking) was four months eighteen days and not forty five days as contended by Mr. I.M. Patel. Adverting to the next contention of Mr. I.M. Patel, regarding extension of time by virtue of section 6‑A of the Banking Companies (Recovery of Loans) Ordinance, 1979 that the suit was in time, we are afraid the contention is untenable inasmuch as the Banking Company had to show sufficient cause for not filing the suit within prescribed period. Section 6‑A of the above Ordinance reads as under "6‑A‑Extension of limitation:‑ A suit for the recovery of a loan other than a loan referred to in section 4 may be entertained by a Special Court within two years of the expiration of the period of limitation applicable to such suit if the Special Court is satisfied that the banking company filing the suit had sufficient cause for not filing it within the said period." The bare reading of the above provision shows that the Banking Company had to show sufficient cause for not filing the suit within time. As far as the contention that the appellant is a Banking Company and required some time to comply with the formalities was concerned, the Banking Company as well as the Government stand on the same footing as an ordinary litigant and we are C not satisfied with the reasons advanced by Mr. I.M. Patel, regarding the delay in presenting the plaint before the learned Special Court (Banking). The learned Special Court has given cogent reasons for dismissing the suit and the judgment does mot suffer from any infirmity and, therefore no interference from this Court is cared for. In view of the above discussion, the above appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs. We had decided the above appeal on 29‑1‑1991 by a short order and these are the reasons for the same. A.A./M‑1454/K Appeal dismissed.