P L D 1962 (W (PLP)

A. R. CHANGEZ, J.‑This writ petition by Bashir Ahmad, Muhammad Rafique and Mst. Hanifan is directed against the order of the Land Acquisition Collector, Multan, dated the 10th of November 1959, whereby he dismissed the application of the petitioners filed before him under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, requiring him to make a reference to the Court concerned as regards their objection to the amount of compensation.

2. The relevant facts giving rise to this writ petition are these. The petitioners were permanent allottees of 12 acres and 3 marlas of land situated in village Jehangirabad, Tehsil and District Multan. This land was acquired by the Government for the P. I. D. C., Multan, for the erection of natural gas power station at Jehangirabad. The possession of the land was taken by the P. I. D. C. authorities on the 28th of December 1956, and the acquisition proceedings continued thereafter. On the 3rd of June 1959, the Land Acquisition Collector, Multan, gave his award, whereby a sum of Rs. 35,724‑3‑6 was fixed as compensation payable to the petitioners. On the 6th of October 1959, the petitioners submitted an application under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, to refer the matter to the Civil Court for deciding the amount of compensation and claimed that the compensation payable to them was Rs. 63,406‑6‑

6. The land Acquisition Collector, however, rejected this application on the ground that the application had been filed beyond six weeks' time from the date of the award.

3. Learned counsel for the petitioners has challenged the order of the Land Acquisition Collector on the following two grounds: ‑ (i) That the Land Acquisition Collector had no jurisdiction to reject the application of the petitioner on the ground that it was time‑barred. (ii) That in fact the petitioners were not present at the time when the Land Acquisition Collector made his award and consequently proviso (b) to section 18 (2) of the Land Acqui sition Act was applicable and, therefore, their application was within time.

4. As regards the first point the learned counsel for the petitioners has strongly relied on a Division Bench ruling of the Oudh Chief Court reported as Ahmad Ali Khan Alawi v. Secretary of State (A I R 1932 Oudh 180) in support of the proposition that the Collector had no jurisdiction to refuse to make the reference even if the applica tion in his opinion was time‑barred. While dealing with this question the learned Judges observed as follows: ‑ "The Land Acquisition Officer has no jurisdiction to refuse to make the reference even if in his opinion the application is not in time under clause (a) or clause (b), subsection (2), section 18, Land Acquisition Act. He should express that opinion and refer the matter to the Court for determination. The section nowhere provides that if the application contra venes clause (a) or clause (b) the Land Acquisition Officer shall reject the application. These clauses are placed in the section by way of a proviso to the substantive enactment contained in subsection (1), section 18 of the Act and relate to the form of the application and do not have the effect of taking away the right given by the substantive enactment to an interested person who has not accepted the award of requir ing that the matter be referred for the determination of the Court." Before considering the question, it seems necessary to reproduce section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act which reads as follows: ‑ "(1) Any person interested who has not accepted the award may, by written application to the Collector, require that the matter be referred by the Collector for the determination of the Court, whether his objection to be the measurement of the land, the amount of the compensation, the person to whom it is payable, or the apportionment of the compensation among the persons interested. (2) The application shall state the grounds on which objec tion to the award is taken: Provided that every such application shall be made, (a) If the person making it was present or represented before the Collector at the time when he made his award, within six weeks from the date of the Collector's award; (b) In the other cases, within six weeks of the receipt of the notice from the Collector under section 12, subsection (2) or within six months from the date of the Collector's award, whichever period shall first expire. (3) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in section 21, the Provincial Government or a local authority or a company for which land is being acquired may, if it has not accepted the award, refer the matter to the Court within a period of six months from the date of announcement of the award, provided that the Court shall not entertain the reference unless in its opinion there is a prima facie case for enquiry into and determination of the objection against the award." It will be noticed that both the proviso lay down the period of limitation during which the party interested is to make an application to the Collector under subsection (1) of this section. It is no doubt true that it is not provided in this section or in any other provision of the Act that if the application is not filed within the period prescribed by the provisos, the Land Acquisition Officer shall reject the application, but it is also nowhere provided that he is merely to express an opinion if the application is not within time and is to refer the matter to the Court for determina tion. Section 20 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that on a reference made by the Collector, the Court, after giving a notice to the parties, will proceed to determine the objection which in our opinion, refers to the objection raised in accordance with sub section (1) of section 18 of the Act. Section 21 of the Act clearly provides that the scope of the inquiry in every such proceeding shall be restricted to a consideration of the interests of the persons affected by the objection. Reading these two sections together, it is quite clear that the inquiry by the Court is restricted to a consideration of the objections raised by the interested parties in accordance with subsection (1) of section 18 of the Act. It does not contemplate the decision on the question of limitation, because that apparently is a matter for the Collector to decide. With great respect to the learned Judges of the Oudh Chief Court, we are unable to agree with the view expressed by them in the afore said ruling. The Oudh ruling was considered by the Full Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Khetsidas Gangaram v. First Land Acquisition Collector (A I R 1946 Cal. 508). The learned Judges while dealing with the question observed as follows: ‑ "The language of section 18 is that a person interested may `require' the Collector to make a reference to the Court. The only qualifications are that the applicant must be a person interested, i.e., a person claiming an interest in the compen sation (section 3 (b)) and his application must be made within certain limits of time. The section does not say that it is for the Collector to see if these conditions have been satisfied, nor that, if they are not satisfied, he may reject the application, but we think these powers are implied. We cannot agree with the Chief Court of Oudh that the Collector is bound to make a reference, whenever, and by whomsoever required, and that if he has any objections, he can only make a note of them and for ward them to the Court." The same view has been expressed by a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Mahadeo Krishna Parkar v. Mamlatdar of Alibag (A I R 1944 Bom. 200). Similarly the view expressed in A. K. Subramania Chettiar v. Collector of Coimbatore (A I R 1946 Mad. 184) by the learned Judges of the Madras High Court supports the view that the Collector has got the power under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act to decide the question of limitation. The same view was taken by a Division Bench of the Judicial Commissioner's Court in S. Attar Singh R. S. Sardar Hira Singh v. Secretary of State (A I R 1940 Pesh. 35). After referring to the Oudh ruling referred to above and a number of other authorities it was held as follows: ‑ "In our opinion a reference to the Act itself indicates that the decision on a question of limitation on an application under section 18, Land Acquisition Act, rests with the Collector and not with the District Judge." Fazal Karim and others v. The Secretary of State for India (A I R 1934 Lah. 589 (2)), also supports the above‑mentioned view, although indirectly. In view of the preponderance of authority on the subject, we are of the considered view that the Collector had undoubtedly the jurisdiction to decide the question whether an application made under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act was time‑barred or not.

5. As regards the second point, the learned counsel for the petitioners has urged that the petitioners had not been served for the 3rd of June 1959, and were in fact not present before the Collector when the award was announced. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent has produced before us the relevant file. It appears that a notice was issued to the petitioners on the 21st of May 1959, for the 28th of May 1959, and Bashir Ahmad petitioner had himself signed that notice. The case was, however, not taken up on the 28th of May 1959 and instead was taken up on the 3rd of June 1959. Although there is no record of it the learned counsel for the respondent has suggested that the case must have been orally adjourned to the 3rd of June 1959. In this connection he has drawn our attention to the award made on the 3rd of June 1959, where the following sentence appears at the end of the order: ‑ "The representative of the P. I. D. C. and the owners (allottees) are present today and the award announced in the open Court in their presence." Learned counsel for the petitioner has urged that some other cases were also decided on that date and the Land Acquisition Collector may have wrongly noted the presence of the petitioner in his order. We have no material before us to show that in fact some other cases were also decided on that date. In any case, we are not prepared to assume that the Land Acquisition Collector, without satisfying himself as to the presence of the petitioner, had noted their presence in the order. In these circumstances it was not necessary for the Land Acquisition Collector to hold an enquiry into the matter, when the petitioners had filed an appli cation under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act and had alleged therein that they were not present on the day when the award was made.

5. For the reasons stated above, we see no force in this petition which is dismissed with costs. K. B. A. Petition dismissed.