P L D 1956 (W (PLP)

KAIKAUS, J.‑This order will dispose of Civil Revisions Nos. 33 and 34 of 1955 which arise out of two petitions filed by the same landlord against two of his tenants under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. The point involved in both the cases is the same, viz.' whether the revision petitions filed in the High Court under section 15 (4) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (XVI of 1953), can be heard after the expiry of the Act. Facts may be shortly stated. Two petitions for ejectment on pleas of default in payment of rent and requirement for personal use were filed on the 1st of June 1953. They were dismissed on the 17th of August 1953. Appeals were filed by the landlord on the 1st of October 1953 and were accepted on the 10th of July 1954. The present revision petitions were filed on the 22nd of July 1954. On the 15th of August 1954, the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act (XVI of 1953) expired. It was a temporary statute. The effect of the expiry of temporary statutes has been considered by a Full Bench of this Court in The Crown v. Haveli (P L D 1949 Lah. 550). In that case a trial under the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act had commenced but before it could be concluded, the Punjab Disturbed Areas Act, which was a temporary statute, expired. The question arose whether the trial could be continued and whether the accused could be punished in accordance with the provisions of the expired Act. It was held that proceedings under the Act could not continue after its expiry and the accused could not be punished in accordance with the Act although it was in force when the offence was committed. The proposition laid down was that the temporary statute is deemed, after its expiry, never to have existed except for transaction past and closed. In the present case, orders under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, admittedly a temporary statute, had been passed the appellate authority and revision applications had been filed before the expiry of the Act. Can the revision applica tions be heard after the expiry of the Act? It is urged on behalf of the respondent that in view of the proposition accepted by the Full Bench the answer to this should be in the negative. I do not think it is possible to contend that an order which is subject to appeal would, by the expiry of the Act under which it was passed, become a valid and unimpeach able order. It would be easy to show by an example that such could never have been the intention of the legislature. Suppose a person is convicted and sentenced to death under a temporary statute, but either before he files an appeal which is provided in the statute or before such appeal is heard and determined, the statute expires, could it be urged that the order would be valid and at the same time the hearing of the appeal would be incompetent? The injustice is too manifest to require any argument. It is unnecessary, though easy, to give other examples. It is obvious that we cannot pronounce such an order to be valid and at the same time not open to appeal. We must hold together (i) that an appeal still lies or (ii) that with the expiry of the temporary statute, the order itself has become void. There is no third alternative. Which then is the interpretation to be adopted? The first alternative is not unjust, but it is not practicable, for there may be cases in which even the tribunal to which an appeal or revision was to be preferred, no longer exists. Then there is the further difficulty of reconciling the first alternative with the proposition accepted in the Full Bench, namely, that after its expiry a temporary Act is deemed never to have existed except for transactions past and closed. If we hear an appeal or revision after the expiry of the statute, which provided for the appeal or revision, we cannot be said to be applying the statute to a transaction past and closed. The second alternative, therefore has to be accepted and it will be observed that this interpretation is not only consistent with the proposition laid down in the Full Bench but may even be said to flow out of it. If the statute that expires is deemed never having existed, except for transactions past and closed, the order that is being impeached will be an order, which is not supported by any law if it could be shown that it was not, when the Act expired, a transac tion past and closed. If the order was subject to appeal or revision can it be said to amount to a transaction past and closed? The answer\should be in the negative. It had not yet acquired finality. Its validity was yet to be determined by a higher tribunal. The whole of the proceedings before different Courts should in such a case be regarded as one transaction and that transaction would be complete only if the proceedings had passed through all the contemplated stages. The order of the trial Court may, in such a case; be regarded as one subject to confirmation. The temporary statute had in view only an order against which opportunities of further recourse were open. It may even be urged that if those opportunities are eliminated, the order does not remain an order under the temporary statute. The question as to what orders passed under temporary statute would become transactions past and closed and would be capable of being enforced after the expiry of the Act may at first sight present some difficulty but I do think that the difficulty is only apparent. I have already dealt with a case of execution of orders passed under the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act in Siraj Din v. Atta Muhammad and others (P L D 1955 Lah, 562) and I have held that after the expiry of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, the execution of the order is not possible. I pointed out therein that to enable a Court to execute an order, there must be a living provision conferring such jurisdiction. The jurisdiction to execute these orders is conferred only by section 17 of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act. That section being no longer in force, there is no jurisdiction in the Civil Court to entertain the application for execution. Of course, if the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, had provided that the order would become a decree within the meaning of the Civil P. C., then the order might have been executed even after the expiry of Act in view of the provisions of the Civil P. C., which provide for the execution of decrees, though there may be difficulties in the practical application of this inter pretation as pointed out in that judgment. It may be urged that on this reasoning even a sentence passed under the temporary statute and maintained in the appeal or revision provided for, should not be capable of execution after the Act has expired. This is not so. The provision of law, which enables the execution of the sentence, is one contained in that permanent statute which relates to the execution of sentences. The sentence is there, a transaction past and closed the law which enable its being executed is a living law, and the sentence can, therefore, be executed. I have tried to look into English cases. There is one case only in point, and that is Spencer v. Hooton (37 T L R 280) wherein there were five connected cases before Lord Roche arising out of the Wages (Temporary Regulation) Act, 1918. The Act provided for the trial of certain offences relating to wages. The complainants had succeeded in all these cases in the Court below. In three of these five cases, appeals had been filed before the Act expired and in two cases after the expiry of the Act. It was urged on behalf of the respondents that the Act having expired, the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeals. Lord Roche gave effect to this objection holding that the statute being temporary, the jurisdiction to hear the appeals had ceased on its expiry. Lord Roche said, however, that he was doubtful whether the order passed by the tribunal could be enforced in view of the expiry of the Act. The case does, to some extent, support the view I have taken. The result is that I hold the orders passed by the District. Judge to be void on the ground that the orders were subject to the revisiooal jurisdiction of the High Court, but this jurisdiction could not be exercised on account of the expiry c of the Act. However the revision petitions cannot be entertained or decided after the Act has expired and they are, therefore, dismissed. It may be that the Provincial Legislature will pass a new Urban Rent Restriction Act and will give it retrospective effect (as has been done previously in case of the Urban Rent Restriction Acts of 1949 and 1952) and the revisions may have to be revived but that is a matter with which I am not concerned just now. There is no order as to costs. A. H. Petition dismissed.