1999SCMR373 (PLP)

Date of hearing: 4th February, 1998. MAMOON KAZI, J.‑‑‑Brief facts of the case are that respondent Muhammad Rashid was employed as Security Guard by Pak. Arab Refinery Limited, the petitioners herein. On 3‑3‑1993 at about 14‑00 hours Muhammad a Rashid brought with him a guest inside the oil installation without proper permission of the Shift Incharge and, thus, he violated the company's Security ., orders. On the next day when he was called upon to explain his conduct, he became cheeky and used threatening language. Show‑cause notice was, therefore, issued to him and after inquiry he was dismissed from service.

2. The said respondent filed his grievance petition before the Vth Labour Court which found that the case was one of mere "omission" rather than misconduct and, therefore, it ordered the respondent's reinstatement in service with full back benefits.

3. The petitioners filed appeal before the Labour Appellate Tribunal and a plea was raised by them before the Tribunal that by virtue of section 1(3)(g) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, the said enactment was not applicable to persons employed as members of security service or staff of an Oil Refinery. The contention found favour with the Tribunal which allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Labour Court.

4. The respondents then filed a Constitution petition before the High Court of Sindh which was allowed arid the order passed by the learned Tribunal was set aside and the case was remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh disposal.

5. The view taken by the High Court was that jurisdiction of the Labour Court under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance had, in fact, been invoked by the respondent by virtue of Standing Order 12(3). in the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968 (hereinafter referred to as "the Standing Orders Ordinance"). Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance are not applicable to the respondent, he can still apply to the Labour Court for redress of his grievance under Standing Order 12(3).

6. Mr. Noor Muhammad, learned counsel for the petitioners has however, argued that the view taken by the learned Labour Appellate Tribunal is correct because persons employed as members of security service have been expressly excluded from the purview of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and therefore, the grievance petition filed by the respondent which was under section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance was not maintainable. Consequently, the learned Judge of the High Court was in error while setting aside the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal.

7. No doubt, section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969; enables a "workman" to seek redress of his grievance in respect of any right guaranteed or secured to him by or under any law or any award or settlement, but, as is indicated by the definition of "worker" or "workman" in the Industrial Relations Ordinance and Standing Order 12(3) in the Standing Orders Ordinance a person who is aggrieved by termination of his service or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, otherwise than in connection with or as a consequence of an industrial dispute, can only approach the Labour Court with his grievance petition under the provisions of Standing Order 12(3) provided that he is a "workman" within the meaning of the said term as defined in the Standing Orders Ordinance. The words "he may take action in accordance with I the provisions of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 (XXIII of 1969) and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance" occurring in Standing Order 12(3) only indicate that the provisions of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance have been extended to Standing Order 12(3) only by reference or incorporation. It, therefore, follows that right to seek redress has been made available to such workman not through the force of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance but by extending the said provisions to Standing Order 12(3). We are fortified in our view by an earlier judgment of this Court in the case of Syed Matloob Hassan v. Brooke Bond Pakistan Limited, Lahore (1992 SCMR 227). In this case one of us (Ajmal Mian, J. as he then was) had observed:‑‑

"Whereas, the above clause (3) of Standing Order 12 contemplates that the services of workman shall not be terminated nor shall a workman be removed, retrenched, discharged or dismissed from service, except by an order in writing containing the reason for the action. It further provides that in case a workman is aggrieved by the termination of his services or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal, he may take action in accordance with the provisions of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance. In other‑words, the above clause (3) of Standing Order 12 incorporates the provisions of section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance by reference for the purpose of enabling a workman as defined in clause (i) of section 2 of the Ordinance to get redress against termination of his services or removal or retrenchment, discharge or dismissal in violation of above clause (3) of the Standing Order 12. "

8. Similar observations have been made in 1998 SCMR 644 (Mustehkum Cement Limited v. Abdul Rashid and others) recently decided by this Court. Incidentally, once again one of us (Mamoon Kazi, J.) has delivered the judgment in the said case. It has been observed in the said judgment:‑‑ "The provisions of Standing Order 12(3), therefore, indicate that it allows right to a workman who is aggrieved by termination of his service or removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal to seek redress in accordance with the provisions of section 25‑A of the Ordinance. The words 'and thereupon the provisions of the said section shall apply as they apply to the redress of an individual grievance' clearly indicate that for the purpose of redress of such grievance the procedural provisions of section 25‑A have been extended to Standing Order 12(3) and the said provisions shall apply in the same manner as they would apply in case of an individual grievance referred to in the said section. It, therefore, clearly follows that right to seek redress has been made available to such workman, not through the force of section 25‑A of the Ordinance but by extending the said provisions to Standing Order 12(3)."

9. It, is thus, clear that in the present case the respondent had sough redress of his individual grievance by virtue of Standing Order 12(3) and the provisions of section 25‑A have been extended to the said Standing Order only for the purpose of the redress of such grievance. However, the provisions of section 25‑A would not apply to the case of such workman through their own force, but by virtue of Standing Order 12(3). Consequently, even if the provisions of the Industrial Relation Ordinance had been excluded in case of persons belonging to security service of an oil refinery, but as the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance have not been excluded, such a person could still seek his remedy before the Labour Court for redress of his grievance in case he falls within the definition of "workman" as given in clause (i) to section 2 of the said Ordinance. Consequently, the view taken by the High Court, which clearly appears to be in consonance with the said two judgments of this Court, appears to be correct. In result, leave is refused and the petition is dismissed. M.B.A./P‑40/S Petition dismissed.