1996 PLP 535 (PLC(CS))

2. Muhammad Rasheed was employed as Security Guard in M/s. Pak Arab Refinery Limited. It was his duty to search the persons entering and going out from the promises and to check the vehicles. On 3‑3‑1993, at 14‑00 hours after close of office respondent Muhammad Rasheed brought his guest one Rafique Jan Grah inside the oil installation without proper permission of the Shift Incharge and without entry permission he was kept in the guest room for one hour and this violated the company's Security orders. On the next day when he was called to explain his conduct he became check and used threatening language. Show‑cause notice was then issued to him and after usual enquiry he was dismissed from service.

3. The Presiding Officer, Labour Court No.V (Mr. Akhtar Farooq) found that the case was one of mere omission and not a misconduct. The application of Muhammad Rasheed was, therefore, allowed and he was directed to be reinstated in service with all the back benefits. The Oil Refinery being very important place from security point of view, its staff has been exempted from application 'of the Labour Laws. Section 1(3)(g) of the I.R.O. reads as under :‑‑ "the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 shall not apply to any person employed as a member of security service or staff of an Oil Refinery '

4. Mr. Latif Sagher for the respondent argues that a Refinery is an establishment for refining petroleum but Pak Arab Refinery is an oil installation. He has not explained the difference between installation and refinery. He says it is installation because that term has been used in a show‑cause notice, But the place is actually Pak Arab Refinery Limited Pumping Station No. 1, Korangi. It is also included in the term Oil Refinery. The idea in exempting an Oil Refinery is to protect it from subotage. It is no use discussing meaning of refinery and installation and showing that installation is not exempted. The essence of the exemption is storage of petroleum which has to be protected.

5. Even on merits the respondent was found guilty of wilful insubordination and disobedience of lawful directions of his superiors and an act subversive of discipline. If he was guilty of an omission under Standing Order 15(ii)(a) then also the respondent could not have been acquitted but the only punishment could have been reduced. He could not have been reinstated with all the back benefits.

6. In any case the respondent cannot seek remedy before the Labour Court under section 25‑A of the I.R.O., 1969, as the Oil Refinery is exempted from application of the I.R.O.

7. Mr. Muhammad Humayun for the Oil Refinery has argued that the staff of an Oil Refinery having specifically been excluded under section 1(3)(g) for the I.R.O. a grievance petition filed by the workman is not maintainable as held in Mobin Ahmed Siddiqui v. The Chairman, S.L.A.T. reported in 1991 PLC 780. (Karachi High Court). It was observed by Imam Ali G. Qazi, J. as under:‑‑ "Section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 provides a process for redress of an individual grievance of a worker only in respect of enforcement of a right guaranteed or secured to him under any law, award or settlement. By clause (3) of Standing Order No.12 grievance in respect of unfair termination of his service or his removal, retrenchment, discharge or dismissal can be brought before a Labour Court as an individual grievance under section 25‑A of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969. The provision contained in clause (3) for Standing Order No.12 will have the effect of amending provision contained in section 25‑A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 to the extent of adding such category of action to be treated as individual grievance that can be redressed under that law. Such a legislative system is valid and known as legislature by reference. Any action that can be taken on or resorted to, will always be within the framework of the enactment to which such reference has been made. Clause (f) of subsection (3) of section 1 of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 has specifically excluded establishments like that of respondent No.2 from the application of the Ordinance. It, therefore, follows that, employees of establishment other than those who are employed by establishments specifically excluded by that revision can only resort to action under clause (3) of the Standing Order No.12. Mr. Habibullah, Advocate for the petitioner had placed reliance on cases referred to by him before the Appellate Tribunal. These cases related to a period before clause (f) was added to section 1(3) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and are, therefore, of no avail to him. As the result of above discussion we are inclined to hold that the establishment of respondent No.2 which is an institution established for the care of sick and infirm is excluded from the operation of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and grievance application filed by the petitioner was not maintainable. By taking such a view we are supported by the conclusions reached in the cases referred to by the Advocate for the respondent No.2 and mentioned hereinabove. We, therefore, find no force in this petition which is dismissed with costs."

8. As the staff of the Refinery is excluded from application of the I.R.O. The Labour Court will have no jurisdiction to pass any orders, nor can this Tribunal come to the rescue of the respondent.

9. The appeal of the Oil Refinery is therefore, allowed and the order of the Labour Court is set aside. The amount of back benefits deposited may be refunded. H.B.T./68/Lb.S Appeal allowed.