1975 PLP 275 (SCMR)

"Clause

10. Appeals to the High Court Judges of the Court . . . . . . . . . . And we do further ordain that an appeal shall lie to the said High Court of Judicature at Lahore from the judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court to the superintendence of the said High Court, and not being an order made in the exercise of revisioral jurisdiction, and not being a sentence or order passed or made in the exercise of the power of superintendence, under the provisions of section 107 of the Government of India Act, or in the exercise of Criminal Jurisdic tion) of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act, and that notwithstanding anything hereinbefore provided an appeal shall lie to the said High Court from a judgment of one Judge of the said High Court or one Judge of any Division Court, pursuant to section 108 of the Government of India Act, made on or after the first day of February 1929, in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction by a Court subject to the superintendence of the said High Court, where the Judge who passed the judgment declares that the case is a fit one for appeal; but that the right of appeal from other judgments of Judges of the said High Court of such Division Court shall be to us, our heirs or successors in our or their Privy Council, as hereinafter provided." An appeal from the impugned order passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court would have been competent under the first part of clause 10 but it was repealed on the 14th April 1972 by the Law Reforms Ordinance XII of 1972. Consequently no Letters Patent Appeal lay in this case in the High Court. However, on the 10th of August 1972 the Law Reforms (Amendment) Ordinance XXXIV of 1472 amended section 3 of Ordinance XII of 1972 as below: (3) Appeal to High Court !n certain case . . . . . . . . . (i) An appeal shall lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from a decree passed or final order made by a Single Judge of that High Court in the exercise of its original civil jurisdiction: Provided that no such appeal shall lie from an order which does not dispose of the whole matter before the Court. (2) No appeal shall lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from an order made by a Single Judge of that High Court under Clause (z) of Article 201 of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in a matter arising under any law relating to the rehabilitation and settlement of displaced persons or from an order so made under sub‑paragraph (1) of paragraph (b) of that clause." On the 12th of September, 1972 subsection (2) of section 3 was further amended by the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act VIII of 1972 as follows: "(2) An appeal shall also lie to a Bench of two or more Judges of a High Court from an order made by a Single Judge of that Court under clause (2) of Article 201 of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, not being an order made under sub paragraph (i) of Paragraph (b) of that clause: Provided that the appeal referred to in this subsection shall not be available or competent if the application brought before the High Court under Article 201 arises out of any proceedings in which the law applicable provided for at least one appeal to any Court tribunal or authority against the original order." In the instant case the Consolidation Officer settled the Scheme for village Radhan, District Sargodha on 31‑12‑1971. The petitioners objected to the Scheme and filed an appeal before the Additional Deputy Commis sioner (Consolidation) claiming that they alone were entitled to the entire Shamlat Deh measuring 1,13,0)0 kanals and that the respondents had no share in it. The appeal was dismissed on 15‑3‑1972. A revision petition before the Additional Commissioner (Consolidation) and a further revision petition before Member a Board of Revenue also met the same fate. Aggrieved by the final order of the Board of Revenue the petitioners moved the present writ petition in the High Court under Article 201 of the Interim Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which too was dismissed to limine. The petition for leave to appeal is directed against the order of the High Court. On the facts set out above the proviso to subsection (2) of section 3 o: the Law Reforms (Amendment) Act VIII of 1972 is plainly applicable. The writ petition in the High Court arose out of proceedings in which the West Pakistan Consolidation of Holdings Ordinance Vi of 1960 provides for one appeal and two further revision petitions to the higher Revenue Authorities. As seen all the three remedies were fully availed of by the petitioners. No further appeal from the order passed by the learned Single Judge therefore lay to a Bench of two or more Judges in the case. The preliminary objection raised to the competence of the petition has thus no force and we proceed to dispose of the petition on merits. The petitioners challenged in the High Court the orders passed by the Board of Revenue and the subordinate Consolidation authorities inter alia on the grounds that, (i) the Member, Board of Revenue had erred in dismissing the Revision Petition as improperly constituted, and (it) that the Consolidation authorities were precluded from adjudicating upon the question of title in the land. The learned Judge found both the grounds untenable and dismissed the writ petition. On hearing the learned counsel for the petitioners we are in agreement with the High Court that the revision filed by the petitioners before the Board of Revenue was incompetent inasmuch as a large number of right holders in the village whose rights were affected had not been impleaded as parties The second ground is equally without force. A compromise was reached between the parties on 16‑4‑1959 in the High Court in a civil suit filed earlier regarding share of the parties in the village Shamlat. Under the compromise half of the Shamlat land was allocated to the Tirniguzars and the other half to Khewatdars. The decree passed on the basis of the compromise was binding on the parties and the consolidation authorities could not go behind it. It was thus not a case of the Revenue authorities determining a question of title as was alleged by the petitioners before the High Court. In the facts found we see no ground to interfere with the order passed by the High Court and refuse leave to appeal. Leave refused,