1996 PLP 350 (PLC(CS))

This is an appeal arising from the order of Fourth Sindh Labour Court, Karachi, dated 22‑1‑1995 whereby the grievance petition of the appellant under section 25‑A of the I.R.O., 1969, for re‑instatement was dismissed, on an application under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C.

2. The facts, in brief, are that the appellant was a permanent employee in Group‑IV in the P.I.A. designated as Traffic Supervisor. Two passengers, Shabbir Chaudhary and Muhammad Shareef, complained that on 24‑5‑1988 while travelling from Karachi to Faisalabad they had despatched one brief‑case alongwith other luggage at the Counter of PK‑366 for Karachi to Faisalabad Flight when Muhammad Younus, appellant, was the Traffic Supervisor Incharge at that Counter. They afterwards found 40 Tolas of gold and currency consisting of ten thousand rupees notes missing from the brief‑case The appellant's case was that the condition of brief‑case was defective with loose locks. He had advised the passengers to take the brief‑case with themselves as hand baggage but they had insisted on sending the brief‑case alongwith other luggage. The appellant was, thereafter suspended from service by order, dated 25‑5‑1988. The Loader, one Shafiquddin, was also suspended but later on his order of suspension was withdrawn while the appellant was issued a show‑cause notice. He was heard in person and then removed without any enquiry. The appellant was removed from service by a letter, dated 1/2‑1‑1989. This letter was delivered to him on 21‑1‑1989. Feeling aggrieved the appellant submitted a Departmental Appeal under the prevailing rules on 29‑1‑1989. At the relevant time under P.I.A. Act, 1956 the employees of PIA were declared to be governed by Essential Services Act as civil servants, On 2‑12‑1991 the appellant wag informed that his appeal filed before the Federal Service Tribunal was dismissed on 3‑11‑1991 on the ground that the appeal was time‑barred, since in those days Departmental appeal was not mandatory and the appeal before the Service Tribunal was required to be filed with thirty days of the dismissal. The appellant, then, preferred an appeal to the Supreme Court but that appeal was also dismissed on the ground that the appeal before the Federal Service Tribunal was time‑barred having been filed after 4 months of the date of dismissal order.

3. This appeal filed before the Supreme Court was dismissed on 11‑3‑1992. A review petition was also filed before the Supreme Court, but that too was dismissed in October, 1992.

4. The appellant, thereafter, kept pressing for a decision by the P.I.A. on his Departmental Appeal but every time he was given the reply that he should wait till he is informed by the Competent Authority. Ultimately by a letter dated 8‑5‑1994 received by him on 13‑6‑1994 the appellant was informed that his appeal was dismissed on merits by the P.I.A.

5. In the meantime Pakistan International Airlines Corporation Act, 1956 was amended on November 2, 1989 and section 10(1), (2), (3) and (4) were omitted. Under this section the service under the PIA Corporation had been declared to be Service of Pakistan and every employee of P.I.A.C. had been deemed to be a 'civil servant' while under subsection (4), Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance was made not applicable to the employees of the. Corporation. Thus, after this amendment of November 2, 1989 the employees of the Corporation were also to be governed by the Standing Orders Ordinance and the Labour Laws. Since the order of dismissal passed against the appellant became final, on dismissal of his Departmental Appeal on merits, he served the Corporation with a grievance notice under section 25‑A of the I.R.O., 1969 as a workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968.

6. It was held in the case of Allied Bank of Pakistan v. Tariq Mehmood Qamar 1980 PLC 106, that 'where appeal had been filed against the termination of service to the management the termination became final from the date of rejection of the appeal and the limitation was to run from the date of rejection of the appeal and not from the original order. This was on the analogy that right to sue accrue under Article 120 of the Limitation Act after excluding the period of two months' notice under section 80 of C.P.C.

7. It was also held in the case of Shakoorullah Khan v. Pakistan Railways 1983 PLC 340 that 'the appellant was entitled to wait for a reasonable time for decision on his appeal before serving the employer with the grievance notice in preferring the grievance petition.

8. On this point it has been argued by the learned Advocate for the appellant that the appellant may file the appeal either after waiting for a reasonable time for the decision of his Departmental Appeal or he may file the same after actual decision of his Departmental Appeal and if the appeal before the decision of the Department was not heard because it was time‑barred, the appeal after the decision by the Department could be filed as being within time and would not be barred by res judicata since the first appeal has not been heard on merits.

9. In the present case since Standing Orders have been made applicable to employees of the PIA Corporation and these orders applied to the case at the time when order of dismissal became final to rejection of the Departmental Appeal the employee instead of filing a second appeal filed a grievance notice under section 25‑A of the I.R.O., 1969 on getting no reply he filed the grievance petition under section 25‑A.

10. It has been admitted that no domestic enquiry was held against the appellant nor was any compensation paid to the complainant regarding theft of his gold and currency. Under these circumstances the Labour Court could not reject the grievance petition under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. as rejection of the grievance petition is not provided under the I.R.O. Under section 36 of the I.R.O. the Labour Court can exercise power of a Civil Court only for the purpose of adjudicating and determining any industrial dispute and these are procedural powers such as enforcing attendance of witnesses, production of documents or issuing commission and such other powers as are similar to these powers, ejusdem generis, as held in 1973 PLC 111, Brooke Bond (Pakistan) Limited v. Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and another by Tufail Ali, C.J. and Fakhruddin, J.

11. In view of the above discussion, even if the appeals filed before the decision on Departmental appeal were dismissed on the ground of limitation, the right of appeal which accrued after the decision of the Departmental Appeal on merits gave a fresh cause of action, and since by that time the Standing Orders Ordinance, became applicable to P.I.A. Employees the grievance petition should have been heard on merits and not rejected under Order VII, Rule 11, C.P.C. The decision of the Labour Court, dated 22‑1‑1995 is, accordingly, set aside and the case is remanded for being heard and decided on merits. H.B.T./7/Lb.S Order accordingly