2026 PLP 895 (PTD)
MUHAMMAD HAMZA KHAN Versus COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE and others
| Citation | 2026 PLP 895 (PTD) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench) |
| Bench Members | N/A |
| Parties | MUHAMMAD HAMZA KHAN Versus COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE and others |
| Primary Law | Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2026 PLP 895 (PTD)?
This judgment primarily cites: Sales Tax Act (VII of 1990) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2026 PLP 895 (PTD)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore High Court (Rawalpindi Bench) bench comprising: N/A.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2026 PLP 895 (PTD) (MUHAMMAD HAMZA KHAN Versus COMMISSIONER INLAND REVENUE and others). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Zahid Shafiq for Petitioner.
- Fazal-ur-Rehman Malik for Respondents with Yousaf Khan, S.O. IR (Hqrs), RTO, Rawalpindi.
Headnotes / Summary
Ss. 14, 45, 45B, second proviso & 46
Compulsory registration, assailing of
Forum(s)
Petitioner filed appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue (Tribunal) against his compulsorily registration which was returned to him on the premise that it is not appealable under S. 45 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 ('the Act')
Section 46 of the Act, while governing the procedure for filing appeals before the Tribunal, explicitly provides that any person aggrieved by an order of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), or any person other than a State-Owned Enterprise where the second proviso to Section 45B applies, may prefer an appeal before the Tribunal within thirty days of the receipt of such order while the term "Appeals" is also provided under Section 45B of Act
Second proviso of Section 45B of Act clearly reveals that the legislature has conferred a discretionary right upon a registered person to directly file an appeal before the Tribunal without first availing the remedy of appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) under said section
Said proviso provides an optional course to the registered person, enabling him either to avail the appellate remedy before the Commissioner (Appeals) or to bypass the said forum and directly approach the Tribunal against the impugned order
The intent of the legislature behind incorporating the said proviso is to provide flexibility in the appellate mechanism and to ensure that the registered person is not compelled to undergo the intermediate appellate stage if he opts to seek redress directly before the Tribunal
Therefore, the second proviso of S. 45B of Act clearly recognizes and protects the right of the registered person to directly invoke the jurisdiction of the Tribunal
Combined and harmonious reading of Ss. 45B and 46 of the Act clearly demonstrates that a registered person has two legally recognized appellate options namely (1) to file an appeal before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), and thereafter approach the Appellate Tribunal; or (ii) to directly file an appeal before the Tribunal by virtue of the second proviso to S. 45B of the Act
Impugned act of Tribunal(Respondent No.3) in refusing to receive and entertain the appeal of the petitioner amounts to an unlawful denial of the petitioner's statutory right of appeal provided under S.46 of the Act, and the order passed under S.14 of the Act by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Respondent No.1), which was impugned before Tribunal (Respondent No.3), was clearly appealable in terms of S. 46(1) read with the proviso to S. 45B of the Act
On returning the appeal by Tribunal (respondent No.3), the petitioner was deprived of his lawful right, which is highly unjustified
Where a statute confers a right along with a prescribed remedy, the concerned authority is under a legal obligation to facilitate the exercise of such right rather than obstruct it
Therefore, the action of Tribunal (respondent No.3) amounted to acting without lawful authority and was of no legal effect
The impugned refusal had caused serious prejudice to the petitioner and had effectively deprived the petitioner of the statutory remedy provided under the Act, which warranted interference by the High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction
High Court directed the Tribunal (Respondent No.3) to receive, entertain and decide the appeal of the petitioner filed under S. 46 of the Act in accordance with law after providing an opportunity of hearing to all the concerned
Constitutional petition was allowed accordingly.
Judgment & Decree
This writ petition in terms of Article 199 of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as "Constitution") was filed by the Petitioner with the prayer to the direct the Respondent No.3 to do what is required by law to do.
2. The facts of the case are that the Petitioner was compulsorily registered by the Respondent No.1 under Section 14 of the Sales Tax Act, 1990 (hereafter referred to as "Act") read with Rule 6(1) and (2) of the Sales Tax Rules, 2006 (hereafter to be referred as "Rules"). Against such treatment, the Petitioner filed appeal before the Respondent No.3/Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue which was returned to him on the premise that it is not appealable under Section 45 of the Act .
3. Learned counsel for the Petitioner contended that non-receiving of appeal of the Petitioner by the Respondent No.3 is highly unjustified in as much as the right of appeal was available to him as order impugned before the Respondent No.3 under Section 14 of the Act was appealable in terms of Section 46(1) read with proviso to Section 45B of the "Act":
4. Learned counsel for the Respondents, on the other hand, supported the impugned order and stated that appeal was not maintainable before the Respondent No.3.
5. Heard. Record perused.
6. It evinces from the record that the Petitioner was compulsorily registered by the Respondent No.1 on 20.10.2023 against which an appeal along with stay application was filed before the Respondent No.3 on 16.12.2025. Pertinently, the procedure for filing appeal is provided under Section 46 of the "Act' which reads as under:
46. Appeals to Appellate Tribunal.
[(1) Any person including an officer of inland revenue not below the rank of an Additional Commissioner aggrieved by an order of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) under this Act or the rules made thereunder, or any person other than SOE aggrieved by an order passed by officer of inland revenue when second proviso to section 45B applies, may within thirty days of the receipt of such order, prefer an appeal to the Appellate Tribunal. (2) The Appellate Tribunal may admit, hear and dispose of the appeal as per procedure laid down in sections 131 and 132 of the Income Tax Ordinance, 2001 (XLIX of 2001), and rules made thereunder. The above provision of law governs the procedure for filing appeals before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue and explicitly provides that any person aggrieved by an order of the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), or any person other than a State-Owned. Enterprise where the second proviso to Section 45B applies, may prefer an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal within thirty days of the receipt of such order. The term "Appeals" is also provided under Section 45B of the "Act"; second proviso whereof reads as under: 45B. Appeals.
[(1) Any person, other than an State Owned Enterprises (SOE), aggrieved by any decision or order passed under sections 10, 11A, 11D, 11E, 11F, 21, 33, 34 and 66 of this Act, by an officer of Inland Revenue may, within thirty days of the date of receipt of such decision or order prefer appeal to the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals): Provided that an appeal preferred after the expiry of thirty days may be admitted by the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals) if he is satisfied that the appellant has sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal within the specified period: Provided further that registered person shall have an option to directly file an appeal before Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue without availing right of appeal under this Section.
Bare reading of the above-mentioned proviso clearly reveals that the legislature has conferred a discretionary right upon a registered person to directly file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue without first availing the remedy of appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) under this Section. This proviso provides an optional course to the registered person, enabling him either to avail the appellate remedy before the Commissioner (Appeals) or to bypass the said forum and directly approach the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue against the impugned order. The intent of the legislature. behind incorporating the said proviso is to provide flexibility in the appellate mechanism and to ensure that the registered person is not compelled to undergo the intermediate appellate stage if he opts to seek redress directly before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue. Therefore, the said proviso clearly recognizes and protects the right of the registered person to directly invoke the jurisdiction of the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue. The combined and harmonious reading of Sections 45B and 46 of the "Act" clearly demonstrate that a registered person has two legally recognized appellate options namely (i) to file an appeal before the Commissioner Inland Revenue (Appeals), and thereafter approach the Appellate Tribunal; or (ii) to directly file an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal Inland Revenue by virtue of the second proviso to Section 45B of the "Act". The impugned act of Respondent No.3 in refusing to receive and entertain the appeal of the Petitioner amounts to an unlawful denial of the Petitioner's statutory right of appeal provided under Section 46 of the "Act", and the order passed under Section 14 of the Act by the Respondent No.1, which was impugned before Respondent No.3, was clearly appealable in terms of Section 46(1) read with the proviso to Section 45B of the Act . On returning the appeal by Respondent No.3, the Petitioner was deprived of his lawful right, which is highly unjustified. It is a settled principle of law that where a statute confers a right along with a prescribed remedy, the concerned authority is under a legal obligation to facilitate the exercise of such right rather than obstruct it. The action of Respondent No.3 therefore amounts to acting without lawful authority and of no legal effect. The impugned refusal has caused serious prejudice to the Petitioner and has effectively deprived the Petitioner of the statutory remedy provided under the "Act", which warrants interference by this Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction.
7. In view of the foregoing, this writ petition is allowed. The Respondent No.3 is directed to receive, entertain and decide the appeal of the Petitioner filed under Section 46 of the Act in accordance with law after providing an opportunity of hearing to all the concerned. MQ/M-57/L Petition allowed.