1994 PLP 930 (MLD)

This order shall also govern disposal of the connected Writ Petition No. 195 of 1992 because the point for decision in both of them was identical.

2. Respondent-Union Council, in each case, imposed a levy on import/export of certain items within the area falling in their territorial jurisdiction. Copies of the order/notification showing imposing of the levy/tax have neither been annexed nor shown at the hearing. Petitioners claiming to be adversely affected by the imposition of the tax have challenged it, in Constitutional jurisdiction. It was stated that neither the Union Council had authority to impose the tax nor was it authorized to recover it, in face of a clear prohibition from the Government contained in Memorandum of 18th August, 1991. It was further stated that-for levying the tax/fee, Union Council did not fulfil the necessary procedural formalities laid down in the Taxation Rules. On 25-2-1992 the Court called for comments and issued notice in the stay matter. On 2-3-1992, stay was refused with a direction to the Union Council to maintain accounts of payments to it. Upon written request of the petitioners, in two separate C.Ms. No.355, 356 of 1992 praying for early hearing, by agreement of the learned counsel, writ petitions were taken up for hearing on merits today. It was argued by Mr. Bashir Ahmad Ansari, Advocate that the imposition and recovery of tax/fee by the Union Councils, apart from being contrary to express prohibition from the Government, was also contrary to the provisions contained in Punjab Local Government Ordinance, 1979. In view of the proposed order, it is unnecessary to dwell and dilate on merits of the contention. Basic levy was challengeable in appeal before a specified forum and also representation to the Controlling Authority under section 156 of the above Ordinance. The argument that the remedy in appeal, and, representation provided in the Ordinance were ineffective was not acceptable. Not only the Appellate but the controlling Authority have all pervasive powers to check and control the excesses of Local Councils regarding performance of functions by them under the Ordinance. No good reason was shown to bye-pass ordinary remedies for invoking extraordinary remedy in this Court. Rule of exhaustion of statutory remedies before embarking upon extraordinary jurisdiction was well-settled. Compliance with the above rule was not only necessary to allow statutory functionaries to perform functions allotted to their fields but is also essential for avoiding over congestion of cases in the High Court, which .could otherwise be effectively handled at other levels. Having looked into the nature of dispute and relevant provisions contained in the Ordinance, I am sufficiently satisfied that the remedies provided in the Ordinance were adequate alternate remedies. Government, I am afraid, does not need the assistance of the High Court to enforce its decision of the kind relied upon by the learned counsel. In view of aforesaid discussion, writ petitions fail and are dismissed in limine. Petitioners must first pursue the remedies provided in the Ordinance and in case of failing to obtain appropriate relief, may then approach this Court for it. H.B.T./M-1397/L Petitions dismissed