P L D 2005 Peshawar 190 (PLP)

Respondent/plaintiff filed suit in the Court of learned Senior Civil Judge Charsadda seeking declaration to the effect that Electricity Bill for the month of September, 1997 showing a sum of Rs.3,38,699 with regard to Meter Account No.6142-04560008132 was wrong, incorrect and ineffective upon his rights. Perpetual injunction restraining the petitioners/defendants to claim the said amount was also sought as consequential relief. The said suit was resisted by the petitioners/defendants by filing written statement. The learned trial Court after framing issues, recording pro and contra evidence of the parties decreed the suit in favour of the plaintiff/respondent vide judgment and decree dated 19-11-2003. Being not satisfied with the said judgment and decree, the petitioners filed appeal in the Court of learned Additional District Judge-V Charsadda, but the said appeal was dismissed vide judgment and decree dated 27-4-2004. Being not contented with the judgments and decrees of the Courts. below the petitioners have filed the revision petition in hand.

2. Mr. Abdul Qadir Khattak, Advocate the learned counsel representing the petitioners argued that the only remedy available to the respondent/plaintiff was to file an application under section 26 (6) of the Electricity Act, 1910 before the Electric Inspector. The suit filed by him was not maintainable, hence the judgments and decrees of the Courts below are coram non judice.

3. I have heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and perused the record.

4. The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners has no force.

5. Firstly because such an objection was never raised by the petitioners/defendants before the Courts below. Had such objection been raised before the learned trial Court, it should have framed issue and given findings thereon. The petitioners, therefore, cannot be allowed to raise such objection for the first time at revisional stage.

6. Secondly subsection (6) of section 26 of the Electricity Act, 1910 deals with `Meter' only. The subsection is reproduced hereunder for convenience:-- "(6) Where any difference or dispute arises between a licensee and a consumer as to whether any meter, maximum demand indicator or other measuring apparatus is or is not correct, the .matter shall be decided, upon the application of either party, by an Electric Inspector, within a period of ninety days from the date of receipt of such application, after affording the parties an opportunity of being heard, and where the meter, maximum demand indicator or other measuring apparatus has, in the opinion of the Electric Inspector, ceased to be correct, the Electric Inspector shall estimate the amount of energy supplied to the consumer or the electrical quantity contained in the supply, during such time as the meter, maximum demand indicator or measuring apparatus has not, in the option of the Electric Inspector, been correct; and, where the Electric Inspector fails to decide the matter of difference or dispute within the said period or where either the licensee or the consumer decline to accept the decision of the Electric Inspector, the matter shall be referred to the Provincial Government whose decision shall be final: Provided that, before either a licensee or consumer applies to the Electric Inspector under this subsection, he shall give to the other party not less than seven days' notice of his intention so to do."

7. The provision of this subsection could be invoked where there was difference or dispute between a licensee and a consumer with regard to any `Meter', maximum demand or other measuring apparatus is or is not correct. The said question is to be decided by an Electric Inspector on filing application by either of the party. The limitation period of ninety days has been fixed for decision of such an application. Principle of natural justice is made application and each party is to be afforded opportunity of being heard. Vast powers had been given to the Electric Inspector to estimate the amount of energy supplied to the consumer where the meter, maximum demand indicator or other measuring apparatus, in the opinion of the Electric Inspector, ceased to be correct. In case of failure of the Electric Inspector to decide the dispute within ninety days, or where either the licensee or the consumer decline to accept the decision of the Electric Inspector, the matter could be referred to the Provincial Government whose decision will be final.

8. In the case in hand the dispute between the parties is not with regard to the `Meter' or maximum demand indicator or other measuring apparatus. Simple question involved is that in September, 1997 the electricity of the respondent/plaintiff's factory/Unit was disconnected by the petitioner but despite disconnection a sum of Rs.3,38,699 was shown as payable amount which amount was challenged by the IC respondent/plaintiff by filing the suit.

9. The perusal of the Electricity Act, 1910 shows that there is no other provision than section 54-C barring the jurisdiction of civil Court. The bar contained in section 54-C is only restricted to the extent that where a licensee gives a notice for recovery of sum recoverable or discontinues supply of energy, no Court shall make an order prohibiting the licensee from discontinuing supply of energy to the premises, or requiring him to restore supply of energy to such premises provided that the plaintiff, applicant or appellant, within a period of thirty days of the date of filing of the suit, application or appeal, as the case may be, to deposit with the Court the amount assessed against him by the licensee and all further charges of the licensee as and when become due. This bar has been imposed only to ensure that the electricity charges are deposited by the consumer either with the licensee or with the Court and, as mentioned above, has been restricted only to the extent of issuance of any restrictive or directory order. There is no bar in the entire Electricity Act in filing a civil suit. Civil Courts or Courts of general jurisdiction to try a suit of civil nature unless jurisdiction of the Court is specifically D barred. In other words wherever the object of proceedings is enforcement of the civil rights, a civil Court has the ultimate jurisdiction to entertain the suit independently of any statute unless its cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred.

10. The Courts below have properly appreciated the evidence available on record. Not only all the officials of PESCO/WAPDA deposed that the electricity of the respondent/plaintiff's unit was closed/disconnected in September, 1997, but they have also in so many clear words stated that the respondent/plaintiff did not use the electricity after September, 1997. When asked as to under which provisions of law after disconnecting the electric supply the petitioners could still demand "minimum charges", the learned counsel was unable to show any such, law, rule or policy. The Courts of competent jurisdiction, as mentioned above, have properly appreciated the evidence available on record and I have not been able to find out any misreading or non-reading of evidence or any illegality or any material irregularity in the impugned concurrent findings. Resultantly the revision petition in hand is dismissed in limine. H.B.T./436/P Revision dismissed. ***