P L D 1969 Supreme Court 267 (PLP)

MUHAMMAD YAQUB ALI, J.

‑The question raised in this appeal by Special leave of the Court involves interpretation of the exception clause in subsection (1) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the effect that a person shall not be released on bail if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life. It is con tended on behalf of the appellants who are charged under section 307, P. P. C. that the exception applies to offences which are punishable with death and alternatively with transportation for life and not to those offences which are punishable only with transportation for life or imprisonment. Subsection (1) of section 497 provides :‑ 497.‑(1) When any person accused of any non‑bailable offence is arrested or detained without warrant by an officer‑in‑charge of a police station, or appears or is brought before a Court, he may be released on bail, but he shall not be so released if there appear reasonable grounds for believing that he has been guilty of an offence punishable with death or transportation for life Provided that the Court may direct that any person under the age of sixteen years or any woman or any sick or infirm person accused of such an offence be released on bail. In effect a Court may in its discretion grant bail to a person accused of a non‑bailable offence, but if the offence is punishable with death or transportation for life then the power to grant bail is limited to the conditions laid down in the exception clause and the proviso thereto. The High Court has disallowed bail to the appellants on the ground that they are charged with an offence punish able with transportation for life. It is, accordingly, contended that the learned Judge in dealing with the appellants' case under the exception clause failed to exercise the discretion vested in the High Court under the main provisions of sub section (1) of section 497 of the Code of Criminal procedure. The answer to the question raised in the appeal lies in finding out whether the word "or" in the exception clause is used in disjunctive or conjunctive sense. Ordinarily "or" is used in disjunctive sense. The governing rule, however, is to carry out the intention of the Legislature. It may be A found necessary to read the conjunctions `or' and `and' one for the other depending on the consequences intended by the Legislature. Applying the rule stated above we find no evidence of the intention on the part of the Legislature that the word `or' in the exception clause of section 497 (1) of the Code Is used for `and'. On the contrary the plain meaning of the clause "punishable with death or transportation for life" is 'punishable with death' or `punishable with transportation for life.' It is also significant that although section 497 (1) has in its present form been on the statute book for over sixty years there is barring some overruled judgments of the Rangoon and Nagpur High Courts no decision in support of the interpretation canvassed for by the appellants. The judgment reported in A I R 1926 Rang. 51 in which ft was held that the word `or' in section 497 (1) of the Code is used in conjunctive sense was overruled by a Full Bench in A I R 1927 Rang.

205. Following this view the Nagpur High Court in the case reported in A I R 193 2 Nag. 130 overruled its earlier decision to the contrary .in A I R 1927 Nag.

53. The interpretation sought to be placed on the exception clause "punishable with death or transportation for life" in section 497 (1) of the Code by the appellants being unten able, we see no other ground to interfere with the order of the High Court refusing to grant them bail pending the trial In the Courts below. In the result the appeal fails and is hereby dismissed. K. B. A. Appeal dismissed.