1981 PLP (Trib (PTD)

‑‑ No. 105, para 3 [as amended by M. L. R. 112]‑Restriction of property declared‑Interpretation of statute‑‑Statute to be considered as a whole‑Sub‑pares (2) & (4) of para 3 read together clarify no tax being chargeable to rupee equivalent of amount repatriated to Pakistan on or before 15‑3‑1972‑Contention that sub- para (4) of para. 3 did not prescribe any time for repatriation of mov able properties declared under sub‑para (1) of para. 3, held, not correct.

No. 105, para 3 [as amended by M. L. R. 1121‑Repatriation of property declared‑No provision of M. L. R. 105 confers any power or jurisdiction in State Bank of Pakistan, or any of its functionaries to enlarge period for repatriation of movable properties declared under para. 3(1)‑No impediment existing to repatriates scripts or their money equivalent to Pakistan within statutory period save desire to fetch more money by disposing theca of over a period of time and even to achieve such desire appellant could repatriate scripts to Pakistan and then take them back for disposal as and when purchasers available‑‑Appellant by adopting a course not legally permissible cannot plead his own default as a valid excuse for not pressing into service explicit provisions of law. ORDER MUHAMMAD MAZHAR ALI (MEMBER).‑The facts giving rise to this appeal, arising from the order of the learned Appellate Commissioner, F‑Range, Karachi, pertaining to charge year 1973‑74, briefly stated, are as under:

2. The assessee‑appellant alongwith others, all members of the well‑known D . . . Family declared under M. L. Rs. 104 and 105 of 1972, the value of his foreign assets, which were in the shape of shares of Attock Oil Company. The total value of the shares declared by the family was Rs. 2,00,

000. It was declared under (M. L. R. 105) Foreign Assets (Declaration) Regulation, 1972 published in the Gazette of Pakistan, Extraordinary. Under paragraph 3(1) of the Regulation any person who owned any movable or immovable properties not being foreign exchange, outside Pakistan was to declare them on or before 15‑1‑1972 to the State Bank of Pakistan. The assessee duly made the declaration to the State Bank of Pakistan before 15‑1‑1971. Under sub‑clause (2) of paragraph 3 the movable property declared under sub‑paragraph 1 were to be repatriated to Pakistan on or before 15‑2‑1972, later on extended by M. L. R. 112 to 31‑3‑1972. Under sub‑paragraph (4) of paragraph 3, the rupee equivalent of any amount repatriated under sub‑paragraph (2) was not to be chargeable to any tax to which it would, but for the Regulation, have been liable. Admittedly the assessee did not repatriate physically the foreign exchange equivalent of the value of shares until 4‑1‑1973. The appellant has given copies reasons for not bringing the amount earlier than 4‑1‑1973. The assessee in his letter dated 3‑2‑1972 addressed to the Deputy Controller, Exchange Control Department; State Bank of Pakistan, explained to him that if the shares were sold in bulk they would fetch very low prices, and he soght permission from the Deputy Controller to dispose them of over a period of time. The Deputy Controller sent his reply after more than a month vide his letter E. C. D. No. M. L. O. 716/06‑72 dated 13‑3‑1972 and asked Mr. S. D. to deposit the shares with the State Bank of Pakistan, immediately, On 15‑3‑1972 the assessee explained to the Deputy Controller the futility of bringing the shares to Pakistan and then sending back to England any of the shares as and when they were sold. In the same letter the assesses required for permission for depositing the shares with either the National Bark of Pakistan L‑Branch, or Habib Bank (Overseas Limited) under the State Bank's Authorisation. By his letter-dated 17thMarch, 1972, the Deputy Controller informed the assessee that the latter's request had been granted and he should now deposit the shares with the National Bank of Pakistan, to the order of the State Bank of Pakistan. In July, 1972 the assessee informed the Controller of Foreign Exchange, State Bank of Pakistan, that the shares had been lodged with the National Bank of Pakistan.

3. Mr. Pasha, the learned Advocate vehemently argued that subpara graph 4 of paragraph 3 of M. L. R. 104 placed no time limit for repatriation and hence the assessee could repatriate any time after he had made the declaration. In his submission, the time limit placed by sub‑paragraph (2) was of no consequence. The learned counsel for the appellant then relied on the maxim Lex non cogit ad impossibilia out inutilis (No man is compelled to do that which is idle or. impossible), Developing his point, Mr. Pasha very forcibly argued that due to the negligence of the State Bank of Pakistan it was rendered impossible for the appellant to comply with the relevant provisions of law, i.e. to repatriate the amount in question by or before the 15th March, 1973.

4. We find it difficult to concede to any of the argument of the learned counsel. From the facts narrated above it was obvious that the appellant had admittedly failed to repatriate ‑ the movable assets or their equivalent rupee value within the time limit allowed by the Martial Law Regulation 105, as amended, by M. L. R.

112. What is, therefore, to be decided is whether appellant is, entitled to exemption from levy of wealth tax in respect of the assets in question under sub‑paragraph (4) of paragraph 3 of M. L. R.

105. Sub‑paragraph (2) of paragraph 3 of M. L. R. 105, so far as it relates to movable properties lays down that "the movable properties declared under sub‑paragraph (1) shall be repatriated to Pakistan on or before the 15th March 1972. Sub‑paragraph (4) of paragraph 3 of the said Regulation provides that, "the rupee equivalent of any amount repatriated under sub‑paragraph (2) shall not be chargeable to any tax to which it would, but for this Regulation, have been liable." It is an undisputed rather an admitted fact that it was on 7th of July, 1972 that the D Group, of which the appellant was one of the members, finally got permission from the State Bank of Pakistan to release the scripts for disposal of any person and the State Bank of Pakistan accorded its approval accordingly. The D Group received in all 1,78,249 sterling equivalent to 4,57,049 Pakistan rupees. The appellant's share in this amount was to the extent of Rs. 1,43,

641. This amount has been subjected to wealth tax by the Wealth Tax Officer by his impugned order, for the exemption allowed by sub‑paragraph (4) of para graph 3 of the said Regulation, was not available to the appellant on account of his having failed to repatriate to Pakistan the said movable property on before the 15th March, 1972. This finding of the assessing Officer has been endorsed by the learned Appellate Assistant Commissioner as well.

5. The mandate of the law was absolutely clear and unambiguous. The exemption from chargeability to any tax was specifically made available to rupee equivalent of any amount repatriated to Pakistan or before 15thMarch, 1972. The argument that sub‑paragraph (4) of para graph 3 of M. L. R. 105 does not prescribe any time for repatriation of the movable properties declared under sub‑paragraph (1) of paragraph 3, clearly overlooks the provisions of paragraph 3(4) of the said M. L. R. It is too well known a principle of construction of Statutes to be recalled that the Statute must be considered as a whole. And hence if we read sub‑paragraphs (2) and (4) of paragraph 3 together, it becomes explicitly clear that no tax is chargeable to the rupee equivalent of any amount, which is repatriated to Pakistan on or before the 16thMarch, 1972. For these reasons we reject the argument of the learned counsel as being wholly fallacious and unsustainable.

6. Now we must turn to the next argument of the learned counsel Here again we are firmly of the view that the abovequoted legal maxi" relied upon by him has no bearing on the facts of the instant case There is no provision in M. L. R. 105.conferring any powers or jurisdiction in the State Bank of Pakistan or any or its functionaries to enlarge the period for repatriation of movable properties declared under paragraph 3(1) thereof. There was, we think, no real impediment whether in the way of the appellant to repatriate the scripts or their money equivalent to Pakistan within the statutory period, save the desire to fetch more money by disposing them of over a period of time. Even to achieve that desire it was definitely within the reach of the appellant to repatriate the scripts to Pakistan and then to take them back for disposal as and when the purchases were available. Anyhow, if led by his own desire, the appellant and or his co‑sharers or members of the group adopted a course which was not warranted by law, as explained and above, then he cannot now be heard pleading his own default as a valid excuse for not pressing into service the explicit provisions of law. Therefore impugned orders passed by the two officers below are, in our opinion, patently unexcep tionable.

7. The upshot of the above discussion is that looked at from whatever angle this appeal has no merit and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.