2003 PLP 2093 (YLR)
Mst. NASEEBAN — Appellant Versus MANZOOR HUSSAIN — Respondent
| Citation | 2003 PLP 2093 (YLR) |
| Forum / Court | Lahore |
| Bench Members | Farrukh Lateef, J |
| Parties | Mst. NASEEBAN — Appellant Versus MANZOOR HUSSAIN — Respondent |
| Primary Law | Displaced Persons (Compensation Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958) |
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 2003 PLP 2093 (YLR)?
This judgment primarily cites: Displaced Persons (Compensation Rehabilitation) Act (XXVIII of 1958) as referenced in Pakistani case law index.
Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 2003 PLP 2093 (YLR)?
The case was heard and decided by the Lahore bench comprising: Farrukh Lateef, J.
Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?
Cite this legal precedent as: 2003 PLP 2093 (YLR) (Mst. NASEEBAN — Appellant Versus MANZOOR HUSSAIN — Respondent). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.
Laws Cited
Representation
- Muhammad Ameer Rhatti for Appellant.
- Ch. Abdul Hakeem for Respondent.
- Date of hearing: 25th October, 2002.
Headnotes / Summary
Ss.22 & 25
Specific Relief Act (I of 1877), S.42
Appellate Court while setting aside plaintiff's decree had found that defendant was owner of the House No.65 as demarcated in the order of Deputy Settlement Commissioner dated 13-1-1971 and that the plaintiff was owner of House No. 78 as described in the same order of the Deputy Settlement Commissioner which order had not been assailed by any of the parties before any higher forum and had thus attained finality
Observation of the trial Court that demarcation was carried out by the Settlement Department on 14-5-1977 was against the record because according to the record demarcation was already made by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner vide order dated 13-1-1971 and on that date viz. 15-4-1977, in presence of both the parties, site plan was prepared in accordance with aforesaid order of demarcation
Contention of the plaintiff that after transferring the suit properties, Settlement Authorities became functus officio and it was not open for them to have demarcated the suit properties, as it was exclusively the function of the Civil Court, was without force because under S.22 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958 it was provided that every order made by any officer appointed under the Act would be final and would not be questioned in any Court and under S.25 of the Act, jurisdiction of the Civil Court was barred in respect of matters falling within the purview of the said Act
House was transferred by the Settlement Department to the defendant by a Provisional Transfer Order but he could not locate it and had been moving applications to the Settlement Department to point out to him where the property was
Defendant, being transferee was within his right to know what was transferred to him and it was the duty of the Settlement Department to demarcate the property and to describe the same in Provisional Transfer Order with exactitude-- Observation of the Trial Court that the Settlement Department had become functus officio because Permanent Transfer Deed had already been issued to the plaintiff and to the defendant after issuance whereof it had no authority to demarcate the suit property was misconceived and against record as it was not the case of either party that Permanent Transfer Deed had been issued to them nor any such document was produced on record-- Transfer documents produced by the plaintiff and the defendant were Provisional Transfer Orders and not the Permanent Transfer Deeds
Plaintiff was not entitled to the decree as prayed for by her in view of the demarcation conducted by the Competent Authority
Judgment by the Appellate Court did not suffer from any legal infirmity and was consequently maintained.
Judgment & Decree
3. After framing issues and recording evidence thereon, trial Court decreed the plaintiff's suit on 13-7-1978.
4. Against the said decree defendant's appeal was accepted by Additional District Judge, D.G. Khan on 14-3-1979. It is mentioned in this judgment that on the application of defendant the disputed property was inspected at the spot by Deputy Settlement Commissioner who passed an order on 16-2-1966 (Exh.D.2) that Houses Nos.65 and 78 were actually one property at the spot which is under occupation of Mst. Naseeban who is willing to pay price of Property No.65 in addition to the price of Property No.78, therefore, on payment of Rs.640 (price of Property No.65) the entire Properties Nos.65 and 78 total measuring 7-1/2 Marlas should be considered transferred to Mst. Naseeban and the amount paid by Manzoor Hussain as transfer price of Property No.65 through adjustment from his own C-Book be restored and P.T.O. issued to him should be considered cancelled. He was given choice of one residential property in lieu of Property No.65 cancelled from his name. On the basis of this report P.T.O. (Exh.P.4) in respect of Properties Nos.65 and 78 was issued in favour of Mst. Naseeban. Manzoor Hussain tiled an appeal against the aforesaid order which was accepted by Additional Settlement Commissioner who set aside the order of Deputy Settlement Commissioner, and remanded the case with the direction to demarcate Properties Nos.65 and
78. The Deputy Settlement Commissioner vide order dated 13-1-1971 (Exh.D.3) demarcated the aforesaid two properties allotted to the plaintiff and the respondent. The matter was, therefore, finalized by the aforesaid order dated 13-1-1971 (Exh.D.3) which was not assailed by any of the parties before any higher forum, therefore, it attained finality and there was, therefore, nothing left to be decided by the Civil Court as the rights of the parties in respect of the present dispute are to be regulated by the aforesaid order (Exh.D.3) wherein extent of both the properties is shown. The learned Additional District Judge, therefore, held Manzoor Hussain as owner of House No.65 as demarcated in the order of Deputy Settlement Commissioner dated 13-1-1971 and Mst. Naseeban as owner of House No.78 as described in the same order by the Deputy Settlement Commissioner.
5. The plaintiff Mst. Naseeban has tiled this R.S.A. against the aforesaid judgment and decree of Additional District Judge.
6. The appeal is opposed by the learned counsel for the respondent. Arguments heard. Record perused.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant urged that Additional District Judge did not advert to the oral and documentary evidence produced by the appellant. In this regard he referred to the statement of Noor Ahmed P. W.1, clerk of Settlement Department who said that House No.65 was transferred to defendant but later on it was cancelled. Learned counsel then referred to Exhs.P.7, P.9 and P.20 to P.23 which according to him proved that House No.65 was amalgamated in House No. 66.
8. The said contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is without force inasmuch as Exh.P.7 and Exh.P.9 are applications dated 20-3-1962 and 23-2-1963 moved by defendant to the Settlement Authority alleging that one Muhammad Shafi has amalgamated House No.65 in his own house bearing No.66, therefore, House No.65 be demarcated and he be informed about its location. Said applications simply reflect that the defendant was not aware about the location of the property which was transferred to him and he had requested the Settlement Department to locate and demarcate the house which was transferred to him. These applications in no way proved that House No.65 was in fact included by Muhammad Shafi in House No.66.
9. Exhs.P.20, P.23 are Form P.T.I. in respect of R.H.No.65, R.H.No.66, Shop No.78 and Shop No.77, respectively. Manzoor Hussain defendant is shown as owner of R.H. No.65 Muhammad Shaf is shown as owner of R.H.No.66 and Mst. Naseeban is stated as owner of Shop No.78. I fail to understand as to how these documents proved that House No.65, was absorbed in House No.66. Both the said houses are shown as separate entities in the Forms P.T.I. as belonging to different persons. One thing which escaped notice of the Courts below was that in the said documents Exhs.P.20 to P.23, Property No.65 is described as residential house (R.H) whereas Property No.78 is stated as a shop and not residential house.
10. It was next argued by the learned counsel for the appellant that in para.14 of the judgment the learned trial Court while referring to Exhs.D.4 and D.5, had observed that demarcation was carried out by the Settlement Department on 14-5-1977 after issuance of P.T.D. to the defendant whereas it had no jurisdiction and authority to demarcate the properties after issuance of P. T. D. It was urged that Settlement Department had become functus officio after the issuance of P.T.D. in favour of the parties, therefore, the demarcation conducted by them (Exh.D.3) was void and the learned Additional District Judge had unlawfully based his decision on the basis of the said document and had drawn unwarranted conclusion which has resulted in miscarriage of justice.
11. Referring to the above argument, it may be observed that observation of the Civil Judge that demarcation was carried out by the Settlement Department on 14-5-1977 is against record because according to Exh.D.4, demarcation was already made by Deputy' Settlement Commissioner vide order dated 13-1-1971 and on that date viz. 15-4-1977, in presence of both the parties, site plan Exh.D.5, was prepared in accordance with the aforesaid order of demarcation.
12. The argument that after transferring the properties, the Settlement Authorities became functus officio and it was not open for them to have demarcated the properties vide Exh.D.3, as it was exclusively the function of Civil Court, is without force because under section 22 of the Displaced Persons (Compensation and Rehabilitation) Act, 1958, it is provided that every order made by any officer appointed under this Act shall be final and shall not be questioned in any Court and under section 25 of the said Act, jurisdiction of Civil Court is barred in respect of any matter which an officer appointed under that Act is empowered to determine. In this case House No.65 was transferred by the Settlement Department to the defendant by a Provisional Transfer Order and he could not locate it and had been moving applications to the Settlement Department to point out to him where the property was. Being transferee he was within his right to know what was transferred to him and it was the duty of the Settlement Department to demarcate the property and to describe the same in the Provisional Transfer Order with exactitude.
13. The other observation of the learned trial Court that Settlement Department had become functus officio because P.T.D. had already been issued to the plaintiff as well as to the defendant, after issuance whereof it had no authority to demarcate the property, w9s also misconceived and against record inasmuch as it was not the case of either party that P.T.D. had been issued to them nor any P.T.D. was produced on record. The document of transfer produced by the appellant in support of her case was a P.T.O. (Exh.P.4) and not P.T.D. and the defendant had also produced on record transfer order Exh. D.1.
14. In view of the demarcation conducted by the competent authority it was, therefore, proved that Mst. Naseeban had included residential Property No.65 belonging to the defendant in her Shop No.78 which comprised of a single room. She was, therefore, not entitled to the decree as prayed for by her, the impugned judgment passed by the learned Additional District Judge, was is unexceptionable, it is accordingly upheld and R.S.A. being devoid of any merit is hereby dismissed. S.M.A.H./N-267/L Appeal dismissed.