2001 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

ABDUL RAZZAQ A. THAHIM (CHAIRMAN).

Appellant, Mr. Fazal Ahmed Jat, Assistant Director (BPS-17), Federal Investigation Agency, was suspended by notification, dated 11th January, 1997 for a period of three months, with immediate effect, issued by the Interior Division, in terms of rule 5 (1) (i) of the Government Servants (Efficiency and Discipline) Rules, 1973. He preferred departmental appeal on 6-2-1997to the Secretary, Establishment Division against the suspension order with the request that the order of suspension be set aside and he be allowed to perform his duties as usual.

2. This appeal came up for preliminary hearing on 9-6-1997 and this Tribunal called for the comments from the respondents, i.e. the Secretary, Establishment Division; Secretary, Interior Division and the Director General, FIA. Notices were issued to the respondents on 10-6-1997 and the appeal came up for preliminary hearing on 23-6-1997 when the representative of FIA, Mr. Shafiq Ahmed, Inspector (Legal) placed on record some documents. The administrative Ministry of Interior neither filed comments nor put up appearance on the date of hearing. We were informed that the representative of the Establishment Division was busy in the Supreme Court and as such he could not appear on the date of hearing, but later on file was produced by the representative of Establishment Division.

3. We have-heard the learned counsel for the appellant. He argued that appeal is competent against the suspension order and he referred to the cases reported in 1985 SCMR 63 and 1984 PLC (C.S.) 926 and submitted that suspension order is final order when it is acted upon, therefore, the Tribunal has got jurisdiction and appeal against that order be admitted. On merits, he argued that when the suspension order was passed, the Establishment Secretary was on leave and the Additional Secretary was holding the charge, who was not competent to approve the suspension as no such notification of his authorisation was issued, therefore, order of suspension is without jurisdiction, He also argued that initially suspension order was made for three months, whereafter it was to be extended with the approval of the competent Authority which has not been done, therefore, the appellant is deemed to be in service and the appeal may be allowed.

4. The representative of the FIA submitted that there were serious allegations against the appellant, therefore, in the interest of justice, the appellant was relieved of the charge and put under suspension by the competent Authority and there is no illegality in the impugned order. He also submitted that suspension period beyond three months had been extended with the approval of the competent Authority. It is argued that the order of suspension having been passed by the competent Authority there is no violation of any rule. He vehemently opposed the admission of appeal on the ground that charge against the appellant is serious and he cannot be put incharge, till disciplinary proceedings are completed and final decision is taken by the competent Authority in the matter.

5. There is no dispute that when suspension order is acted upon, it is to be treated as final order. Moreover, according to the recent amendment in section 4 (1) of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, appeal is competent against any order affecting terms and conditions of a civil servant. This matter was also earlier settled by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case reported in 1985 SCMR 63 (Muhammad Sadiq Khokhar v. Engineer-in-Chief, Pakistan, GHQ) and 1984 PLC (C.S.) 926 (Bahawal Khan v. Secretary to the Government of the Punjab, Finance Department). Therefore, we are of the view that in view of the recent amendment in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 whereby word "final" has been omitted and earlier law laid down by Supreme Court, the appeal is competent before the Tribunal under section 4 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 and to that extent, we agree with the learned counsel for the appellant.

6. The appellant has been suspended under Rule 5 (1) (i) of the Government Servants (E&D) Rules, 1973, and the relevant portion of this Rule- reads as under: "

5. Inquiry procedure.--(1) The following procedure shall be observed when a Government servant is proceeded against under these rules:-- (i) In case where a Government servant is accused of subversion, corruption or misconduct, the authorised officer may require him to proceed on leave or, with the approval of the authority suspend him provided that any continuation of such leave or suspension shall require approval of the authority after every three months: Provided further that where the authority is President, or Prime Minister the powers of the authority under this clause shall be exercised by the Secretary, Establishment Division." Disciplinary proceedings against the appellant have been initiated under Rule 3 (a), (b) and (c) of the E & D Rules, and we do not like to repeat the charges contained in the charge-sheet served on the appellant, as it might cause prejudice to the parties at the time of passing final order but it would suffice to say that the appellant has been charged for misconduct and corruption and in such circumstances, proper course is that the appellant should be either forced to proceed on leave or put under suspension, therefore, it is an interim arrangement till final decision on the basis of inquiry report is taken to logical end by the competent Authority. Moreover, the appellant will not suffer any monetary loss as during suspension, a civil servant is entitled to full salary and other benefits of the post, and therefore, the appellant cannot force the respondents to put him as incharge of the post he was holding when during his posting he was charged for corruption.

7. We have gone through the file of the Establishment Division and we are satisfied that the power of suspension has been exercised by the Acting Secretary, Establishment Division when perhaps, the Secretary was on leave, and we find no illegality in the suspension order. The record also indicates that extension in the suspension was made by the competent Authority, for a further period of three months, with effect from 11-4-1997, vide Establishment Division U.O.No.2/64/96-D.1, dated 18-6-1997, and the contention of the learned counsel: for the appellant that suspension order has not been extended though this point has not been taken in the pleadings but argued in Court, and we are of the view that argument has no basis.

8. For the reasons recorded above, no case is made out for admission and as such appeal is dismissed in limine. H.B.T./195/St/F Appeal dismissed.