1973 PLP 358 (PLC)

(a) West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance (VI of 1968), S. O. 2(c) read with Factories Act (XXV of 1934), S. 9(i)(e)-"Employer"-Manager of factory or mills -Employer for being cited as respondent in petition by worker. (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969), S. 2(xxviii) [as amended by Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance (IX -of 1972)]-"Workman"-Supervisior merely performing supervisory duties-Enjoying no power to engage or remove, or to take discip linary action against other workers by his own authority-Not out of definition of workman. (c) Industrial dispute-Termination of service-One month's notice issued to worker for termination of service-Termination order effective on expiry of notice period and not from date of notice-Law operative on date of expiry of notice period, in circum stances, held, applicable to termination order. May & Baker (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen 1961 P L C 1127 rel. "This is to inform you that your services are not required by this organization, hence you are served with a one month notice valid up to 18th April 1972. You war be entitled to have all benefits according to Rules and Regulation. You are further advised to produce no-demand certificate on 18-4-1972 duly signed by all the concerned -departments for the purpose of finalisation of your account." Aggrieved by the above order the appellant sent a grievance notice to the respondent on 123-5-1972; to which no reply was received. He thereupon tiled a petition under section 25-A of Industrial Relations ordinance, 1969, which was dismissed. (i) That the appellant was not an employee of the respondent. (ii) That the appellant was not a workman. Cross Objection No. I

The learned counsel for the respondent contended that Punjnad Textile Mills Limited, Mullah were the employers of the appellant and not the Manager, who is just an employee of the management like the appellant. Therefore, the petition should' have been filed not against the Manager but against the Punjnad Textile Mills Limited, Multan. This conten tion has no force because according to section 2(c) of the West Pakistan Industrial and Commercial Employment (Standing Orders) Ordinance, 1968, employer means an owner of an Industrial or commercial establishment and includes in a factory any person named under clause (e) of subsection (i) of section of the Factories Act. 934 (XX of 1934) as manager of the factory. Thus a manager of a factory is included in the definition of employer. "I was the head of electrical section. It is incorrect that I was a foreman in the establishment. Application Exh. R-1 wag submitted by me for leave. Is this application I have described myself as a foreman. One Abdul Ghani was Assistant foreman under me. I had charge-Sheeted one Ashraf Julani under the direction of the employer. I had also charge-sheeted Muhammad Ramzan and Allah Ditta under the direction of the employer. I had no authority to appoint a person in the respondent's mills." "'Worker' and `Workman' mean any person not falling within the definition of employer who is employed (including employment as a supervisor or as an apprentice) in an establishment or industry fur hire or reward either directly or through a contractor whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied, and for the purpose of any proceeding under this Ordinance in relation to an industrial dispute retrenched, laid cu` otherwise removed from employment in connection with or as a consequence of that dispute or whose dismissal, discharge, retrenchment, lay off, or removal has led to that dispute. Explanation.-',supervisor' means a worker immediately above the lowest level of workers in an establishment or industry who has supervisory duties but no power to engage or remove, or take any other discipline action against another worker by ;his own authority." From the above it is clear that the employees who performed these supervisory duties have now been added in the definition of workman by the Labour Laws (Amendment) Ordinance,1972. The mere fact that the appellant had cl arse-sheeted some workers under the direction of his employer would not exclude him from the definition of a worker. 7'he respondent in this case failed to produce reliable evidence such as the duty list of the appellant is order t,) show that the appellant had power to engage or remove, or take any disciplinary action against another worker by his own g authority. Therefore, the mete fact that the appellant was performing the supervisory duties will not take him out of the definition of a workman. Under these circumstances I find no force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the respondent.

3. The learned counsel for the respondent on the other hand contended that the order of termination of services of the appellant came into effect on 19-3-1972 when it was passed and, therefore, at that time it was not necessary to give the reasons for terminating the services of the appellant, because the Labour Lags (Amendment) Ordinance, 1972 had not come into force.

4. I have gone through the order Exh. P-1 and find that it is not an order terminating the services of the appellant on 19-3-1972 but only a notice that his services would he terminated on 18-4-1972. This notice before 18-4-1972 could also have been withdrawn, it the management so desired find, therefore, it cannot be said that it was the final order of termination of his service. T s n fortified in this view by the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in the case, and Baker (India) Ltd. v. Their Workmen (1961 P L C 1127) wherein it was observed "Where the services of a workman are terminated by payment of one months wages in lieu of notice, his services come to an end on the date on which it is terminated. If, on the other hand, the workman had been given one month's notice and after that month his services are terminates, his services would come to an end only after the notice period. " In view of the above I hold that the order of termination of services came into effect on 18-4-1972, when it had become necessary to mention the reasons for terminating the services in that order. Since it was not done, the order of termination of the services was bad in law. I, accordingly, accept the appeal, set aside the decision of the learned lower Court and direct that the appellant be re-instated with full benefits.