PLC(CS) 1999

1999 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

SHAHNAWAZ SHAH Versus KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION through Chairman/Managing Director or Secretary and another

Jurisdiction / Court
Karachi High Court
Decided Date
Suit No. 364 of 1997, decided on 3rd October, 1997.
Honorable Judges
Mushtaq A. Memon, J
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation 1999 PLP (C (PLC(CS))
Forum / Court Karachi High Court
Bench Members Mushtaq A. Memon, J
Parties SHAHNAWAZ SHAH Versus KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION through Chairman/Managing Director or Secretary and another
Primary Law ORDER, Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)‑‑‑
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in 1999 PLP (C (PLC(CS))?

This judgment primarily cites: ORDER, Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)‑‑‑ as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case 1999 PLP (C (PLC(CS))?

The case was heard and decided by the Karachi High Court bench comprising: Mushtaq A. Memon, J.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: 1999 PLP (C (PLC(CS)) (SHAHNAWAZ SHAH Versus KARACHI ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION through Chairman/Managing Director or Secretary and another). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Laws Cited

ORDER Service Tribunals Act (LXX of 1973)‑‑‑

Headnotes / Summary

‑‑‑‑Ss. 2‑A & 6‑‑‑Civil service‑ ‑‑Abatement of proceedings‑ ‑‑Pending service matters of employees of Corporations controlled by Federal Government after insertion of S.2‑A in the Service Tribunals Act‑‑‑Effect of such insertion‑‑‑Services in Corporations controlled by the Federal Government had been declared to be service of Pakistan‑‑‑Persons holding post under such Corporation were deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of Service Tribunals Act, 1973‑‑‑Proceedings pending prior to the insertion of S.2‑A in the Act stood abated under S.6 of Service Tribunals Act, 1973. WAPDA v. Akhter Khalid 1980 SCMR 443 rel. Khushi Muhammad for Plaintiff. Mrs. Navin S. Merchant for Defendants Nos. 1 and

2. This matter has been fixed for orders on statement filed on 16‑6‑1997 to the effect that this Court has ceased to have jurisdiction to entertain this matter in view of insertion of section 2‑A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 by way of Act XVII of 1997. The newly added section 2A is as follows:‑: "2‑A. Service under certain corporations, etc. to be service of Pakistan‑‑‑Service under any authority, corporation, body or organisation established by or under a Federal law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest is hereby declared to be service of Pakistan and every person holding a post order such authority, corporation, body or organisation shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of this Act." A copy of the statement was supplied to the learned counsel for the plaintiff on 29‑9‑1997 and the objections thereto, if the plaintiff so desired, were required to be filed within three days. Today, Mr. Khushi Muhammad has appeared and has argued the matter. No objections, in reply to the statement, have been filed. The learned counsel for the plaintiff while conceding to the factual position that the defendant No. 1‑Corporation is controlled by the Federal Government and the service there under has been declared to be service of Pakistan with the result that every person holding a post under the defendant No. l‑Corporation is deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of Service Tribunals Act, 1973, contends that the present proceedings had been filed prior to the promulgation of Act XVII of 1997 and, therefore, shall not be effected by the amendment. The learned counsel was asked as to what shall be his reply as to applicability of section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, particularly in view of the rule laid down in the case of WAPDA v. Akhter Khalid 1980 SCMR

443. Mr. Khushi Muhammad simply shrugged his shoulders and did not contest applicability of the said provision to the present matter. The dictum laid down in the above referred judgment is as follows:‑‑ "In such like situations the underlying principle appears to be that when a statute is extended to a territory or class or persons who were originally not covered by it, regarding those territories and persons when a new statute is enacted ' by reference' to the original statute, the date of commencement given in the original statute is synchronized with the date on which the said statute is extended to the new territories and/or persons. Ip these cases, 'the original statute, i.e. the act was enacted on 29th September, 1973. The Water and Power Development Authority (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 whereby the Act was extended to the WAPDA employees came into force on 30th of September, 1975. Therefore, the Act would apply mutatis mutandis to the WAPDA employees on and after 30th of September, 1975. The civil appeals by the WAPDA filed before the District Court against the decrees passed by the learned trial Judge were pending before the District Court on 30th September, 1975. Therefore, they abated on the said date. That being so, the WAPDA had the right to file appeals before the Tribunal under the proviso to section 6 of the Act. Of course, the said provision, on account of natural barrier of time would apply mutatis mutandis, meaning thereby that the period of limitation would commence from the date of the abatement; namely, 30th of September, 1975. " In view of the above dictum which is applicable to the present case, the present proceedings to abate by virtue of section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. I have taken such view in the case of Nahal Rahjeed Farooqui v. P.S.O. Co. Ltd. and others (Suit No. 241 of 1997) and Shaikh Muhammad Javed v. K.E.S.C. and others (Suit No. 383 of 1997) and I do not find any justification to deviate from such view expressed by me. In the circumstances, the present proceedings abate by virtue of section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act read with Act XVII of 1997. The parties shall bear their own costs. Q.M.A./S‑166/K

Judgment & Decree

WAPDA v. Akhter Khalid 1980 SCMR 443 rel. Khushi Muhammad for Plaintiff. Mrs. Navin S. Merchant for Defendants Nos. 1 and

2. This matter has been fixed for orders on statement filed on 16‑6‑1997 to the effect that this Court has ceased to have jurisdiction to entertain this matter in view of insertion of section 2‑A in the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 by way of Act XVII of 1997. The newly added section 2A is as follows:‑: "2‑A. Service under certain corporations, etc. to be service of Pakistan‑‑‑Service under any authority, corporation, body or organisation established by or under a Federal law or which is owned or controlled by the Federal Government or in which the Federal Government has a controlling share or interest is hereby declared to be service of Pakistan and every person holding a post order such authority, corporation, body or organisation shall be deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of this Act." A copy of the statement was supplied to the learned counsel for the plaintiff on 29‑9‑1997 and the objections thereto, if the plaintiff so desired, were required to be filed within three days. Today, Mr. Khushi Muhammad has appeared and has argued the matter. No objections, in reply to the statement, have been filed. The learned counsel for the plaintiff while conceding to the factual position that the defendant No. 1‑Corporation is controlled by the Federal Government and the service there under has been declared to be service of Pakistan with the result that every person holding a post under the defendant No. l‑Corporation is deemed to be a civil servant for the purposes of Service Tribunals Act, 1973, contends that the present proceedings had been filed prior to the promulgation of Act XVII of 1997 and, therefore, shall not be effected by the amendment. The learned counsel was asked as to what shall be his reply as to applicability of section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973, particularly in view of the rule laid down in the case of WAPDA v. Akhter Khalid 1980 SCMR

443. Mr. Khushi Muhammad simply shrugged his shoulders and did not contest applicability of the said provision to the present matter. The dictum laid down in the above referred judgment is as follows:‑‑ "In such like situations the underlying principle appears to be that when a statute is extended to a territory or class or persons who were originally not covered by it, regarding those territories and persons when a new statute is enacted ' by reference' to the original statute, the date of commencement given in the original statute is synchronized with the date on which the said statute is extended to the new territories and/or persons. Ip these cases, 'the original statute, i.e. the act was enacted on 29th September, 1973. The Water and Power Development Authority (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975 whereby the Act was extended to the WAPDA employees came into force on 30th of September, 1975. Therefore, the Act would apply mutatis mutandis to the WAPDA employees on and after 30th of September, 1975. The civil appeals by the WAPDA filed before the District Court against the decrees passed by the learned trial Judge were pending before the District Court on 30th September, 1975. Therefore, they abated on the said date. That being so, the WAPDA had the right to file appeals before the Tribunal under the proviso to section 6 of the Act. Of course, the said provision, on account of natural barrier of time would apply mutatis mutandis, meaning thereby that the period of limitation would commence from the date of the abatement; namely, 30th of September, 1975. " In view of the above dictum which is applicable to the present case, the present proceedings to abate by virtue of section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. I have taken such view in the case of Nahal Rahjeed Farooqui v. P.S.O. Co. Ltd. and others (Suit No. 241 of 1997) and Shaikh Muhammad Javed v. K.E.S.C. and others (Suit No. 383 of 1997) and I do not find any justification to deviate from such view expressed by me. In the circumstances, the present proceedings abate by virtue of section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act read with Act XVII of 1997. The parties shall bear their own costs. Q.M.A./S‑166/K