P L D 1966 (W (PLP)

(3) All Civil Judges in Kalat Division. [This notification was issued on March 12, 1959 and published in the Gazette of West Pakistan Extraordinary on March 16, 1959]. (II) "No. Judi: 1-17 (4)/59-In continuation of Govern ment of West Pakistan, Home Department Notification No. H. G.-10-2/59 dated the 12th March, 1959, and in pursuance of the provisions of clause (b) of section 2 of `the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance of 1959 (West Pakistan Ordinance VI of 1959), the Governor of West Pakistan is pleased to appoint the following officers also to perform the functions of Controllers under the said Ordinance in the urban areas within the limits of their respective jurisdiction:- All Third Class Civil Judges and subordinate Judges in West Pakistan except Quetta and Kalat Divisions." [This notification was issued on October 30, 1963 and published in the Gazette of West Pakistan Extraordinary on November 6, 1963]. (III) "No. Judi: 1-17 (4)/59.-In pursuance of the provisions of clause (b) of section 2 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (West Pakistan Ordinance VI of 1959) and in super session of Government of West Pakistan, Home Department Notification No. H. G.-10-2/59, dated the 12th March, 1959 (appointing certain officers to perform the functions of Controllers under the said Ordinance), the Governor of West Pakistan is pleased to appoint the following officers to perform the functions of Controllers under the said Ordinance in the urban areas within the limits of their respective civil jurisdiction:- (i) all First and Second Class Civil Judges in West Pakistan except Kalat Division; (ii) all Qazis and Nazims (Magistrates, First Class) in Kalat Division." [This notification was issued on March 25, 1964 and published in the Gazette of West Pakistan Extraordinary on April 1, 1964]. (IV) "No: Judl. 1-17(4)/59.-In pursuance of the provisions of clause (b) of section 2 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (West Pakistan Ordinance VI of 1959) and in continuation of Government of West Pakistan, Home Department Notification No. Judi: 1-; 7(4)/59 dated the 30th October; 1963, the Governor of West Pakistan is pleased to appoint all Third Class Civil Judges in Quetta Division to perform the functions of the Controller under the said Ordinance in the urban areas within the limits of their respective jurisdiction." [This was issued on July 15, 1964 and published in the Gazette of West Pakistan Extraordinary on July 30, 1964]. (V) "No. Judl. 1-17 (4)/59.-In pursuance of the provisions of clause (b) of section 2 of the West Pakistan Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance, 1959 (West Pakistan Ordinance V1 of 1959) and in super session of Government of West Pakistan, Home Department Notification No. Judl. 1-17(4)/59, dated the 25th March, 1964 (appointing certain officers to perform the functions of Controllers under the said Ordinance), the Governor of West Pakistan is pleased to appoint the following officers to perform the functions of Controllers under the said Ordinance in the urban areas within the limits of their respective civil jurisdiction:- (i) all First and Second Class Civil Judges in West Pakistan, except Kalat Division; (ii) all Nazims (Magistrate, First Class) in Kalat Division. [This notification was issued on November 24, 1964 and published in the Gazette of West Pakistan Extraordinary on December 21, 1964].

7. It was conceded that under the second notification issued on November 30, 1963, (except in Quetta and Kalat Divisions), all Civil Judges III Class were empowered to exercise the functions of the Controllers and if that notification remained in force, then respondent No. 1 being Civil Judge III Class will be competent to exercise the powers of Controller under the Ordinance. However, learned counsel for the petitioner-company `argued that the second notification was in the nature of addendum or corrigendum to the first notification of March 12, 1963 and, therefore; the former cannot be preserved, indepen dently, on its own footing. He laid stress on the words "In continuation of" in the second notification followed by a reference to the first notification and urged, that these words left no manner of doubt that the second notification could not operate independently of the first notification and was in essence an amendment of the first notification. In substance the argument was, that the second notification upon its issuance merged in the first notification and when the first notification was superseded on March 25, 1964, by the third notification, the second notification also went over board automatically having no independent footing of its own. According to this argument, the result was, that with the issuance of the third notification on March 25, 1964, only the First and Second Class Civil Judges could validly exercise the powers of Controllers within their respective jurisdictions in the province other than Kalat Division. Petitioner's learned counsel also pressed in service the doctrine of implied repeal and contended that the third notification impliedly superseded the second notification for it covered the whole province anew, for the relevant purpose.

8. We have carefully considered the argument of the petitioner's learned counsel, but it seems us to be devoid of substance. On its plain reading, the only change, the third notification in the series was intended to bring about was- (i) to place Quetta Division at par with the rest of the Province (other than Kalat Division) except as respects the powers of III Class Civil Judges; and (ii) to replace all Civil Judges in Kalat Division by Qazis and Nazims. The fourth- notification abolished even the limited distinction between Quetta and the rest of the Province (other than Kalat Division) as respects the appointment of III Class Civil Judges. It may be, that the draftsman could have adopted a less drastic process than the wholesale super session of the first notification to achieve the above objects underlying the third notification but on no discoverable principle, can the third notification .be read so as to supersede the second notification. The notification sought to be superseded, was superseded expressly with reference to its number and date and such particularization will ex facie exclude any other notification not so named.

9. It is cardinal principle of interpretation of statute (which equally extends to statutory notifications) that repeal of a earlier statute by implication is not to be presumed on the coming into force of a later statute, unless the provisions of the later statute are so repugnant to the earlier statute that the two cannot stand together. In such an event the earlier statute stands impliedly repealed by the later. Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant. It was not contended that the second and the third notifications are so repugnant to each other that they cannot stand together. The first notification empowered all First and Second Class Civil Judges and Subordinate Judges in West Pakistan except in Quetta and Kalat Divisions to perform the functions of Controllers. The second notification empowered all "3rd Class Civil Judges and Subordinate Judges in West Pakistan except in Quetta and Kalat Divisions to perform the functions of Controllers. The appointments under, the second notification were plainly in addition to and not in derogation of the appointments made under the first notification. In essence the first and the second were to parallel notifications which remained in operation in juxtaposition to each other. Moreover, there is no warrant for the suggestion, that the second notification was in the nature of an amendment to the first notification, so that after engrafting amendment, it could not survive the first notification so as to continue in opera tion independently. The expression "In continuation of the context in which it is used" plainly means "in addition to". According to Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Edition), the word "continuation" means "the action of continuing; perserverance, continued existence or operation, the causing of anything to continue." Had the intention been to make the second notification merely addendum or corrigendum to the first notifica tion, then the appropriate expression to use would have been "In modification of" and not "In continuation of". As observed already, the fact that the third notification supersedes the first notification with reference to its number and its date cannot be explained upon any hypothesis other than this that the intention was to supersede the first notification only: had the intention been to supersede the second notification then the draftsman ought have referred to the second notification also by its number or date or at any rate, suffixed the words "as amended" after a reference to the first notification. Therefore, both on account of the phraseology employed in the third notification and absence of any repugnancy between the second and the third notifications, the second notification continues to be in operation unimpaired by the third notification.

10. Apart from the above comparative examination of the various notifications, it is firmly established principle that repeal) by implication is not to be favoured. A statute ought not to e be held to be repealed by implication without some strong reasons and unless such a result becomes inevitable. (c.f. Maxwell on Interpretation of Statute 1962 Edition page 162.) There are no such compulsive circumstances in the instant case; therefore, there is no reason, whatever, to hold that the third notification while expressly superseding the first notification also superseded by implication the second notification. Nay: the continued operation of the second notification eminently fits in the scheme of things in the relevant field, namely, that except as respects Kalat Division (where Nazims, i.e., Magistrate First Class are invested with the powers of Controllers) all First, Second and Third Class Civil and Subordinate Judges are invested with the powers of Controllers. This result cannot be achieved unless the second notification is treated to be in operation.

11. There is yet another very significant circumstance which should set at rest all lurking doubts on the point. When we turn to the fourth notification (by which all Third Class Civil Judges in Quetta Division were also empowered to perform the functions of Controllers in that Division), we find that this notification is expressly issued "In continuation of Government of West Pakistan, Home Department's Notification No. Judl.-1-17(4)/59, dated the 30th October, 1963", that is to say the second notification (which had earlier invested all Third Class Civil and Subordinate Judges in other divisions not being Quetta and Kalat with similar powers). From the fourth notification it becomes manifest that the second notification had survived the issuance of the third notification: else there was no occasion for its reference in the fourth notification. In the face of the wording of the fourth notification also, it is otiose to contend that the second notification was also superseded by the third notification, by implication.

12. Learned counsel for respondent No. 2 urged wit some vehemence, that apart from the merits of the case, the petitioner-company by reasons of its vexatious conduct was disentitled to, what after all was, a discretionary relief under Article 98 of the Constitution. It was stressed that while the petitioner-company has instituted multiple proceedings to frustrate the order of its ejectment from the premises in suit, it had not paid a penny towards rent since December 1963, which had now accumulated, to about Rs. 25,

000. There is force in the contention. Since, however, the petitioner company's main claim fails on merits, we do not consider it necessary to record a definitive finding on this aspect of the matter.

13. For the aforesaid reasons, we have reached the conclu sion that the second notification by which all 3rd Class Civil and Subordinate Judges in West Pakistan except in Quetta and Kalat Divisions, were empowered to perform the functions of Controllers, continues to be in full force and operation. The writ petition, therefore, fails and the same is dismissed with costs. K. B. A. Petition dismissed.