1991 PLP 798 (PLC)

2. Aggrieved by the termination of her services, the petitioner served a notice upon respondent No. 1 under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969; but no heed was paid by the respondent to this notice.

3. The petitioner thus in order to seek the redress of her grievance, filed an application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 before the Punjab Labour Court No. 9 at Multan, which was accepted, vide judgment dated 31-1-1988.

4. Aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the respondent No. 1 took an appeal before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore (respondent No.2) and vide judgment dated 24-5-1988, the case was remanded to the Labour Court to determine, as to whether section 1(3) (f) of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 was attracted; and that what was the status of the respondent No.l; was it a commercial or industrial establishment. In remand, the evidence was recorded, and once again, the petition was allowed, and the petitioner was reinstated in service with back benefits, vide order dated 29-1-1990:

5. Respondent No.l took up an appeal against the aforesaid order before the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore, and the said Court held, that the Labour Court had no jurisdiction in the matter, inasmuch as, the petitioner was not a workman, because respondent No. 1 was a charitable organization, and was not a commercial or industrial establishment, so as to attract the applicability of the provisions of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969.

6. To assail the aforesaid order dated 26-3-1990, this writ petition has been filed. I have heard both the parties at length. In support of his contentions, the learned counsel for the respondent No.l has relied upon the judgment reported as Holy Family Hospital Society v. Third Sindh Labour Court, Karachi and another PLD 1979 Kar.

529. In the similar circumstances, as is the case of the respondent, the Sindh High Court held, that Holy Family Hospital was a charitable organisation, and was not engaged in any commercial activities, and the profits are not made for distribution between the directors or members of the society. Hospital was neither commercial nor industrial establishment, therefore, its employee was not covered by the definition of the workman under the Standing Orders Ordinance, and therefore, the employee could not move application under section 25-A of the Industrial Relations Ordinance, consequently, the reinstatement of the employee, as ordered by the Labour Court, was held to be without lawful authority and jurisdiction, and thus, the same was set aside.

7. Similarly, in an other case reported as the Project Manager, Pakistan Mineral Development Corporation and Gola Khel Collieries District Mianwali v. Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal, Lahore and two others 1986 P L C 521, it was held that the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance were not applicable to the hospital, and thus, in exercise of the constitutional jurisdiction, this Court also set aside the order passed by the Labour Appellate Tribunal.

8. In order to prove its case, another case was referred, PLD 1976 Lahore 1097 KG Old Principal Christian Technical Centre v. The Presiding Officer, Punjab Labour Court (Northern Zone) and 6 others and Mrs. Nasim Sadiq v. Sindh Labour Appellate Tribunal and others 1984 P L C 1679 was also relied upon in support of his contention. In all these cases, it was held that the provisions of Industrial Relations Ordinance were not applicable to the hospitals.

9. To satisfy myself, as to the character of respondent No.l, I made a probe, and it came to light, that Women's Christian Hospital, Multan is a society registered under the Societies Act, 1860. This hospital is a charitable organization, and is being run on non-profit basis. The petitioner had remained absent from her duty in an unauthorized manner for about 21 days, and therefore, her services were terminated.

10. I have gone through the Memorandum of Association, which clearly shows, that it has been established as a charitable organization for orphanages, schools and training centres etc. and it provides relief to the poor and needy irrespective of caste, colour or creed, and to promote and carry on the delivery of health care by establishing and maintaining hospitals and clinics, or by rendering other medical assistance. In para 5 of the Memorandum, it has been further incorporated, that the income of the society howsoever derived shall be applied solely for the purpose of the business and objects of the society as set out in the Memorandum of Association and no portion thereof shall be paid or transferred directly by way of profit to the members of the society.

11. Clause 8 of the Memorandum of the Association also provides that all moneys and properties, movable and immovable, that the society shall purchase, derive, inherit or receive in any form shall vest in the society, and neither the Managing Board, nor the Secretary nor Treasurer shall be entitled to alienate or encumber in any way or manner the aforesaid properties and assets unless the society or Managing Board decides otherwise.

12. There are plethora of judgments in support of the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent, which I need not cite. The upshot of the above discussion is, that the contention of the learned counsel for the respondent No.l has force, that the hospital is a charitable organization, and not a commercial or industrial establishment, so as to attract the provisions of Standing Orders Ordinance or the Industrial Relations Ordinance. In this view of the matter, the judgment delivered by the Punjab Labour Appellate Tribunal dated 26-3-1990 has been delivered with lawful authority and jurisdiction, and is in accord with the correct state of law, and therefore, no exception can be taken thereto. Consequently, this petition is dismissed.

13. During the pendency of this writ petition, purely on human ground, this asked the Administrator, Women's christen hospital Multan that without prejudice to the legal decision, was it possible to provide a job to the petitioner. In response thereto, respondent, No.1 expressed his willingness to provide the job to the petitioner; accordingly, she was appointed as a fresh recruit, which was a laudable and noble part from respondent No.l. M.Y.H./S-903/L Appeal dismissed.