1976 PLP 473 (PLC)

3. The application was resisted by the Management. A preliminary objection was taken that the application was not maintainable in view of the settlement arrived at between the parties on 17th April 1975 with regard to the same dispute. In this connection it was alleged that the Union had served a communication under section 26 (1), I. R. O. on 14th March 1975 and joint meetings were held on 15th March 1975, 25th March 1975 and 15th April 1975, and finally on 17th April 1975 a settlement was reached and it was signed by the parties except the General Secretary who though had agreed but avoided to sign the settlement. This settlement bears the signatures of the President, Vice-President, Joint Secretary and seven members of the Managing Committee. There remained the Secretary and two members, Khyber Zaman and Makhan Khan, who had not signed it as they remained absent at the time of the signing of the settlement. The copies of the settle ment were sent to the Director Labour, Assistant Director Labour, Labour Secretary, Government of Sind and Ministry of Labour, Government of Pakis tan. It was further alleged that the settlement was approved by the Mana gement on 17th June 1975 and ratified by the General Body on 1st July 1975. Not only this but the settlement was acted upon and in pursuance of the settlement all the workers except the General Secretary received the bonus acknowledging the settlement. There were 64 workers in the employment and out of them 63 received the bonus.

4. Since the genuineness of the very settlement was disputed the evi dence was tendered by both the parties. The Management submitted the affidavits of the President and Joint Secretary of the Union besides the affidavits of the officers of the company. The President as well as Joint Secretary supported the Management so far their affidavits go but when they were cross-examined they turned hostile and gave a complete go-by and denied that any settlement was arrived at. On the other hand, the General Secre tary filed an affidavit and he was cross-examined. He too disputed the settlement.

5. On the assessment of evidence the learned Labour Court rejected the preliminary objection by holding that the settlement was not signed by the Union 4$ it was never approved in any meeting and, therefore, it was not binding on the Union. With regard to the payment of bonus it was observed that it was really astonishing that the Management hastened to get a declaration signed from the workers in the garb of payment of some amount without waiting for the decision on the question of settlement and this indicated that there was something fishy and could not be approved. It was further observed that in any case it was merely an agreement and not a settlement and therefore, it was binding only on the persons who, had actually signed the agreement.

6. According by this, the present appeal had teen filed. A preliminary objection had been taken on behalf of the Union that the appeal was not maintainable on the ground that the impugned decision of the Labour Court did not amount to an Award.

7. According to section 37 of I. R. O. an appeal can be filed by a part aggrieved lay an award. Now the question that arises for consideration is whether the order of the Labour Court amounts to an award. The term 'Award' has been defined by section 2 (ii) of the I. R. O. and it reads as under :- "Award" means the determination by a Labour Court Arbitrator or Appellate Tribunal of any industrial dispute or any matter relating thereto and includes an interim award." Thus it is clear that not only the determination of an industrial dispute is an Award but even any matter relating to the industrial dispute is also covered by the aforesaid term, apart from the extension of the definition to an interim award. There is no dispute that the industrial dispute was not decided. It also cannot be said to be an interim award as none of the remands was determined. This leaves us with the expression, "any matter relating thereto". In order to appreciate the term, it is necessary to refer to the definition of the term industrial dispute , which reads as under:-- "'Industrial Dispute' means any dispute or difference between employees and employers or between employers and workmen or between work men and workmen, which is concerned with the employment or no employment or the terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person." The aforesaid definition covers three classes of dispute connected with (i) employment cr non-employment, (ii) terms of employment and (iii) conditions of work. Thus the expression "any matter relating thereto" must be restricted to any of these three classes. It cannot be extended to every order passed by a Labour Court. This, a decision, in order to be called an award presupposes the application of the mind of the Presiding Office: of the Labour Court to the submission made by the parties with regard the controversy touching the questions of employment or non-employment or terms of employment or the conditions of the work of the workmen. The term 'award' has no other reference, which will empower this Tribunal to entertain the appeal.

8. In this connection, following observations made by the Supreme Court in the case of Province of West Pakistan v. Moharram Ali (P L D 1970 S C 292) are noteworthy:- "Phrase 'any matter relating thereto' in this definition is to be read 'ejusdem generis' with the words 'industrial dispute' to cover only controversies with regard to employment or non-employment or terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person .............. .. It is clear, therefore, that the award intended by subsection (2) or subsection (2-B) is the one which culminates after the initiation of proceedings.",

9. Indeed, their Lordships were dealing with the order of the Labour Court extending the terms of the operation of an award but the implication of the phrase, any matter relating thereto' has been aptly clarified and the controversy with regard to its interpretation has been set at rest. So, the rule laid down by the Supreme Court provides the necessary guidance in all those cases in which the question depending upon the aforesaid phrase arises for consideration.

10. Turning to the impugned decision, it is clear that it does not amount to an award within the meaning of the term as defined by section 2 (ii), I. R. O. The controversy, which has been decided by the Labour Court, is in respect of an alleged settlement. It was contended on behalf of the Mana gement that a settlement had been reached in accordance with law and it was still in force and operation, therefore, no industrial dispute covering the same demands could be raised by the Union or entertained by the Labour Court. On the other hand it was disputed on behalf of the Union that there was any such settlement. It was this controversy which was disposed of by the Labour Court. The dispute with regard to employment, or non-employment or terms of employment or the conditions of the work of workmen were not adjudicated or determined. The Labour Court merely held that there was no valid settlement.

11. It has, however, been urged that the settlement itself covered the main dispute. Indeed, it is so but the existence or non-existence of a settle ment is not the controversy of the nature contemplated by the aforesaid phrase. There is a clear distinction between the controversy over the opera tion of a settlement and the controversy with regard to the employment, non-employment or terms of employment or the conditions of work of any person. It is not possible to extend the meaning of the aforesaid phrase to the controversy agitated in the present case.

12. In the circumstances I hold that the appeal is not maintainable. In view of this finding, it is not necessary to deal with the factual aspect of the case but it will be open to the appellant to agitate this on the final determination of the main dispute.

13. In the result the appeal is dismissed.