PLC(CS) 1988

word 'Organisation' as used in section 2(e) of the Act should be read to give colour of those terms which precede or follow it (PLP)

KARAM CERAMIC PRIVATE (Ltd.) Versus FAKIR MUHAMMAD

Jurisdiction / Court
Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Decided Date
Appeal No.KAR‑376 of 1987, decided on 2nd February, 1988.
Honorable Judges
Ali Nawaz Budhani, Appellate Tribunal
Case Reference Summary (AEO Optimized)
Citation word 'Organisation' as used in section 2(e) of the Act should be read to give colour of those terms which precede or follow it (PLP)
Forum / Court Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind
Bench Members Ali Nawaz Budhani, Appellate Tribunal
Parties KARAM CERAMIC PRIVATE (Ltd.) Versus FAKIR MUHAMMAD
💡 Quick Legal QA & Summary / سوال و جواب خلاصہ
Q1: What are the key laws and sections cited in word 'Organisation' as used in section 2(e) of the Act should be read to give colour of those terms which precede or follow it (PLP)?

This judgment primarily cites: statutory provisions as referenced in Pakistani case law index.

Q2: Which judicial bench decided the case word 'Organisation' as used in section 2(e) of the Act should be read to give colour of those terms which precede or follow it (PLP)?

The case was heard and decided by the Labour Appellate Tribunal Sind bench comprising: Ali Nawaz Budhani, Appellate Tribunal.

Q3: What is the official citation format for this judgment on Pakistan Law Portal?

Cite this legal precedent as: word 'Organisation' as used in section 2(e) of the Act should be read to give colour of those terms which precede or follow it (PLP) (KARAM CERAMIC PRIVATE (Ltd.) Versus FAKIR MUHAMMAD). Read the full summary and cross-referenced laws free on Pakistan Law Portal.

Representation

  • Mahmood Abdul Ghani for Appellant.
  • Khalilur Rehman for Respondent.
  • Date of hearing: 2nd February, 1988
  • 5. I have heard Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani, the learned Advocate for the appellant management and Mr. Khalilur Rehman, the learned representative on behalf of the respondent and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case as well as the written arguments submitted by both the parties. It was argued on behalf of the appellant management that in the present case, the learned Labour Court which had passed the impugned order had no jurisdiction in view of the fact that the factory where the respondent was working was not situated within the territorial limits of that Court, therefore, the impugned order is without authority. In the present case, the dismissal order of the respondent was not issued by the factory Manager, but, it was issued by the Head Office which was situated within the area of the learned Labour Court passing the impugned order. In support of this legal objections, Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani, the learned Advocate for the appellant establishment has relied upon 1974 P L C 194 at page 198 and a decision of this Tribunal in Appeal No.KAR‑89/87, dated 29‑11‑1987. On the other hand, Mr. Khalilur Rehman, the learned representative for the respondent has vehemently argued that as the order of dismissal of the respondent was exclusively issued by the Head Office, situated at Clifton, Karachi and not from the Factory Manager where the respondent was working and this factory was situated within the limits of Labour Court No.l, therefore, in this matter, both the Labour Courts have concurrent jurisdiction. In support of his arguments, Mr. Khalilur Rehman has relied upon the cases reported in 1983 P L C at page 119, 1985 P L C 662 and 1988 Y L C 746. After perusal of these cases and considering the, facts and circumstances of the present appeal, I see much force in the arguments of Mr. Khalilur Rehman, the learned representative for the respondent and would hold that the findings of the learned Labour Court on this point are quite correct and need not to be interfered with. The authorities relied upon by Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani, the learned Advocate for the appellant management are distinguishable and not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present appeal.
  • 6. As regards the merits of the present appeal, it was argued by the learned Advocate for the appellant establishment that the charge of gross misconduct had been fully established without any doubt, in the lawfully and properly held domestic enquiry in which not only evidence of both the parties were fully recorded and opportunity to defend was also accorded to the respondent in compliance with the required principle of natural justice, therefore; the learned Labour Court was not justified to sit in appeal over the findings of the Enquiry Officer. As, the impugned order is well reasoned and very much logical on this point, therefore, I find nothing wrong with it to interfere, hence, the contentions of the appellant management) have no force. On the other hand, Mr. Khalilur Rehman, the learned representative for the respondent has submitted that as the first enquiry officer viz. Ansar Ahmad Khan had himself admitted that the respondent was involved in a false and concocted case of gross misconduct, vide his application to the Labour Directorate, dated 19‑3‑1986, Annexure A‑19, therefore, he was removed from the, employment by the appellant management and another enquiry officer,' namely, Shamim Ahmed was appointed to complete rest of the enquiry proceedings who, admittedly is an eye‑witness to the alleged incident. It was further argued that neither the complainant nor the enquiry officer was produced by the appellant management before the learned C Labour Court to enable the respondent to cross‑examine these witnesses to ascertain the truth. I see much force in these contentions. An eye‑witness cannot be either an enquiry officer or a Judge against, an alleged charge of misconduct. The proceedings which were partly', conducted by Ansar Ahmad Khan cannot be taken into consideration to determine the charge of misconduct in view of the facts that. during the enquiry proceedings he had himself realized that they respondent had been involved in a false case. The correct procedure,' for the appellant management should have been that it must have appointed an independent enquiry officer to conduct the enquiry afresh. The entire evidence against the respondent is, therefore, doubtful and as such the benefit should go in favour of the accused. I, therefore, hold that the appellant management had no case against the respondent, hence, his dismissal from service cannot be sustained, 1 thus, it is set aside.

Headnotes / Summary

(a) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑S. 35‑‑Territorial jurisdiction, Labour Court‑‑Head Office of factory from where dismissal order of worker was issued located at one place and factory where worker had been working located at another place‑ Labour Courts at both the said places, held, had territorial jurisdiction in the matter. (b) Industrial Relations Ordinance (XXIII of 1969)‑‑ ‑‑‑Ss.25‑A & 38(3)‑‑Reinstatement‑‑Worker dismissed from service on ground that he was instrumental in collecting other workers, leading them to office of factory manager, raising slogans and used abusive language against him‑‑First Enquiry Officer who admitted and realised that worker was involved in a false and concocted case of gross misconduct, was removed from employment by appellant management‑ Other enquiry officer who completed enquiry was eye‑witness to alleged incident against worker and could not either be an enquiry officer or a judge against alleged charge of misconduct‑‑Independent enquiry officer not appointed by management to conduct inquiry‑‑Entire evidence against worker doubtful‑‑Order of reinstatement passed by Labour Court maintained in circumstances.

Judgment & Decree

Mahmood Abdul Ghani for Appellant. Khalilur Rehman for Respondent. Date of hearing: 2nd February, 1988 This is an appeal filed by the appellants against an impugned order, dated 25‑10‑1987, passed by the Sind Labour Court No.V, Karachi, who had allowed the grievance petition of the respondent under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969, directing his reinstatement in service with full back benefits.

2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that the respondent claimed to be a permanent workman of the appellant establishment and that on 27‑1‑1986, he was issued a charge‑sheet that on 23‑1‑1986, he was alleged to have collected the workers of Casting Department and led a procession to the office of the factory manager raising slogans and using abusive language against him. The respondent claimed that though he had submitted a satisfactory reply to this charge‑sheet which was not found satisfactory therefore, one Ansar Ahmed Khan, Personnel Officer was appointed to conduct a domestic enquiry against him, but, he was not supplied with a copy of the alleged complaint. Further, it was claimed that as the enquiry officer was not fair and impartial and had partly conducted an enquiry against him, therefore, he lodged a protest to the management that he had no faith in him so another enquiry officer be appointed. Thus, a new enquiry officer was appointed who had conducted the rest of the enquiry, resulting in his dismissal from service, vide order, dated 14‑8‑1986. The respondent, therefore, claimed to have served grievance notice upon the appellant management followed by a grievance petition under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1969 before the learned Labour Court.

3. The appellant management resisted the petition on the grounds that the allegations levelled in the grievance notice or in the grievance petition were false and that neither any partial enquiry was conducted nor he was victimized for his alleged trade union activities, but, in fact, he was found guilty of the misconduct in a properly and lawfully held enquiry resulting in his dismissal from service, therefore, he teas not entitled to maintain his grievance petition, which was liable to be dismissed.

4. Both the parties filed their respective affidavits‑in‑evidence and they were duly cross‑examined. Thereafter, the learned Labour Court had passed the impugned order, hence, the present appeal.

5. I have heard Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani, the learned Advocate for the appellant management and Mr. Khalilur Rehman, the learned representative on behalf of the respondent and have also carefully perused the record and proceedings of the case as well as the written arguments submitted by both the parties. It was argued on behalf of the appellant management that in the present case, the learned Labour Court which had passed the impugned order had no jurisdiction in view of the fact that the factory where the respondent was working was not situated within the territorial limits of that Court, therefore, the impugned order is without authority. In the present case, the dismissal order of the respondent was not issued by the factory Manager, but, it was issued by the Head Office which was situated within the area of the learned Labour Court passing the impugned order. In support of this legal objections, Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani, the learned Advocate for the appellant establishment has relied upon 1974 P L C 194 at page 198 and a decision of this Tribunal in Appeal No.KAR‑89/87, dated 29‑11‑1987. On the other hand, Mr. Khalilur Rehman, the learned representative for the respondent has vehemently argued that as the order of dismissal of the respondent was exclusively issued by the Head Office, situated at Clifton, Karachi and not from the Factory Manager where the respondent was working and this factory was situated within the limits of Labour Court No.l, therefore, in this matter, both the Labour Courts have concurrent jurisdiction. In support of his arguments, Mr. Khalilur Rehman has relied upon the cases reported in 1983 P L C at page 119, 1985 P L C 662 and 1988 Y L C

746. After perusal of these cases and considering the, facts and circumstances of the present appeal, I see much force in the arguments of Mr. Khalilur Rehman, the learned representative for the respondent and would hold that the findings of the learned Labour Court on this point are quite correct and need not to be interfered with. The authorities relied upon by Mr. Mahmood A. Ghani, the learned Advocate for the appellant management are distinguishable and not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the present appeal.

6. As regards the merits of the present appeal, it was argued by the learned Advocate for the appellant establishment that the charge of gross misconduct had been fully established without any doubt, in the lawfully and properly held domestic enquiry in which not only evidence of both the parties were fully recorded and opportunity to defend was also accorded to the respondent in compliance with the required principle of natural justice, therefore; the learned Labour Court was not justified to sit in appeal over the findings of the Enquiry Officer. As, the impugned order is well reasoned and very much logical on this point, therefore, I find nothing wrong with it to interfere, hence, the contentions of the appellant management) have no force. On the other hand, Mr. Khalilur Rehman, the learned representative for the respondent has submitted that as the first enquiry officer viz. Ansar Ahmad Khan had himself admitted that the respondent was involved in a false and concocted case of gross misconduct, vide his application to the Labour Directorate, dated 19‑3‑1986, Annexure A‑19, therefore, he was removed from the, employment by the appellant management and another enquiry officer,' namely, Shamim Ahmed was appointed to complete rest of the enquiry proceedings who, admittedly is an eye‑witness to the alleged incident. It was further argued that neither the complainant nor the enquiry officer was produced by the appellant management before the learned C Labour Court to enable the respondent to cross‑examine these witnesses to ascertain the truth. I see much force in these contentions. An eye‑witness cannot be either an enquiry officer or a Judge against, an alleged charge of misconduct. The proceedings which were partly', conducted by Ansar Ahmad Khan cannot be taken into consideration to determine the charge of misconduct in view of the facts that. during the enquiry proceedings he had himself realized that they respondent had been involved in a false case. The correct procedure,' for the appellant management should have been that it must have appointed an independent enquiry officer to conduct the enquiry afresh. The entire evidence against the respondent is, therefore, doubtful and as such the benefit should go in favour of the accused. I, therefore, hold that the appellant management had no case against the respondent, hence, his dismissal from service cannot be sustained, 1 thus, it is set aside.

7. For the reasons discussed by me above, I see no reason to interfere with the impugned order and would maintain the same. The present appeal is accordingly dismissed. The respondent is directed to be reinstated in service with full back benefits. The amount of back benefits already deposited by the appellant management before this Tribunal be paid to the respondent immediately after proper verification. M.Y.H./1195/Lb.S?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? Appeal dismissed.