1988 PLP 364 (PLC)

Date of hearing: 18th August, 1987. These are two separate suo motu revision applications under section 38(3‑a), I. R.0 1969 filed by the applicant against two separate impugned orders initiating criminal proceedings by the learned Presiding Officer, Sind Labour Court No. VI, Hyderabad, in the proceedings under section 25‑A (8) of I.R.O. 1969. As the facts and the legal points involved in both these revision applications are common and similar, therefore, I would also decide them by this single decision.

2. Brief facts of the case are that both the respondents were permanently employed in the applicant's mills and that on 28‑5‑1985 at about 1.30 A.M. a sudden fire broke out in the Winding and Twisting sections as well as at Yarn godowns resulting into a total loss and damage of the machinery including the yarn. That in view of the cause beyond the control of the applicant, no manufacturing process could be carried out, consequently, the mill had to be stopped and the services of the workers were dispensed with in accordance with the provisions of Standing Order 11 read with 12 of the Standing Orders Ordinance, 1968. Therefore, for these reasons the services of both the respondents were also terminated. The applicant further claimed that despite the full knowledge of the fact, the respondents had filed their respective grievance petitions under section 25‑A, I.R.O. 1979, before the learned Labour Court No. VI, Hyderabad who vide his order, dated 29‑5‑1986 had reinstated both these respondents in service with back benefits. The order of the learned Labour Court in each case, is as under: "The Respondent has been served but did not choose to contest it. Its Accountant appeared and submitted application that the dues of applicant shall be paid after the restart of the mill. The termination is, however, not disputed. Accordingly, the application of the applicant is allowed and he is directed to be re‑instated with back benefits as prayed." It was further claimed by the applicant that after re‑instatement of the respondents, their services were again terminated vide letter, dated 3‑6‑1968 on account of the fact that since breaking out of the fire in the mills, it had not yet commenced its operation for the causes beyond the control and these letters were attempted to be delivered personally to the respondents on the same date, but, as they refused to take delivery therefore, they were pasted at the gate of the mill. The case of the applicant was that a mala fide intention and to harass the applicant, the respondents had filed criminal complaints under section 25-A (8), I.R.O.1979 against the applicant and the learner Labour Court had taken cognizance of the allegations of non- compliance of the re-instatement order of the respondents, dated 29-5-1986 and thus summons had been served upon the applicant for his appearance. The applicant further claimed that the action of the learned Labour court was quite illegal and improper as in accordance with the law , such complaint can only be filed by the Labour Court in case of non‑compliance of its order and that the learned Labour Court cannot initiate criminal proceedings on a complaint filed by a worker, if such order of the Labour Court does not specify any period. The applicant, therefore, submitted that in view of the mandatory provisions of subsection (9) of section 25‑A, I. R.O. 1969, the learned Labour Court had usurped the jurisdictional powers, thus, the issuance of the summons against the applicant was without jurisdiction, incompetent, invalid and of no legal effect, hence, the criminal proceedings initiated against the applicant by the learned Labour Court be quashed and dismissed, as having been void ab anitio and suffer from an illegality patent on the face of the record.

3. Both these revision petitions were admitted and registered on 10‑11‑1986 and Notices were issued to the respondents for hearing on 8‑12‑1986, but neither the respondents nor anyone else on their behalf had appeared before this Tribunal. Today, the respondents are again absent and no intimation is sent by them. However, I have heard Mr. Muhammad Humayoon the learned Advocate for the applicant at length. I have also carefully considered the factual and legal aspects of the present revision petitions. The legal position is that the contentions of Mr. Muhammad Humayoon, the learned Advocate for the applicant must prevail. The action of the learned Labour Court initiating criminal proceeding under section 25‑A (8), I.R.O. 1969 against the applicant is set aside and quashed accordingly. However, Mr. Muhammad Humayoon, the learned Advocate for the applicant has very correctly relied upon a case reported in 1981 PLC at page 663, in support of 'his arguments; wherein it was held as under: Re‑instatement order passed by Labour Appellate Tribunal containing no specific period for giving effect thereto was not complied with. Ors complaint of the workmen the Officers of the Establishment respondent side therefore. were prosecuted by the Labour Court and convicted. It was argued that since no period was specified in the order the matter fell within the scope of clause (b) of section 25‑A (9) of Industrial Relations Ordinance, 1969 and no criminal proceedings could have been initiated save upon the complaint of the Labour Appellate Tribunal i.e. which passed the order and since no complaint was filed by the Tribunal the taking of cognizance by the Labour Court on the complaint of the workmen was invalid. The plea was accepted by the Labour Appellate Tribunal in appeal. Held: A bare reading of clauses (a) and (b) of subsection (9) of section 25‑A of the Ordinance makes it clear that whereas clause (a) is applicable to cases where the period for the compliance of the order of the Labour Court or the Tribunal is specified in the order itself, clause (b) applies to cases where an order or decision of the Labour Court or the Tribunal is not complied with at all. The difference in the, phraseology of the two clauses is significant and cannot be ignored. No doubt, it is provided in subsection (8) of section 25‑A, that if a decision or order of a Labour Court or Tribunal, which does not specify the period within which it is to be given effect to or complied with, is not complied with within a week, the defaulter is liable to be punished, but the said subsection merely states the ingredients of or the acts which constitute the offence, but it cannot be read as. indicating that were a decision or order of the Tribunal or a Labour Court does not specify the period for its compliance, the period is to be considered as 7 days, and that further the said period is to be presumed to be specified in the order itself. If such had in fact been the intention of the legislature, not only the wording of the 2 clauses would have been different but possibly clause (b) would become largely redundant. In fact, the real intention of the legislature appears to be that where the period within which an order 'or decision of the Labour Court or the Tribunal is to be complied with is not specified in the order itself, it should not be left open to the complainant to initiate criminal proceedings against the defaulter, but the proceedings should be initiated solely on the complaint of the Tribunal or the Court itself. Of course the scope of clause (b) of subsection (9) of section 25‑A is not restricted to such cases only, for there may be cases where there has been non‑compliance with the order of the Labour Court, although the period for complying with the order is specified in the order itself. In such cases, presumably, if the Court considers it appropriate, it could file a complaint against the defaulter under the provisions of clause (b) of subsection (9), though the complainant may not have filed any complaint.

4. For the reasons stated by me above, I would allow both these suo motu revision applications and would immediately quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the applicant. Orders accordingly. A. E. /1090/Lb.S Revisions allowed.