1997 PLP 871 (SCMR)

"(a) That the impugned judgment cannot at all be considered as judgment in accordance with law, as the analysis part is confined in paragraph 14 consisting of only eight lines. The contentions of the petitioners were no[ dealt with in accordance with law. (b) That the alternation of conviction from section 304, Part I, P.P.C.. to section 302, P.P.C. of Sahab Khan and Saif Ali petitioners was against the facts of the case and not in accordance with law. (c) That the findings of the Honourable trial Court that 'the occurrence did not take place in the manner as alleged by the prosecution was not dealt with nor controverted by reasoning, which resulted in grave miscarriage of justice. (d) That the trial Court in convicting the petitioners and the learned High Court in upholding their convictions as well as converting the conviction from section 304, Part I, P.P.C. to section 302, P.P.C. of Saheb Khan and Saif Ali had not acted in accordance with the weight of reliable evidence and in doing so had not passed their findings on the facts and the circumstances, which did not establish the guilt of petitioners beyond all reasonable doubts. (e) That the witnesses were interested and closely related inter‑se with the deceased and inimical too. (f) That there was no corroboration worthwhile to such an interested evidence. (g) That the medical evidence completely belied the ocular account. (h) That the prosecution evidence was materially discrepant and full of improbabilities. The injuries suffered by the petitioners' party were completely suppressed and prosecution version on the face of it was improbable and there was possibility of defence version being true. (i) That the intricate questions of law and facts were overlooked. (j) That the impugned judgment has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice. " The learned counsel has argued the above points before us which were raised and argued by him before the High Court. According to him, it is apparent from the impugned judgment that these points were not taken into account by the High Court. Be that as it may, we are of the view that the mandatory provisions of section 367, Cr.P.C., have not been followed in deciding these appeals. Section 367, Cr.P.C., reads as follows:‑‑‑ "(1) Every such judgment shall, except as otherwise expressly provided by this Code, be written by the Presiding Officer of the Court (or from the dictation of such Presiding Officer) in the language of the Court, or in English; and shall contain the point or points for determination, the decision, thereon and the reasons for the decision; and shall be dated and signed by the Presiding Officer in open Court at the time of pronouncing it (and where it is not written by the Presiding Officer with his own hand, every page of such judgment shall be signed by him). (2) It shall specify by offence (if any) of which and the section of the Pakistan Penal Code or other law under which, the accused is convicted, and the punishment to which he is sentenced. (3) When the conviction is under the Pakistan Penal Code and it is doubtful under which of two sections, or under which of two parts of the same section, of that Code, the offence falls, the Court shall distinctly express the same, and pass judgment in the alternative. (4) If it be a judgment of acquittal, it shall state the offence of which the accused is acquitted and direct that he be set at liberty. (5) If the accused is convicted of any offence punishable with death, the Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, the Court shall in its judgment state the reason why sentence of death was not passed. (6) For the purposes of this section, an order under section 118 or section 123, subsection (3) shall be deemed to be a judgment." Without going into the merits and demerits of the case of the parties, we hold the view that criminal appeals referred to above were not decided in the light of afore‑noted statutory provisions. They shall, therefore, be deemed to be still pending adjudication. Needless to state that at the appellate stage, whole original case stands reopened for its hearing and decision in accordance with law. Such‑like appeals cannot be decided summarily without analytically discussing the evidence‑ on record. The appeals of the parties were required to have been decided in accordance with the evidence. This could not be done for no obvious legal reasons. The learned counsel has attempted to argue that both the appeals may be heard and decided on merits by this Court to do substantial justice between the parties. We cannot substitute our opinion/decision with the one, which is still to be given by the High Court on the basis of evidence available on record. On 4‑2‑1997, following short order was passed:‑‑‑ "For reasons to be recorded later, we set aside the impugned judgment in both these appeals for the reason that the impugned judgment does not contain evaluation of evidence and discussion in the manner it should be and also does not assign reasons for arriving at the conclusion as required under section 367, Cr.P.C. We, therefore. remand the case to the High Court for fresh hearing of both the appeals strictly according to law and fresh judgment in the light of what is stated above. Since this matter is old, it will be appreciated if the same is disposed of finally within three months from now." These are the reasons in support of our order referred to above, With the above observations, the appeals succeed and are allowed. N.H.Q./S‑1089/S Case remanded.