1984 PLP (C (PLC(CS))

A. G. Humayun, District Attorney for Respondents. MALIK ZAWWAR HUSSAIN (MEMBER).‑ Rana Muhammad Anwar ex‑Sub‑Inspector No. L./103, District Police Lines, Lahore has filed this appeal under section 4 of the Punjab Service Tribunal Act, 19 74, in which he has impleaded the Deputy Inspector‑General of Police, Punjab, Lahore and the Superintendent of Police, City Division, Lahore as respondents.'

2. By virtue of this appeal he has prayed that the impugned order dated 9th October, 1982 passed by the respondent No. 2 be set aside and he may be re‑instated into service with all back benefits.

3. Brief facts of the case are that while the appellant was working as S.H. O. Police Station Tibbi City, a case F. I. R. No. 13, dated 24th February, 1982 under section 5 (2) 47, P. C. A. was registered at Police Station A. C: E., Lahore against him on the allegation that he had acquired huge immovable property. It was quite disproportionate to his known sources of income. Consequently a case was also registered by the Anti‑Corruption Establishment, Lahore. The Superintendent of Police, City Division, Lahore served a show‑cause notice under the Punjab Police (E & D) Rules, 1975 calling upon him to show cause as to why the major penalty including dismissal from the service be not imposed upon him on the aforesaid allegation. The appellant submitted reply to the show‑cause notice and was heard in person by the Superintendent of Police, City Division, Lahore on 9th October, 1982. The Superintendent of Police was not satisfied with the explanation given by the appellant and dismissed the appellant w.e.f. 9th October, 1982 vide order, dated 9th October, 1982. The appellant filed an appeal to the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Lahore Range, Lahore on 26:h October, 1982. The Deputy Inspector‑General of Police, Lahore Range, Lahore has not decided the appeal within the statutory period of 90 days. So, the appellant filed the present appeal within the next 30 days. Hence the present appeal.

4. We have heard the learned counsel for the appellant as well as the learned District Attorney on behalf of the respondents.

5. It has been argued on behalf of the appellant that the Superinten dent of Police, City Division, Lahore without recording any evidence or holding a regular enquiry had concluded that the appellant acquired property disproportionate to his known sources of income. It has further been argued that the case was registered by the Anti‑Corruption Establish ment. The case was sent up for trial before the Senior Special Judge, Anti‑Corruption, Punjab, Lahore and the appellant has been acquitted honourably vide judgment dated 1st November, 1983. Thus, it has been submitted that the allegations of acquiring the property disproportionate to the known source of income have not been proved against the appellant. It has lastly been argued that the Superintendent of Police, respondent No. 2, has not exercised the discretion to dispense with the regular enquiry in a judicial manner and thus the appellant was dismissed by him, arbit rarily, without proving the allegations. The dismissal order passed by him is not based on the facts and is also unlawful.

6. On the other band it has been argued on behalf of the respondents by the learned District Attorney that the judgment of the learned Senior Special Judge, Anti‑Corruption, Punjab, Lahore is not relevant for the purpose of disposal of this appeal. It has further been argued that there was sufficient material on the file to dispense with the enquiry as the allegations stood proved against the appellant. Thus, be has concluded that the order of dismissal from service passed by the Superintendent of Police, City Division, Lahore is a valid, correct and lawful order.

7. We have given our anxious thoughts to the arguments of the parties and have perused the record of this case carefully. We find that while passing the impugned order the Superintendent of Police, City Division, Lahore has taken the note of the facts that the criminal case was registered against the appellant and it was decided by the Anti‑Corruption Committee No. III to challan the appellant. The Superintendent of Police, has based his order only on this fact alone without enquiry into the details of the allegations himself. He also did not appoint any Enquiry Officer to conduct an enquiry into the matter. The nature of the allegations in this case were such that it was incumbent upon the Superintendent of Police to hold a regular enquiry to prove the charges against the appellant. As such we hold that the Superintendent of Police has committed a grave illegality by dispensing with the appointment of an Enquiry Officer, which has caused grave miscarriage of justice to the appellant. We have also perused carefully the judgment, dated 1st November, 1983 passed by the Senior Special Judge, Anti‑Corruption, Punjab, Lahore. During the trial against the accused, the prosecution produced a number of witnesses and the accused (now appellant) had also produced defence witnesses. After discussing the entire evidences, the learned Senior Special Judge, Anti‑Corruption, Punjab, Lahore has held that the prosecution have failed to prove that the funds for purchase of the property said to be illegally acquired in the name of his brothers by the appellant were supplied by the appellant. There was overwhelming evidence on record that both his brothers had been leading independent life and they have their own sources of income. The learned Senior Special Judge has thus held that the appellant was only supposed to account for two properties i.e. a house in Shahdara Town and Agricultural land acquired by the appellant in his own name and in the name of his son in village Kaloke. The value of these two properties was a sum of Rs. 994 and Rs. 43,600 respectively. The appellant was able to show that he has earned an income of Rs. 1,30,

700. Thus, the learned Senior Special Judge, Anti‑Corruption, Punjab, Lahore has concluded in para. 15 of the judgment that the appellant was to account for an amount of Rs. 43,600 but his income was far higher than the property purchased by him. Thus, he has concluded that the acquisition of the property by the appellant was not disproportionate to the known sources of his income and he held the appellant not guilty. The analysis of the well‑considered judgment of the learned Senior Special Judge clearly reveals that the appellant was acquitted after perusal of the entire evidence and was not let off merely on the benefits of doubt.

8. In view of the above detailed analysis of the case, we accept the appeal and set aside the impugned order having no effect at all. The appellant is directed to be re‑instated in service from the date of his suspension with all back benefits. There will be no order as to costs. A. E. Appeal accepted.