P L D 1956 Karachi 418 (PLP)

Section 7 confers rule‑making power upon the Central Government in the following words :‑‑ " The Central Government may frame such rules as it con siders necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act." Rule 15 (3) says :‑ "A Tribunal shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, power and authority, in accordance with the same procedure and practice, in respect of contempt of itself as a High Court." The question arises whether the conferment of the jurisdiction, power and authority to punish for contempt carries out the purposes of the Act. One must consider the provisions of the Act to ascertain its purposes. Section 3 of the Act aims ultimately at disqualifying certain persons from holding public and representative offices who have been found guilty by the Federal Court or a High Court or a Tribunal, of misconduct in any matter relating to any of the specified offices held by them. The section contemplates a judicial inquiry because the finding is to be by the Federal Court or a High Court or a Tribunal consisting of two or more High Court judges and the liability to disqualification arises only upon a finding of guilt by the Federal Court, a High Court or a Tribunal. That being so, it is a purpose of the Act to provide for a judicial inquiry into the allegations of misconduct against any person coming under it, to prescribe the procedure to be followed in the inquiry and to confer the power to do things as are ancilliary to the completion of the inquiry, and arriving at a finding. The legislature was aware that the Federal Court as also a High Court each being a Court of Record had inherent power to punish for contempt of itself. That one class of contempt for which it punished was the publication of matter which had the object or tendency of depriving the Court of the power or opportunity to administer justice duly, impartially and with reference solely to the matters judicially brought before it, free from prejudice and prepossession and that there was another class of contempt which consisted of obstruction of or interference with proceedings or processes of the Court. The legislature also knew that the inherent power to punish for contempt was a necessary aid to the holding and completion of a free, fair and just inquiry by the Federal Court or a High Court and it would be unreasonable to think that the legislature did not think in the same terms in respect of an inquiry before a Tribunal. We therefore, think that the conferment of the jurisdiction, power and authority upon g Tribunal to punish for contempt of itself under Rule 15 (3) carries out the purposes of the Act. By its terms all that section 7 requires is shall be necessary to carry out the purposes of and there is no objective or other test prescribed so that there is no room for the judicial examination of sufficiency of grounds on which the rule may be considered necessary. Whether the rule is necessary is a matter for the considera tion of the Central Government, and the relevant opinion is that of the Central Government. The result is that if the rule is within the power and not beyond it, the Court must find it valid. It is said that the rule creates offences and permits punishment by arrest of the person or seizure of property, that they can be created and permitted by the legislature only and that the legislature cannot delegate its power to legislate in these respects to an external authority such as the Central Government. That the legislature contemplated the confer ment by rules of power of arrest and seizure is indicated by the consideration that the Tribunal would need power to compel attendance of witnesses and production of documents and things, without which the Tribunal could not reasonably be expected to function effectively. In the context of this case the contention implies that even if the conferment of the jurisdiction, power and authority to punish for contempt were within the purposes of the Act, the legislature could not delegate to an external authority the power to confer them, but must do so itself. This is tantamount to saying that the legislature has no power of delegation in relation to matters necessary to carry out the purposes of its own Act. We are not aware of any authority for such a wide proposition. It is well‑settled that regulations and rules when within the powers, may create offences and provide for their punish ment and the instances which come readily to mind are those under the Defence of the Realm Act, 1914, in England and the Defence of India Act in this subcontinent. For the consideration of the present case the decision of the House of Lords in Rex v. Halliday (L R (1917) A C 260 = 116 L T R 417), which arose under the Defence of the Realm Act, 1914, is appropriate. Even on a question of taxation, the legislature may dele gate the power to levy a duty to an external authority as the Privy Council has held in Powell v. Apollo Candle Co:, (L R (1884‑85) 10 A C 282 at 291) and in George Walkem Shannon v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board (L R (1938) A C 708 at 722 = A I R 1939 P C 36 at 39). These cases are relevant because arrest and seizure are involved in the collection of taxes. We hold that Rule 15 (3) of the Public and Representative Offices (Disqualification) Rules, 1950, is intra vires and dismiss the application under section 491, Criminal P. C. K. B. A. Application dismissed.