P L D 1974 Karachi 140 (PLP)

Further to that the Workmen's Compensation Act provides for payment of compensation whereas the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance, nowhere speaks of any compensation for injury. It speaks of gratuity. It does speak of "benefit" and "grant" but not of "compensation". In that context it would have to be seen whether the purposes of two enactments are similar and if these are not similar, then the question of any inconsistency in regard to the matter with which two enactments deal would not arise at all. In the same context I may also refer to the beneficiaries under the two enactments. Under section 2(1) (d) of the Workmen's Compensation Act "dependent" has been defined. On the other hand section 2(6) of the Social Security Ordinance also defines "dependent". There is a marked difference between these two definitions. The Workmen's. Compensation Act defines "dependent" as a person who is either a widow or minor legitimate son and unmarried daughter or widowed mother and also several other persons who are related to the deceased. The Social Security Ordinance limits the definition of "dependent" to wife or wives or a needy invalid husband and any unmarried children under the age of sixteen years dependent upon the secured person. This would clearly show that the beneficiaries under the two enactments are different. There is still another marked difference in the two enactments. Under the Workmen's Compensa tion Act, compensation has to be paid by the employer to the employee if he is alive or to the dependents of the employee if he is dead. Under the Social Security Ordinance a fund has to be created and distributed by virtue of section 2(5). This fund has to be contributed by money payable by an employer and as the law stood before 1972, when the subsection (5) of section 2 was amended, even the employee had to make a contribution to the creation of this ‑ fund. Moreover, in Chapter V entitled "benefits" what Social Security Ordinance contemplates are sickness benefits, maternity benefit, death grant, medical care during sickness and maternity, injury benefits, disablement pension, disablement gratuity, and survivor's pension. It does not at all speak of compensation on account of bodily injuries or death that a workman may suffer while he is employed in the course of his duties to the employer. The Social Security Ordinance does not mention "compensation" as‑being payable to the dependents of a person who dies in the course of his employment. Section 37 of the Ordinance however, speaks of a "death grant" being payable. This section reads as follows: --‑ "Death grant.‑On the death of a secured person receiving or entitled to receive injury benefits, sickness benefit or medical care at the time of his death, the surviving widow, widows or needy widower, or if there be no surviving widow, widows or needy widower, the person who provided for the funeral, shall, subject to regulations, be entitled' to a death grant equal to the daily rate of sickness benefit multiplied by thirty, but in no case less than five hundred rupees." On a plain reading of this provision it would appear that if a secured ‑‑person "receiving or entitled to receive" injury or sickness benefit at the time of his death dies, a sum equivalent to 30 times the sickness benefit as stated in section 36 of the Ordinance will be payable to surviving widow, widows or needy widower, and in case there is no widow to the person providing funeral, "Sickness benefit" according to Schedule appended in section 35 of the Ordinance is payable at 50 % of the daily Wages. Since "death grant" is to be equivalent to "daily rate of sickness multiplied by thirty'' the death grant will be equal to 15 days' wage only, and that in this case would amount to about Rs. 80 since the deceased workman was earning a daily wage of Rs. 5.50. This provision in my view is designed to provide funeral expenses rather than compensation. Firstly section 37 does not speak of compensation and secondly it does not speak of "dependents" as in the Workmen's Compensation Act, and secondly if compensation on account of the death of a workman was contemplated by section 37 of the Ordinance, it would be most unreasonable to assume that in case of absence of widow the same would be payable to the person providing funeral expenses. One can visualise a case when a workman' dies leaving young children. In that case it would be absurd to conclude that "death grant" if it were a substitute for "compensation" as mentioned in Workmen's Compensation Act, should be payable to the person providing funeral rather than the dependent children of the deceased workman. I cannot persuade myself to interpret "death grant" to be a substitute for "compensation" so as to conclude that section 81 of the Social Security Ordinance has repealed any such provision of the Workmen's Compensation Act providing for payment of compensation. Furthermore, I am of the view that section 37 of the Social Security Ordi nance comes into operation only if a secured person dies after falling sick or after receiving injury. The plain words are that he should be receiving or be entitled to receive injury benefit or sickness benefit. A person would be entitled to receive injury benefit for the days "excluding the first 3 days after receiving the injury" so that if a person dies instantaneously he could not be entitled to any death grant for the simple reason that he could not be considered to be receiving or entitled to receive any injury benefit, clearly for such reason it would appear that the concept of "death grant" is widely different from "Compensation". In my view section 37 of the Ordinance is designed only to provide for funeral expenses. I may here state that section 8(4) of the Workmen's Compensation Act makes a provision in regard to the payment of funeral expenses. It is possible that section 81 of the Social Security Ordinance may be deemed to imply a repeal of section 8(4) of the Workmen's Compensation Act but it is not necessary to consider the point any further because it is not directly or indirectly in issue in the present case. I have however, no doubt whatsoever that the provisions of section 4 or 10 of the Workmen's Compensation Act or Schedule IV of the said Act is not impliedly repealed by virtue of section 81 of the Social Security Ordinance. I may however, state that what is the exact meaning of "inconsistency". The word "inconsistent" has come up for definition by the Supreme Court of Pakistan. In the case of Chittaranjan Cotton Mills Ltd. v. Staff Union (P L D 1971 S C 197) Hamoodur Rahman, C. J. considered the impact of the two words inconsistent and incompatible as compared with dissimilar. His Lordship was pleased to express his opinion in the following words: "The provisions of the two statutes are, in my opinion, not only dissimilar but also inconsistent and incompatible. It is true that mere dis similarity may not be enough to establish incompatibility in substance and in spirit, and not merely in form." In my humble opinion if the purposes of the two enactments are dissimilar and of different import, no question of inconsistency can arise unless there be some provisions which are commonly dealt with and the two enactments contain different provisions in that context. As I have stated above while the Workmen's Compensation Act speaks of compensation, the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance speaks only of "Death grant" and "gratuity". The two concepts are entirely different. In my view section 37 of the Ordinance has provided some additional benefits but not created any inconsistent provision.

5. The word "compensation" has been defined in various dictionaries. A definition that was accepted by Anwarul Haq, J. in the case of Land Acquisition Collector v. Abdul Aziz (P L D 1965 Lah. 327) was the definition given in the Oxford Dictionary. The definition was counter‑balancing, rendering equivalent, requittal, weighing one thing against another." In Chamber's Dictionary the word compensation is defined as "an act of compensation, making amends for the loss sustained, "Webster's Dictionary has given a definition of the word "compensation" as applicable to cases of labour and the definition is "amount received by workman or his dependent for claims under Workmen's Compensation Act". On the other hand there are definitions of the word "grant". I anti referring to these definitions because the Social Security Ordinance speaks of grant. Chamber's Dictionary defines grant‑

"bestowing, something bestowed, an allowance, a gift and conveyance of property by deed." The Oxford Dictionary again defines `grant' and this definition is a general definition, not reliable to case‑law on workmen, but all the same the definition is: --‑ "To agree, consent; to assent to the request of; to accede to, consent to fulfill a request, prayer, wish etc. to allow or concede as an indulgence; to permit or suffer a person to have something; to bestow or confer as a favour or in answer to a request."

6. The Social Security Ordinance also speaks of gratuity and pension. Gratuity by its very connotation means a sort of bounty and not something, which is acquired as a matter of right. Pension once again is widely different from compensation. It may be termed to be a reward for the e services done or things done by an employee for the employer for which he wishes to give some sort of compensation. But by no stretch of interpreta tion "gratuity" and "pension" can be considered to be synonym or equivalent for "compensation".

7. On a consideration of the various reasons I find that the purposes of the two enactments are different, the beneficiaries under the two enactments are different, the manner of raising funds for. payment to beneficiaries are and in the context of the present circumstances, the appellant who different is the mother of the deceased will be deprived of her right in case interpretation that is sought to be placed by the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation in this case is accepted. After all Workmen's Compensation Act is beneficial enactment and has to be given effect in a manner as would advance the purpose of it the purpose of the Workmen's Compensation Act is to compensate the worker or his dependents, in case the worker dies, on account of the loss of support that the dependents got from the worker if he is alive.

8. I am therefore, clearly of the view that although the provisions may, be dissimilar in certain respects the provisions in. so far as they relate to the present case viz. compensation to the present appellant who is the mother of the deceased workman, there is no inconsistency so as to be a bail by reason of section 81 of the West Pakistan Employees' Social Security Ordinance.

9. Under these circumstances I allow this appeal and remand this to the Commissioner for Workmen's Compensation who shall reopen the case and give decision in the light of the facts and circumstances of the case. Since this matter has involved discussion only on point of law I order the parties to bear their own costs. S.A.H. Appeal allowed.