P (PLP)

(2) that the landlords required the premises for their own use as they had extended their business of grading pure ghee at the instance and with the assistance of Government and they had ‑to fit up an ,installation and chemical laboratory. The Controller held that the rent in dispute had been duly tendered and not accepted but that even if it had not been tendered, he would not exercise his discretion against the tenants for a month's default. (Actually, the default was for two months). He also held that although the petitioners genuinely required the premises for their own business, he could not grant them any relief under section 13,3) (a) of the Urban Rent Restriction Act of 1949 as the landlords were occupying another shop in the same urban area for the purpose of their business. In appeal the learned Additional District Judge of Lahore reversed these findings. He disbelieved the evidence relating to the tender or offer of rent and held that no such tender or offer had been made. He pointed out that although section 13 (2) gave him a discretion to direct or not to direct the ejectment of the tenant where there had been a default in the payment of rent, he thought it a fit case for the exercise of discretion in favour of the landlords (1) They had incurred great expense over the extension of their business and were even paying a large sum of money as the salary of an officer appointed by the Government for supervising their work, (2) the landlords being the owners of the building, the Court, should, if possible, sympathize with them and should not deprive them of the use of the building ,pit the time of their own need; and (3) if the tenants seek to take advantage of technicalities, they should not be permitted to prevent the landlords from similarly taking advantage of technicalities. As regards the' second point., the Additional District judge held that although the landlords were occupying another shop in the same urban area, it was not "such building" within the meaning of section 13, subsection (3; (a), clause (ii), sub‑clause (b), as was required for their business and that consequently on this ground also the tenants should be ejected. From this order the tenants have come in revision and a preliminary objection has been taken that a petition in revision is not competent. The finding of the Additional District Judge that rent for October and November 1948 was not tendered or offered, is one of fact and cannot clearly be questioned in revision. The only thing now left is whether the discretion which the language of section 13, subsection (2) gives to the Controller, has been proper. ly exercised by the Additional District judge, and, if not so exercised, a Court of revision can interfere with it. It was held in N. S. Venkatagiri Ayyanger v. The Hindu Religious Endowments Board, Madras (A. I. R. 1949 Penal Code 156) that section 115 Civil Procedure Code "empowers the High Court to satisfy itself upon three matters: (a) That the order of the subordinate Court is within its jurisdiction; (b) that the case is one in which the Court ought to exercise jurisdiction; and (c) that in exercising jurisdiction the Court has not acted illegally that is, in breach of some provision of law, or with material irregularity, that is, by committing some error of procedure in the course of the trial which is material in that it may have affected the ultimate decision. If the High Court is satisfied upon those matters, it has no power to interfere because it differs, however profoundly, from the conclusions of the subordi nate Court upon questions of fact or law". . The learned counsel for the petitioners argued that in appre ciating the evidence the Additional District judge had violated the principles of natural justice and further that in exercising his discretion improperly, he had acted with material irregularity. It was pointed out that the tenants' case being that rent for October and November 1948 had been tendered to Saleh Muhammad, one of the landlords, the non‑production of Saleh Muhammad in evi dence to deny this assertion and the production instead of Muhammad Siddique, the other landlord, was an act which should prejudice the case of the landlords The learned Additional District judge accepted the explanation of the landlords that it was merely by an oversight that Muhammad Siddique and not Saleh Muhammad had been produced. Now, in the first place, it cannot be said that any principle of natural justice was violated in the acceptance of this explanation, but even if that were so, the violation of any such principle amounts neither to an illegal exercise of jurisdiction nor an exercise of it with material irregularity, for it involves neither a breach of some provision of law nor the com mission of some error of procedure. As regards the exercise of discretion, the main reason given by the learned Additional District judge, which impelled him to act in favour of the landlords, is that they have incurred considerable expense for the extension of their business in which they have been assisted by Government and for which purpose they are paying the salary of a Government Expert, and that appears to me to be a very good reason even if the other two reasons are ignored. But were, again, of discretion is not the same thing as the exercise of jurisdiction, far less an exercise of it illegally or with material irregularity. The learned Additional District judge had jurisdiction to in ejecting the tenants and he exercised it. In the exercise of that jurisdiction he violated neither any provision of law nor any rule of procedure. The argument, therefore, that be used his discretion in a manner contrary to that in which the Controller had‑used it, does not arise, though it may be pointed out that the Controller having once held that rent had been tendered to the landlords, left no room for the exercise of any discretion and his observation, therefore that even if the rent in question had not been tendered, he would have exercised his discretion in favour of the tenants and would not have ejected them, does not amount to an actual exercise of discretion. The argument that the object of the Urban Rent Restriction Act, as stated in the preamble. being to restrict ejectment of tenants, the Additional District judge was not exercising his discretion properly in sympathizing with the landlords, falls to the ground for the same reason. As I am satisfied that the learned Additional District judge has exercised a jurisdiction which is vested in him by law and that in the exercise of that jurisdiction he has violated neither any provision of law nor a rule of procedure, I find no case for revision under section 115 Civil Procedure Code and dismiss this petition with costs. The petitioner is allowed two more months to vacate the premises. A. H. Petition dismissed.