2000 PLP 831 (CLC)

The learned Additional District Judge, out of the pleadings,. framed the following issues:‑‑ (1) Whether the respondents Nos. l and 2 have served notice upon the applicants before acquiring the land as provided under Law Acquisition Act? (2) Whether the procedure under the Land Acquisition Act has been adopted by the respondents Nos. l to 2 before taking possession of the land? (3) Whether compensation fixed by the respondents is arbitrary and not according to market value of the property? (4) What was market value of the property at the time of acquiring land in question? (5) Whether any notice under section 12 of Land Acquisition was served by the applicants, if so, what it's affect? (6) What should the order be? The parties led their evidence and ultimately the claim' of respondents was accepted in a reference and award passed by appellant No. l Assistant Commissioner/Land Acquisition Officer, Shahdadkot, was modified in the terms stated above on 19‑6‑1998. This judgment is called in question by the appellants in this first civil appeal. At the very outset, the learned counsel for appellants was asked to satisfy the Court on the point of Limitation, as the appeal was obviously time‑barred. The impugned judgment was passed on 19‑6‑1998, in presence of Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Gul Muhammad Jarwar and the appeal ryas preferred after nine months. For the first time, the application for obtaining cope of impugned judgment was moved on 4‑11‑1998. The time limitation of ninety days fn, filing an appeal had already expired. The copy of impugned judgment was delivered on 17‑11‑1998 and the appeal was presented before this Court on 15‑3‑1999. If the grace time is allowed and it is calculated from the receipt of impugned judgment, then in that event, the appellants were required to file appeal on 17th February, 1999. The appeal is still barred by 18 days, if the time is calculated as stated above. The counsel for the appellants has no explanation for it, The learned counsel for the appellants has moved an application under section 5 of Limitation Act supported by an affidavit of one Ghazenfar Ali, the Executive Engineer, Public Health Engineering Department, Division No.2 Larkana. Nowhere in the affidavit, it is stated that when they got the knowledge of impunged judgment and there is no explanation whatsoever as to why the appeal was not preferred in time after the copy obtained on 17‑11‑1998. The contention of learned counsel that the appellants had no knowledge of impugned judgment, has no force as the judgment was announced in presence .of Assistant Government Pleader. The learned counsel has only stated that it takes time for the Government to get sanction and face the lengthy procedure for filing the appeal. This can hardly be the reason to condone the delay, which has created substantive right in favour of the respondents. The Government cannot claim to be treated in any manner differently from an ordinary litigant nor it can be granted the facilities other A than the ordinary litigants. The reference in that context could be made to l a case of Project Director, Dara Khan Bridge Project, D.I. Khan v. The l Land Acquisition, D.I. Khan and 205 others PLD 1998 Peshawar 21, wherein, their Lordships have held as under:‑‑ ... The cause mentioned by the appellant/applicant does not seem to be well‑founded. In the instant case sanction was granted by the Provincial Government on 27‑11‑1991 much earlier than filing of the instant appeal and within the stipulated period fixed for appeal. Thus, the reason given for condonation is not well‑founded, satisfactory and legal. The judgments referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioner are in different circumstances and on different footings. In both the cited judgments the delay caused by the carelessness of the State officials was condoned for the reason that the officials held liable for negligence and carelessness were proceeded departmentally but in the instant case the sanction was duly granted before the expiry of period of limitation and no action or proceedings have been taken against the defaulting officials. It was observed in case "Government of Balochistan v. Abdul Nabi" reported in 1988 SCMR 1906 that under the law each day of limitation must properly and satisfactorily be explained and the excuse that the matter got delayed because of its having remained under examination at different levels is never a valid ground for extension of period of limitation and does not constitute a sufficient ground for condonation of delay. It was observed that the Government departments so organize their business that legal cases are not unnecessarily delayed and are instituted In Court within the time limit for such matters. It was observed in case Commissioner of Income Tax v. Raees Pir Ahmad Khan reported in 1981 SCMR 37 that: 'Government cannot claim to be treated in any manner differently from an ordinary litigant. In fact the Government enjoys unusual facilities for the preparation and conduct of their cases and its resources are much larger than those possessed by ordinary litigants. If in spite of these facilities, the Government cannot comply with the requirements of law of limitation then it is for it to take steps to have that law changed'. " Reference can also be made to a case of Punjab Province v Muhammad Akhtar & Co. 1995 CLC 351. ‑ Nowhere in the memo. of appeal, the application under section 5 of Limitation Act and the affidavit in support thereof, it has been stated that the delay was due to obtaining sanction from Government. It appears that the Government functionaries were unnecessarily careless, negligent and deliberately delayed the filing of appeal even after obtaining the copy of 8 impugned judgment, for which, the learned counsel has no reply. For the foregoing reasons, since the appeal was filed beyond the prescribed period of limitation and no cogent reason has been given for condonation of delay, the appeal is hereby dismissed in limine being barred by time. Q.M.H./M.A.K./A‑368/K Appeal dismissed,